On the eve of the second round of the 1996 Russian presidential election, two employees of Yeltsin's election headquarters were detained while trying to take more than half a million dollars from the Government House building. What was it, a provocation or ordinary theft of public funds?
Background
In the 1996 elections, Yeltsin found himself in a difficult position. Considering the likely possibility of communists coming to power, the head of the presidential guard, Alexander Korzhakov, FSB director Mikhail Barsukov and Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Soskovets persuaded him to cancel the elections, suspend the constitution and ban the Communist Party of the Russian Federation. The oligarchs, on the contrary, persistently advised Yeltsin to go to the polls, promising to do everything to win.
They say that Yeltsin was ready to follow the advice of the security forces and, in fact, introduce a state of emergency in the country. However, Anatoly Chubais, through the president’s daughter Tatyana Dyachenko, dissuaded the current head of state from taking a rash step. Now the fate of the elections was in the hands of the triumvirate: Berezovsky - Gusinsky - Chubais.
Political technologies coupled with oligarchic capital have done their job. In the first round of the presidential elections, held on June 16, Boris Yeltsin defeated Gennady Zyuganov with 35% of the votes, who received 32%. However, a second round was required to determine the winner.
Strange box
On the evening of June 19, 1996, employees of the Security Service of the President of the Russian Federation detained two members of Yeltsin's election headquarters - Arkady Evstafiev and Sergei Lisovsky. The first was a close associate of Chubais, and the second was the organizer of a campaign in support of Yeltsin’s candidacy involving Russian pop stars.
The reason for the detention was 538 thousand US dollars in cash in a box of Xerox paper, which Lisovsky and Evstafiev tried to take out of the Government House building. Later, Tatyana Dyachenko explained this episode this way: “Korzhakov was responsible for control over all the finances of the election campaign. Therefore, he carefully watched how Lisovsky, as well as many others, dozens of times received money in Xerox boxes, in boxes of writing paper, in other boxes, in cases, in whatever it was convenient to carry the money and pay.” .
Korzhakov himself noted that this time the money from Yeltsin’s election headquarters turned out to be unaccounted for, and he, as a responsible person, could not allow the theft of these funds by “activists.” According to him, the security service has repeatedly received reports of the theft of election campaign funds.
Immediately after the detention of the “activists,” Chubais held a press conference where he criticized Korzhakov and Barsukov, accusing them of fraud and the desire to usurp power. He called the “box of money” “one of the elements of the traditional KGB Soviet provocation.”
Exceeded authority
Yeltsin's daughter Tatyana Dyachenko comes into action again and asks Korzhakov and Barsukov to release the detainees. Chubais behaves more harshly: “We need to explain the situation to Messrs. Korzhakov and Barsukov: either they behave like human beings, or we will imprison them. Either they shut up or I’ll put you in jail, absolutely unambiguously.” According to Dyachenko and Chubais, the development of the scandal was in the hands of the security forces, which could mean one thing: the end of the elections.
Soon, under pressure from the press and thanks to calls from the Kremlin, Lisovsky and Evstafiev were released. On June 20, 1996, a meeting of the Security Council of the Russian Federation took place. At it, Yeltsin accused Mikhail Barsukov and Alexander Korzhakov of “exceeding their powers” and removed them from their positions.
Literally two days after his resignation, Korzhakov wrote a letter to Yeltsin, in which he indicated that his (the president’s) decision was wrong, counterproductive and extremely destructive for Boris Nikolayevich himself, since it gave a free hand to the man “whom the whole country hates” - Chubais.
Addressee unknown
They decided to conduct their investigation of the high-profile events at the editorial office of the magazine “Faces”. It was noted that after talking with the detainees Lisovsky and Evstafiev, the presidential security service found out where the money was taken from. It turned out to be from the office of the deputy head of the foreign loans department. An employee of an unnamed bank, Boris Lavrov, was in the room, although Oleg Lurie, a columnist for the newspaper “Top Secret,” claimed that Lavrov worked at the National Reserve Bank.
Lavrov stated that in March 1996 he became part of the control and accounting group of the headquarters for the election campaign of Boris Yeltsin. On the morning of June 19, he met with Deputy Minister of Finance German Kuznetsov, who asked him to transfer money to Evstafiev.
Then everything goes according to plan. Evstafiev and Lisovsky, who arrived in the evening, packed the money into a box, after which the latter left a receipt confirming receipt of half a million dollars. The meeting, according to Lavrov, lasted several minutes. He did not know who the final recipient of the dollar parcel was.
It is noteworthy that during the secret opening of the safe of Deputy Minister of Finance German Kuznetsov, which followed the interrogation, the Security Service on the night of June 19, 1996, according to Korzhakov, discovered another 1.5 million US dollars.
The fight between two camps
Boris Yeltsin in his book “Presidential Marathon” explains the detention of activists of his election headquarters and their subsequent accusation of embezzlement of money by Korzhakov’s desire to “settle personal scores with political opponents.”
State Security Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Litvinenko, who died in 2006 in London as a result of polonium poisoning under strange circumstances, called the money scandal “the first battle of a big war between oligarchs and security officers.” He noted that the further course of events confirmed this, turning, in essence, into a confrontation between “people in uniform and people with deep wallets.”
Political scientists note that the triumvirate of Berezovsky, Gusinsky and Chubais has something to be proud of. They emerged victorious from this struggle, simultaneously “crushing” the Russian communists. True, in the near future, disagreements and civil strife will play a cruel joke on the oligarchs.
