Today is the 70th anniversary of the liberation of Leningrad from the siege.
On this occasion, questions are being raised again: wouldn’t it have been better to surrender Leningrad to the Germans and not torment the city’s residents? Another question is asked much less frequently: why didn’t Hitler take the city?
To answer these questions, let me offer extracts from articles in the January issue of Dilettant magazine.
“By the beginning of the fighting in the Leningrad direction (July 9), the Germans captured Lithuania, Latvia, parts of Estonia and the northwestern regions of the RSFSR.
In early July, Hitler began to rush the commander of Army Group North, Field Marshal Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb, and sent his chief adjutant, Colonel Rudolf Schmundt, to him, who reported: “The Fuhrer is extremely pleased with the way the fighting is developing. He gives great importance the speedy neutralization of the Russian fleet so that German supply transports could once again ply the Gulf of Bothnia. Based on this, the quick capture of St. Petersburg and Revel is so important.”
During these days, Hitler constantly kept Leningrad in his sights. His thoughts were recorded in his diary by Franz Halder: “The Fuhrer’s decision to raze Moscow and Leningrad to the ground is unshakable in order to completely get rid of the population of these cities, which otherwise we will then be forced to feed during the winter. The task of destroying these cities must be carried out by aviation. Tanks should not be used for this. This will be “a national disaster that will deprive not only Bolshevism of centers, but also Muscovites (Russians) in general.”
On July 10, Army Group North launched an attack directly on Leningrad. It had every opportunity for success, at least on paper: in the direction of the main attack, German troops outnumbered Soviet troops in personnel in a ratio of 2.4:1, in guns and mortars - 5:1, in tanks - 1.2: 1.
But precisely at the moment when everything was ready for the attack on Leningrad, Hitler suddenly lost interest in him. Now all his attention was focused on the Kyiv battle that began on July 7 in the south. On July 12, the chief of staff of Army Group North, Lieutenant General Kurt Brenneke, reported to von Leeb that “the Fuhrer no longer attaches much importance to St. Petersburg.” The Field Marshal wrote in his diary: “Schmundt... said the exact opposite. What information is correct?
Franz Halder, who led the ground forces, from the very beginning was not enthusiastic about the Fuhrer’s ideas to attack on all three directions. On Sunday, July 13, Halder recorded in his war diary a change of intentions: “The Fuhrer agreed with the proposed plan of operation... On the front of Army Group North” decisive task is the exit to the area north of the lake Ilmen and Ladozhsky, blockade of Leningrad from the east." On July 15, Brenneke obtained an audience with Halder, who confirmed to him: “The task of the army group for now is not to capture Leningrad, but only to blockade it.”
Hitler returned to headquarters in full confidence that, as von Leeb wrote in his diary, “the capture of St. Petersburg (because of the Russian naval base) is more important than the capture of Moscow.” The leadership of the ground forces (Brauchitsch and Halder) did not object, but conveyed to the Fuhrer the idea that the command of Army Group North “does not have a strike force and makes mistakes all the time” (entry in the “War Diary” dated July 22, 1941). On the evening of the same day, in a detailed report to Hitler, Halder reported that “there will be enough forces (if used correctly!) to cut off Leningrad, narrow the encirclement ring around the city and thus deprive the Russian fleet of its base.” Hitler relented, pointing out that "the ultimate task is the destruction of enemy forces."
The turning point in the Leningrad operation was July 25. It was on this day that Hitler made the final decision that Leningrad needed to be encircled and strangled with a blockade. General Brenneke, who was at headquarters, received corresponding instructions from Halder, which he reported to von Leeb the next day. The latter recorded in his diary: “Leningrad should not be taken, it only needs to be surrounded.”
Hitler proceeded from the fact that previous experience of taking cities led to large losses among personnel. The Germans had already lost a lot in the battles near Leningrad, so Hitler and the German command knew that large cities would be mined, as was the case with Kiev and other cities, and any use of infantry during the assault on the city would lead to excessive casualties.
At the same time, the Germans were not going to accept surrender; this decision was made on August 28, 1941, even before the blockade began. The German command, starting from the high command right down to the divisions, issued an order on the need to destroy Leningraders who would enter the blockade ring, regardless of the fact that they would be women, old people and children.
For the Germans there was a problem - what would they do with a population of 3 million? Even before the attack on the USSR, the German Ministry of Food Supply stated: the problem of food supply for Leningrad was insoluble.
The German command considered different options: from blocking the city and exhausting it with hunger to an option in which the population was released from the city (saving face in front of civilized countries). The first option was chosen.
An order was also found in the archives for the first German division, which was near Peterhof, 20 kilometers from the center of Leningrad, stating that if the civilian population attempts to break out of the blockade ring, fire on them. It was signed by his division commander.
All subsequent decisions of Hitler only confirmed what had been accepted. The order to Army Group North dated August 28, 1941 (the so-called order No. 1 on the encirclement of Leningrad) stated:
"1. Block the city of Leningrad with a ring as close to the city itself as possible in order to save our forces. Do not put forward demands for surrender.