The story itself “with the Xerox box” showed that the 1996 election campaign, from a legal point of view, leaves many questions. In particular, the investigation initiated by Korzhakov revealed that the pre-election expenses of the Yeltsin team were several times higher than the permissible level established by law.
As is known, the sources for the formation of the Kremlin’s “election fund” were money from leading bankers and entrepreneurs. Budget funds were also used for these purposes. But since the withdrawal of treasury funds was not provided for by law, the money went first to the oligarchs, and then the “laundered” ones were returned to the election headquarters. It is possible that the “money in the Xerox box” had to travel exactly this way.
One of the key members of Yeltsin's election headquarters, Arkady Evstafiev, remembers 1996
"I've never carried a Xerox box."
How Chubais and Korzhakov fought, whether there were “carousels” in 1996, and what Zyuganov would have done if he had won, one of the key members of Yeltsin’s election headquarters, Arkady Evstafiev, tells Gazeta.Ru.
The presidential election campaign was new for us, although we already had significant experience in conducting PR campaigns on a national scale. At one time we already had to deal with unusual, new things - the process of privatization.
We carried out not only a large advertising campaign, but also a huge amount of work related to PR: it was necessary to explain to people the essence of privatization, how to behave various options. The work was not easy; we had to do everything for the first time and in difficult circumstances. The Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR did not want to pass laws that would make privatization convenient for everyone. By the way, it was the Supreme Council that insisted on the issuance of privatization checks - “vouchers”.
By that time, I had knowledge of how American and European PR specialists work. Now they say they also took part in the campaign. But a huge share of the work was done by Russians.
I remember well Yeltsin’s personal participation in the campaign, when he went on stage, the posters “Vote with your heart”, “Vote or lose”. These were beautiful and bright ideas, and they were implemented with high quality.
I was invited to work at the headquarters by Anatoly Chubais when it became obvious that the other heads of the headquarters - [Alexander] Korzhakov, [Oleg] Soskovets - did everything according to Soviet patterns. They carried out orders, and all this resembled pure party activity, while no one guaranteed the result.
There was no obvious conflict between the Chubais and Korzhakov groups, just a completely different vision of the country’s development paths.
The members of our team, which worked under the leadership of Chubais, were like-minded people and ideologically supported Yeltsin. In very difficult conditions, he laid the foundations of democracy, freedom and development of the country. Literally pulled her out of the quagmire of obscurantism and degradation.
Now thinking people sometimes they are contemptuously called “creaks”, “hamsters”, but it was under Yeltsin that a generation of thinking people was born who strive to rely on their own strengths and do not want to live in the gray paradigm of paternalism, hoping for a state that will give them everything.
Thanks to Yeltsin, people appeared who can be critical of themselves and their actions. Accordingly, they are critical and demanding of power.
The 1996 presidential election was truly competitive, the level of competition was incredibly high. Such concepts as “stuffing” and “carousel” were completely absent. Some governor could speak for Zyuganov, someone for Boris Nikolayevich, there was no order of votes.
Society was incredibly divided and the presidential campaign was difficult. We must remember what 1996 was like: the average oil price was $20, the budget was empty, many people felt that there would be no food tomorrow.
During the campaign, my tasks included, among other things, negotiations with representatives of the public. Every day calls were made, sometimes incredible offers were made. We met many people - mobile communications were not so widespread at that time. It was a terrible job from morning to night, and the proposals were very different: from quite sensible ones to the proposal to use space aliens in the campaign...
I am often asked about the notorious “copier box,” and my position has not changed in 20 years: I have never carried this box. I don't know where she came from. If I knew, I forgot.
When everything happened, the box was on the floor, and one of the armed men demanded that [Sergei] Lisovsky take this box and carry it. I told him: “Don’t you dare touch.” They took the box themselves and carried it to the security room. I asked them to fingerprint her, but they didn't. It is difficult to suspect them of such unprofessionalism. This was definitely a provocation on their part; headquarters never hid anything from them. There is a saying: the “Cheburashka effect” has worked - I hear everything, I understand nothing.
The purpose of this provocation, I believe, was to discredit that part of the election headquarters that worked under the leadership of Chubais. They couldn’t interfere, but they launched a “duck” that is still “flying” across various media outlets.
But despite these troubles, I am glad that I worked at the headquarters, and would not hesitate to go there again. Recently Sergei Lisovsky called me and congratulated me on the 20th anniversary of those events, we laughed and remembered our joint work.
Then, however, we had no time to laugh, we understood that if we defeated the Zyuganovs, we would not expect mercy. And today I do not agree with Chubais, who says that we can return to Sovietism, but we cannot return to communism.
I wonder why educated adults have such a short historical memory. Sometimes it seems to me that this is a legacy of the deceitful Soviet period, when everyone said “yes” in public, but “no” in the kitchen, and this left its mark on psychology. It seems that a general psychosis has begun in the country, when everything is easily changed. Many of today's politicians, even of the highest rank, consider it almost their duty to criticize the “dashing nineties.”
But none of them will ask themselves the question: who would he be now if Zyuganov had won in 1996?
Now we are again at a crossroads. The authorities have succumbed to the temptation to easily and non-competitively solve problems through unspoken agreements with society - ephemeral stability for loyalty. As a result, a huge number of smart, qualified, talented people left Russia.
Russia vitally needs the changes initiated by President Yeltsin. So that later it doesn’t turn out like the head of the Soviet state Yuri Andropov once said: “We don’t know the society in which we live.”
A. Korzhakov, film “Musicians of Bremen and Co” (2000)
Oleg Soskovets
Alexander Korzhakov in those years he was playing a complex multi-step political game. Having come to power relatively young and, as it seemed to him, for a long time, Korzhakov did not even think about the possibility of losing it. He was ready to fight for this power by any means and deliberately soldered President Yeltsin, whom he protected, in order to make him incapacitated. Korzhakov prepared Deputy Prime Minister for the role of Yeltsin's successor Russian government Oleg Soskovets, former director of the Karaganda Metallurgical Plant. True to his principle of promoting and subjugating only compromised people, Korzhakov chose Soskovets, since he knew that a criminal case had been brought against him due to large-scale thefts at the plant led by Soskovets. In other words, Korzhakov had dirt on Soskovets.
Korzhakov's plan was quite simple. Korzhakov as the head of the SBP, Barsukov as the director of state security and Soskovets as the vice-premier (some kind of analogue of the vice-president) should have really concentrated in their hands all the power in the country, primarily control over all law enforcement agencies, the military-industrial complex and the arms trade in Russia and abroad.
At any cost it was necessary to make it out of Russian State Duma governed body. The drugged Yeltsin had to either be permanently incapacitated or eventually die from alcohol poisoning. By this time, it would be desirable to have a state of emergency declared in the country under one pretext or another, which would make it possible not to hold regular or early presidential elections. Such a state of emergency would make it possible to declare Soskovets as Yeltsin's successor or acting president. Having at some point gained control over the main first channel of Russian television, it would be possible to properly conduct an election campaign and, at a favorable moment for Soskovets, finally hold “democratic” elections and make Soskovets the formal president. The timing of the operation conceived by Korzhakov, which would be more correctly called a coup d’etat, was known: no later than the presidential elections provided for by law on June 16, 1996.
Money
Sometimes, involuntarily letting it slip in his circle, Korzhakov would say something like: “ What do you think, would I not be able to govern a state like Russia?". For Korzhakov, Soskovets was only a temporary political figure in achieving the ultimate goal - absolute power. But he needed money, very big money, with which he could buy leading politicians, the Duma, voters. The question was where to get this money.
Korzhakov, using the SBP to extort money from businesses, businessmen and officials, had significant in cash, including in foreign currency. These funds were spent in order to prepare for a creeping coup in the country. More than $50 million was spent by the SBP of Russia on the purchase of high-quality hearing monitoring equipment abroad, much of which was installed in the Kremlin. The control was total. The Kremlin offices were stuffed with German super-sophisticated “bugs”, which their high-ranking inhabitants, in principle, guessed, but could not resist the total surveillance of Korzhakov and Barsukov. Head of the Presidential Administration Yeltsin of that time Sergei Filatov constantly complained to journalists that in his office he was forced to communicate with visitors through notes, and conduct the most important negotiations in the corridor. According to a number of analytical structures, Korzhakov’s special service numbered more than 40 thousand people by 1995 (during Andropov’s time, the number of the KGB of the USSR with its Foreign Intelligence Directorate was about 37 thousand).
Appointing Komelkov as “supervisor” of the television center, Korzhakov had no idea what kind of currency was circulating on television. Later, when he finally estimated the approximate level of foreign exchange earnings from advertising, he set out to subjugate these financial flows, which were not taken into account by the tax department and the state budget. This money would certainly be enough for any coup d'etat. However, they needed a person who was completely uninitiated in the purpose of the planned operation to seize power, inexperienced in big politics, who had no contacts in the Kremlin, and who at the same time enjoyed authority on television. This person must be sure that everything he will do is done for the good of the country, since outwardly everything should have looked like establishing financial order on television in the interests of the state. Based on Komelkov’s strong recommendation, the choice fell on Vladislav Listyeva.
And Korzhakov, a member of President Yeltsin’s family, began to instill the idea that Listyev was the future of Russian television. In September 1994, Listyev, through the efforts of Korzhakov, was appointed vice-president of the Academy of Russian Television, and in January 1995 - general director of Public Russian Television (ORT), created on November 30, 1994 as a result of the privatization of the first state channel in accordance with a presidential decree Yeltsin, initiated by Korzhakov.
For Korzhakov, Listyev was truly an ideal naive figure. He wanted to be a producer at ORT entertainment programs and didn’t see myself in anything more. True, Korzhakov and Komelkov demanded something completely different from Listyev: subordination of the entire advertising market on ORT, and all proceeds from the sale of advertising time should go to accounts controlled by Korzhakov’s SBP.
A few days after his appointment, in January 1995, Listyev made a public statement that from now on advertising on ORT would be transferred to a limited circle of companies controlled by him personally. Panic literally began among television workers. The newspaper "Evening Club" wrote: " This is understandable. Advertising is real money. TV companies' income and personal income. Both legal and illegal. On TV there is even a special term “jeans”. It denotes a program, a TV story, or information made according to a “leftist” order. Payment for which goes directly to the performers, bypassing the official cash desk. There will no longer be such a feeder at Ostankino (such a monthly shortage is estimated at 30 million rubles). Consequences will surely come"Approximately half of the television advertising business in Russia was controlled by Lisovsky's company Premier SV.
One of the authors of the idea of reforming and privatizing the first channel was Boris Berezovsky, who proposed creating a joint-stock company, 51% of the shares of which would belong to the state, and 49% to private investors loyal to President Yeltsin, which would allow the president to really control ORT, and most importantly, to use this resource in the election campaign presidential campaign 1996 The plan satisfied Yeltsin and Korzhakov, who stood behind him, whom Berezovsky at that moment considered his obvious ally. Having such an ally, Berezovsky certainly strengthened his political influence in the Kremlin, and his LogoVaz concern gained access to the advertising market of Channel One and signed a corresponding agreement with the advertising tycoon Sergei Lisovsky. In addition, 49% of ORT shares remained with a group of people selected by Berezovsky, primarily Berezovsky himself.
After the privatization of the first channel, ORT General Director Listyev, at the request of Korzhakov-Komelkov, decided to focus his attention primarily on the activity due to which the channel was losing millions of dollars - selling advertising time. Listyev’s curator, SBP officer Komelkov, with the help of his colleagues - the head of the security department of the television complex, FSB lieutenant colonel Tsibizova and head of the 1st ORT department, state security resident V. V. Malygina- the plans of the main businessmen-advertisers, all their connections, structures that provided their financial support and security were quite well known. The names of people who visited various television editorial offices were known through the ORT pass registration department. Through the operational records of the FSB-MVD, it was not difficult to identify individuals associated with various organized criminal groups in Moscow.
Korzhakov and Komelkov knew everything about the ORT advertising business. First of all, Listyev began negotiations with Lisovsky. The latter offered to pay ORT compensation for the right to manage advertising on the channel and thereby maintain its control. At the same time, Listyev began negotiations with another advertising businessman Gleb Bokiy, representing the BSG commercial and industrial group. The negotiations dragged on. On February 20, 1995, Listyev, who opened his own company Intervid for the advertising business, announced that he was introducing a temporary moratorium on all types of advertising until ORT develops new ethical standards. It is clear that Korzhakov was trying in this way to strike a blow at Lisovsky and Bokiy, maybe even get them out of the advertising business by switching all their clients to Intervid.
On March 30, 1994, a meeting took place between Listyev, Lisovsky and Bokiy in a restaurant on Kropotkinskaya Street in Moscow. Lisovsky and Bokiy demanded that Listyev share airtime advertising time, and the inexperienced Listyev, succumbing to the joint pressure of his competitors, was obviously mistaken. A day later, his mistake was corrected: on Spartakovskaya Street, Bokiya’s Cadillac was perforated by six shots from a TT pistol. To be sure, they also threw a grenade into the car. Bokiy died on the spot.
On April 9, 1994, the head of Varus Video, G. Topadze, who had a 6.5 percent share in the advertising business of Channel One, was shot. In June, an assassination attempt was made on Berezovsky, as a result of which his driver was killed and Berezovsky himself was wounded. To prevent a second attempt on Berezovsky's life, Gusinsky urgently took him out of Russia on his private plane. Such an open intervention by Gusinsky-Bobkov on the side of Berezovsky should have shown absolutely all interested parties that an obvious rival of the Most concern was behind the latest murders and assassination attempts.
Then it was Lisovsky's turn. It was believed that he was covered by the leader of the Orekhovskaya criminal group Sergey Timofeev(Sylvester). In September 1994, Sylvester was blown up in his Mercedes along with the driver. Someone systematically and cold-bloodedly eliminated Listyev’s competitors. This “someone” was the all-powerful General Korzhakov in those years, who fought for complete control over ORT on the eve of the presidential elections in the summer of 1996.
Korzhakov hurried Listyev. Money was needed to prepare public opinion to replace the soldered Yeltsin with the young and active Deputy Prime Minister Soskovets. We needed complete control over ORT. There was little time - the country's presidential elections were approaching, and Korzhakov and the members of his team had little confidence that the current president with an extremely low popularity rating would be able to win them. The amount of upcoming costs was determined by Korzhakov at 50-60 million dollars. I couldn’t get the leaves of this money for Korzhakov. It was urgent to get rid of Listyev and take control of ORT into our own hands.
It is difficult to determine exactly when the plan to kill Listyev matured. But it is obvious that the operation was conceived as a multi-purpose one. At its first stage, Listyev was removed. On the second, the charge of organizing Listyev’s murder was brought against an influential person in Russia and on ORT, who at that time had influence on Yeltsin - Boris Berezovsky, and against Listyev’s main competitor in the advertising market, Lisovsky. At the third stage, Berezovsky was arrested, and Yeltsin, disappointed in Berezovsky, Lisovsky and the influential reformist politician Anatoly Chubais associated with them, transferred control of ORT to a new person proposed by Korzhakov. 49% of non-state shares were at the disposal of Korzhakov or his people. Lisovsky, who came under suspicion, was also deprived of the opportunity to continue his activities at ORT.
Listyev was waiting in those days for representatives of the Solntsevo group, who were supposed to come to him demanding a compensation of several million dollars, since the project in which they were interested turned out to be Listyev’s failure. Listyev asked Komelkov to intervene and protect him from the financial harassment of his “brothers.” The simplest form defense, as Listyev believed, would have been a refusal to issue them passes to the building on Ostankino. The fact that passes were issued to “Solntsevsk” representatives meant for Listyev that Komelkov and his handlers from the SBP had abandoned him. Perhaps it was the Solntsevsk bandits who received the corresponding instructions from Komelkov. On March 1, 1995, Listyev passed away. He was killed in the entrance of his house. It is impossible to assume that Komelkov carried out this operation without Korzhakov’s instructions.
As Korzhakov planned, it was primarily Berezovsky and Lisovsky who came under suspicion. However, the SBP's attempt to arrest Berezovsky at the LogoVaz headquarters on Novokuznetskaya Street in Moscow was unsuccessful. Berezovsky managed to contact the Prime Minister in time Viktor Chernomyrdin, and the latter prevented arrest. Through media controlled by Gusinsky, materials compromising Korzhakov and Barsukov were promptly released to the press. Chubais, who enjoyed authority with Yeltsin, took the side of Berezovsky and Gusinsky. ORT remained in the hands of Berezovsky, and Korzhakov never received advertising money or the $50-60 million he needed to change public opinion. Then he decided to take the cheapest route, which did not require television PR.
A small, but by no means victorious war
Chechnya turned out to be the weakest link in the multinational Russian mosaic. Counting Dzhokhara Dudayeva their own, the KGB did not object to his coming to power. General Dudayev, a member of the CPSU since 1968, was transferred from Estonia to his native Grozny, as if specifically in order to become in opposition to the local communists, to be elected president of the Chechen Republic and to proclaim the independence of Chechnya (Ichkeria) in November 1991, as if demonstrating Russian political elite, to what split is Yeltsin’s liberal regime leading Russia.
It was probably no coincidence that another Chechen close to Yeltsin, Ruslan Khasbulatov, also became guilty of dealing a fatal blow to the Yeltsin regime. Khasbulatov, former employee Komsomol Central Committee, member of the Communist Party since 1966, became Chairman of Parliament in September 1991 Russian Federation. It was this parliament, headed by Khasbulatov, that Yeltsin would disperse with tanks in October 1993.
By 1994, the Russian political leadership already understood that it was not ready to give independence to Chechnya. Granting sovereignty to Chechnya could indeed lead to the further disintegration of Russia. But was it possible to start in the North Caucasus? civil war? The “war party,” relying on the power ministries, believed that it was possible. However, public opinion had to be prepared for war. It would be easy to influence public opinion if the Chechens began to fight for their independence through terrorist attacks. The only thing left to do is to organize explosions in Moscow with a “Chechen trace.”
On November 18, 1994, the FSB made the first recorded attempt to commit a terrorist attack, declare Chechen separatists responsible and, relying on the anger of the Russian people, suppress the independence movement in Chechnya. On this day in Moscow, an explosion occurred on the railway bridge over the Yauza River. According to experts’ descriptions, two powerful charges of approximately one and a half kilograms of TNT each went off. Twenty meters of the railway track were mangled. The bridge almost collapsed. However, the terrorist attack occurred prematurely, even before the train passed through the bridge. At the scene of the explosion they found the body of the demolition man himself, the captain, torn to shreds. Andrey Shchelenkov, an employee of the Lanako oil company. Shchelenkov blew up his own bomb while adjusting it on the bridge.
It was only thanks to this oversight by the perpetrator of the terrorist attack that the direct organizers of the explosion became known. The fact is that the head of the Lanako company, who gave the name of the company the first two letters of his last name, was a 35-year-old native of Grozny Maxim Yurievich Lazovsky, who was a particularly valuable agent of the FSB Directorate (UFSB) for Moscow and the Moscow region and who had the nicknames Max and Khromoy in the criminal environment. Looking ahead, we note that absolutely all employees of the Lanako company were full-time or freelance employees of the Russian counterintelligence agencies and that all subsequent terrorist attacks in Moscow in 1994-1995. also organized by Lazovsky's group. In 1996, terrorists from the FSB were arrested and convicted by a Moscow court. But by this time the first Chechen war had become a fait accompli. Lazovsky did his job.
The war in Chechnya made it very easy to finish off Yeltsin politically. And those who started the war and organized terrorist attacks in Russia understood this well. But there was still a primitive economic aspect of the relationship between the Russian leadership and the president of the Chechen Republic: Dudayev was constantly extorted money. This began in 1992, when bribes were received from Chechens for Soviet weapons left in Chechnya in 1992. Bribes for these weapons were extorted by the head of the SBP (Presidential Security Service) Korzhakov, the head of the FSO (Federal Security Service) Barsukov and the First Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation Oleg Soskovets. It is clear that the Ministry of Defense did not stand aside either.
When the war began, naive Russian citizens began to wonder how all the weapons that Chechen militants used to kill Russian soldiers remained in Chechnya. In the most banal way: for multi-million dollar bribes from Dudayev to Korzhakov, Barsukov and Soskovets.
After 1992, the cooperation of Moscow officials with Dudayev was successfully sold for bribes. The Chechen leadership constantly sent money to Moscow - otherwise Dudayev could not resolve a single issue in Moscow. But in 1994 the system began to slip. Moscow extorted larger and larger sums in exchange for resolving political issues related to Chechen independence. Dudayev began to refuse money. Initially, the financial conflict gradually turned into political and then forceful confrontation between the Russian and Chechen leadership. The smell of war was in the air. Dudayev requested a personal meeting with Yeltsin. Then the trio controlling access to Yeltsin demanded several million dollars from Dudayev for organizing a meeting between the two presidents. Dudayev refused the bribe. Moreover, for the first time he intimidated people who had previously helped him (for money) to use against them documents that were compromising them, confirming the unselfish connections of officials with the Chechens. Dudayev miscalculated. Blackmail didn't work. The meeting did not take place. The President of Chechnya became a dangerous witness who had to be removed. A provoked, cruel and senseless war began.
On November 23, nine Russian Army Aviation helicopters from the North Caucasus Military District, believed to be MI-8s, launched a missile attack on the town of Shali, about 40 km from Grozny, in an attempt to destroy the armored vehicles of a tank regiment located in Shali. There were wounded on the Chechen side. The Chechen side stated that it has a video recording showing helicopters with Russian onboard markings.
The main headquarters of the armed forces of Chechnya claimed that on the border with the Naursky district, in the village of Veselaya Stavropol Territory, concentration occurs military units: tanks, artillery, up to six infantry battalions. As it became known later, a column of Russian armored vehicles, formed on the initiative and with the money of the FSK, with soldiers and officers hired by the FSK on a contract basis, including among the military personnel of the Taman and Kantemirovskaya divisions, really formed the backbone of the troops concentrated for the assault on Grozny.
On November 25, seven Russian helicopters from a military base in the Stavropol Territory fired several missile salvos at the airport in Grozny and nearby residential buildings, damaging the landing strip and the civil aircraft standing on it. Six people were killed and about 25 were injured. In this regard, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) of Chechnya sent a statement to the administration of the Stavropol Territory, which, in particular, indicated that the leadership of the region “bears responsibility for such actions and in the event of adequate measures from the Chechen side,” all claims of Stavropol “should be assigned to Moscow."
On November 26, the forces of the Provisional Council of Chechnya (the Chechen anti-Dudaev opposition), supported by Russian helicopters and armored vehicles, attacked Grozny from four sides. More than 1,200 people, 50 tanks, 80 armored personnel carriers (APCs) and six SU-27 aircraft took part in the operation from the opposition. As stated in the Moscow (puppet) center of the Provisional Council of Chechnya, “the demoralized forces of Dudayev’s supporters offer virtually no resistance, and by morning everything will probably be over.”
However, the operation failed. The attackers lost about 500 people killed, more than 20 tanks, another 20 tanks were captured by Dudayev’s troops. About 200 military personnel were taken prisoner. On November 28, “as a sign of victory over the forces of the opposition,” a column of prisoners was marched through the streets of Grozny. At the same time, the Chechen leadership presented a list of fourteen captured soldiers and officers who were Russian military personnel.
It seemed that on November 26 an armored column was brought into Grozny specifically to be destroyed. The column could not disarm Dudayev and his army. Capture a city and hold it too. Dudayev's army was equipped and well armed. The column could and did become a living target. Defense Minister Grachev hinted at his non-involvement in this adventure. From a military point of view, the task of capturing Grozny, Grachev said at a press conference on November 28, 1996, was quite feasible with the forces of “one airborne regiment within two hours. However, all military conflicts are ultimately resolved by political methods at the negotiating table. Without It really was pointless to bring tanks into the city to cover the infantry." Why were they introduced then?
Later General Gennady Troshev will tell us about Grachev's doubts about the Chechen campaign: " He was trying to do something. He tried to squeeze a clear assessment of the situation out of Stepashin and his special services, tried to postpone the start of the deployment of troops to the spring, even tried to personally come to an agreement with Dudayev. Now we know that such a meeting took place. We didn't agree".
General Troshev, already waging a second war in Chechnya, was perplexed why Grachev could not come to an agreement with Dudayev. Yes, because Dudayev insisted on a personal meeting with Yeltsin, and Korzhakov did not agree to hold it for free ( Korzhakov claims that EBN himself refused to meet, and he, Korzhakov, on the contrary, persuaded him otherwise - approx. Impcommiss).
Brilliant military operation The burning of a column of Russian armored vehicles in Grozny was actually organized not by Grachev, but by the director of the FSK Stepashin and the head of the Moscow FSB Directorate Savostyanov, who oversaw the elimination of the Dudayev regime and the entry of troops into Chechnya. However, those who described the banal mistakes of the Russian military in introducing an armored column into the city, doomed to destruction, did not understand the subtle political calculations of the provocateurs. Supporters of the war needed the convoy to be effectively destroyed by the Chechens. This was the only way to provoke Yeltsin into starting full-scale military operations, which actually began in December 1994.
Arms trade
During the existence of the Soviet Union, the sale of weapons abroad was in charge of the Main Engineering Directorate (GIU) of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations. The employees of the Main Intelligence Directorate were predominantly career officers of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the USSR Ministry of Defense (GRU). However, after the August revolution of 1991, the head of the President’s SBP, Korzhakov, decided to subjugate the cash flows from the arms trade. On November 18, 1993, Yeltsin signed secret Decree No. 1932-c, according to which, in order to streamline the conduct of affairs in the difficult business of selling weapons, the state company Rosvooruzheniye was created, representing the interests of the military-industrial complex (MIC) of Russia to foreign ones companies that sell weapons. The same decree assigned control over the activities of the state-owned company Rosvooruzheniye to the Presidential Security Service.
For these purposes, department “B” (from the word “weapons”) was created in the SBP, the main task of which was to control the activities of the Rosvooruzheniye company, Goskhran and Gosdrugmet. General Samoilov became the head of Rosvooruzhenie. And at the head of department “B” Korzhakov appointed a person devoted to him Alexandra Kotelkina.
Kotelkin, born in 1954, graduated from the Kiev Military Technical School, and served in the Air Force for a number of years. Then he was accepted into service in the GRU and sent to study at the Diplomatic Academy of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs. At the end of the 80s, Kotelkin served as a military intelligence officer under diplomatic cover at the Permanent Mission of the USSR to the UN.
During his stay in the United States, Kotelkin came to the attention of the FBI due to numerous love affairs with the wives of Soviet diplomats and UN employees, as well as due to unconventional sexual relationships with colleagues in the GRU station. Kotelkin was also on close friendly terms with Sergei Glazyev, former government Yegor Gaidar Deputy Minister, and then Minister of Foreign Economic Relations. With the assistance of Glazyev, Kotelkin was appointed to the post of head of the Main Directorate of Military-Technical Cooperation (receiver of the State Administration) of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations (MFER). While in this position, Kotelkin abused his official position and illegally received bonuses amounting to tens of thousands of American dollars from controlled enterprises.
When the state company Rosvooruzheniye was created in 1993, through the efforts of Korzhakov it was Kotelkin who was hired as the head of department “B”, which controls the newly created government structure. Korzhakov had enough compromising evidence against Kotelkin. This was a guarantee that Kotelkin would carry out any instructions from Korzhakov. In November 1994, Kotelkin headed Rosvooruzhenie. As a result, Korzhakov and people loyal to him from among the employees of Rosvooruzhenie managed to embezzle several hundred million US dollars in the period until the summer of 1996, when Korzhakov was fired from the civil service.
Emergency
Just before the 1996 elections, Korzhakov, Barsukov and Soskovets convinced President Yeltsin that he had no chance of winning the election against his main competitor, Communist Party candidate Gennady Zyuganov, and that the only way to retain power in the country was to declare a state of emergency (state of emergency), referring to the ongoing war with the Chechen Republic. This had its own logic. If Zyuganov had come to power, he would certainly have put Yeltsin in prison for dissolving parliament in October 1993. The forced dissolution of Russia's legislature could easily be portrayed as unconstitutional, with all its consequences. If democrats had come to power, they could easily have brought Yeltsin to justice for the outbreak of the first Chechen war, war crimes committed Russian army in Chechnya and the genocide of the Chechen people. And any new president could question the legality of Yeltsin’s privatization Russian economy. AND Yeltsin signed a decree canceling the presidential elections and declaring a state of emergency.
However, before its publication, this became known to all those whom Korzhakov did not manage to finish off: Berezovsky, Chubais, Gusinsky, Lisovsky and all those who later began to be called Russian oligarchs. In a single impulse, which I have never seen since then Russian history, with the help of the president's daughter Tatiana Dyachenko, they got a reception from Yeltsin and offered him to use money, newspapers and television instead of tanks and a decree introducing a state of emergency. And Yeltsin recalled the decree he had already signed, dismissed Korzhakov, Barsukov and Soskovets and appointed Chubais as head of his administration.
Berezovsky was responsible for supporting Yeltsin on ORT. Gusinsky - on NTV. Lisovsky - for advertising. Almost unknown Roman Abramovich - for extra-budgetary funding... With an initial popularity of 3%, Yeltsin managed to gain the largest percentage of votes in the first round of elections in June, entered the second round together with his main opponent Zyuganov and defeated Zyuganov in the second round of elections in July victory. Shortly after Yeltsin's election, on August 31, 1996, a peace agreement was signed with the Chechen Republic. The first Chechen war is over. Russia has returned to the path of democracy. And Komelkov left the SBP and returned to serve in the FSB as deputy head of the Directorate for the Protection of the Constitutional System.
On June 19, 1996, activists from Boris Yeltsin’s election headquarters, Sergei Lisovsky and Arkady Evstafiev, were detained near the Government House of Russia. As reported by the media, the detainees were carrying a Xerox box in their hands, which contained $500 thousand. The phrase “Xerox box” instantly became popular. In 1997, this term was used in 0.02% of publications in the Russian press, which is comparable to the use in the media of the phrase “wet in the toilet” in 2000. Meanwhile, the notorious box was not from a copier at all, but from Xerox A4 paper. Standard box for paper has a length of 30.1 cm, a width of 22.5 cm and a height of 21.5 cm. Since the volume of a pack of 1000 $100 bills is 104.5 cm 3, such a box can fit a maximum of $1 million 393 thousand. In 1996 Xerox-5317 copiers were popular, the boxes from which were 65x60x40 cm in size. Thus, in a box from a real copier, Sergei Lisovsky and Arkady Evstafiev could take $14 million 928 thousand from the White House, which is almost 30 times more the amount found on them at the time of arrest.PAVEL CHERNIKOV
By 6.8% Russia's GDP increased in the first quarter of 2003 compared to the same period in 2002.
84th place Gazprom is included in the list of the 500 largest companies in Europe compiled by Handelsblatt and The Wall Street Journal. In total, there are 11 companies from Russia in the rating.
400 crimes, falling under the article “Terrorism”, was committed on Russian territory in 2002, reports the Prosecutor General’s Office.
2nd place Moscow is ranked in the ranking of the most expensive cities in the world to live, compiled by Mercer Human Resource Consulting. Tokyo is in first place, St. Petersburg is in 12th position. The capital of Paraguay, Asuncion, is recognized as the cheapest of the major cities.
90 million rubles allocated by the Moscow government to prevent SARS. Of this, 17 million rubles will be spent on disinfection of public transport.
6.7 thousand crimes committed in Moscow by citizens of foreign countries in January-May 2003. 1.5 thousand crimes were committed against foreigners themselves.
27 thousand rubles The families of miners who died as a result of the June 16 accident at the Ziminka mine in Prokopyevsk will receive a one-time benefit from the Russian government.
In 24 countries The activities of emissaries of Chechen militants were noted, reports the Prosecutor General's Office of the Russian Federation. IN financial assistance 16 funds and 4 banks were identified as militants.
15th place MTS is ranked by Business Week magazine in the ranking of the most successful companies in the world operating in the field of information technology. VimpelCom (Bee Line network operator) took 28th position.
35 military satellites Russia will launch into space in 2003, said Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov. Currently, the Russian orbital constellation includes about 100 military and dual-use satellites.
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Background
In the 1996 elections, Yeltsin found himself in a difficult position. Considering the likely possibility of communists coming to power, the head of the presidential guard, Alexander Korzhakov, FSB director Mikhail Barsukov and Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Soskovets persuaded him to cancel the elections, suspend the constitution and ban the Communist Party of the Russian Federation. The oligarchs, on the contrary, persistently advised Yeltsin to go to the polls, promising to do everything to win.
They say that Yeltsin was ready to follow the advice of the security forces and, in fact, introduce a state of emergency in the country. However, Anatoly Chubais, through the president’s daughter Tatyana Dyachenko, dissuaded the current head of state from taking a rash step. Now the fate of the elections was in the hands of the triumvirate: Berezovsky - Gusinsky - Chubais.
Political technologies coupled with oligarchic capital have done their job. In the first round of the presidential elections, held on June 16, Boris Yeltsin defeated Gennady Zyuganov with 35% of the votes, who received 32%. However, a second round was required to determine the winner.
Strange box
On the evening of June 19, 1996, employees of the Security Service of the President of the Russian Federation detained two members of Yeltsin's election headquarters - Arkady Evstafiev and Sergei Lisovsky. The first was a close associate of Chubais, and the second was the organizer of a campaign in support of Yeltsin’s candidacy involving Russian pop stars.
The reason for the detention was 538 thousand US dollars in cash in a box of Xerox paper, which Lisovsky and Evstafiev tried to take out of the Government House building. Later, Tatyana Dyachenko explained this episode as follows: “Korzhakov was responsible for control over all the finances of the election campaign. Therefore, he carefully watched as Lisovsky, as well as many others, received money dozens of times in boxes from a copier, in boxes from writing paper, in other boxes, in cases, in whatever was convenient for carrying money and paying."
Korzhakov himself noted that this time the money from Yeltsin’s election headquarters turned out to be unaccounted for, and he, as a responsible person, could not allow the theft of these funds by “activists.” According to him, the security service has repeatedly received reports of the theft of election campaign funds.
Immediately after the detention of the “activists,” Chubais held a press conference where he criticized Korzhakov and Barsukov, accusing them of forgery and the desire to usurp power. He called the “box of money” “one of the elements of the traditional KGB Soviet provocation.”
Exceeded authority
Yeltsin's daughter Tatyana Dyachenko comes into action again and asks Korzhakov and Barsukov to release the detainees. Chubais behaves more harshly: “We need to explain the situation to Messrs. Korzhakov and Barsukov: either they behave like human beings, or we will imprison you. Either they shut up, or I will imprison you, absolutely unambiguously.” According to Dyachenko and Chubais, the development of the scandal was in the hands of the security forces, which could mean one thing: the end of the elections.
Soon, under pressure from the press and thanks to calls from the Kremlin, Lisovsky and Evstafiev were released. On June 20, 1996, a meeting of the Security Council of the Russian Federation took place. At it, Yeltsin accused Mikhail Barsukov and Alexander Korzhakov of “exceeding their powers” and removed them from their positions.
Literally two days after his resignation, Korzhakov wrote a letter to Yeltsin, in which he indicated that his (the president’s) decision was wrong, counterproductive and extremely destructive for Boris Nikolayevich himself, since it gave a free hand to the man “whom the whole country hates” - Chubais.
Korzhakov's voice was not heard. Then a rumor spread that there was no money in the copier box; supposedly it was taken out by dummies. For some time the incident was forgotten.
Addressee unknown
They decided to conduct their investigation of the high-profile events at the editorial office of the magazine "Faces". It was noted that after talking with the detainees Lisovsky and Evstafiev, the presidential security service found out where the money was taken from. It turned out to be from the office of the deputy head of the foreign loans department. An employee of an unnamed bank, Boris Lavrov, was in the room, although Oleg Lurie, a columnist for the newspaper “Top Secret,” claimed that Lavrov worked at the National Reserve Bank.
Lavrov stated that in March 1996 he became part of the control and accounting group of the headquarters for the election campaign of Boris Yeltsin. On the morning of June 19, he met with Deputy Minister of Finance German Kuznetsov, who asked him to transfer money to Evstafiev.
Then everything goes according to plan. Evstafiev and Lisovsky, who arrived in the evening, packed the money into a box, after which the latter left a receipt confirming receipt of half a million dollars. The meeting, according to Lavrov, lasted several minutes. He did not know who the final recipient of the dollar parcel was.
It is noteworthy that during the secret opening of the safe of Deputy Minister of Finance German Kuznetsov, which followed the interrogation, the Security Service on the night of June 19, 1996, according to Korzhakov, discovered another 1.5 million US dollars.
The fight between two camps
Boris Yeltsin in his book “Presidential Marathon” explains the detention of activists of his election headquarters and their subsequent accusation of embezzlement of money by Korzhakov’s desire to “settle personal scores with political opponents.”
State Security Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Litvinenko, who died in 2006 in London as a result of polonium poisoning under strange circumstances, called the money scandal “the first battle of a big war between oligarchs and security officers.” He noted that the further course of events confirmed this, turning, in essence, into a confrontation between “people in uniform and people with deep wallets.”
Political scientists note that the triumvirate of Berezovsky, Gusinsky and Chubais has something to be proud of. They emerged victorious from this struggle, simultaneously “crushing” the Russian communists. True, in the near future, disagreements and civil strife will play a cruel joke on the oligarchs.
The story itself “with the Xerox box” showed that the 1996 election campaign, from a legal point of view, leaves many questions. In particular, the investigation initiated by Korzhakov revealed that the pre-election expenses of the Yeltsin team were several times higher than the permissible level established by law.
As is known, the sources for the formation of the Kremlin’s “election fund” were money from leading bankers and entrepreneurs. Budget funds were also used for these purposes. But since the seizure of treasury funds was not provided for by law, the money went first to the oligarchs, and then the “laundered” ones were returned to the election headquarters. It is possible that the “money in the Xerox box” had to travel exactly this way.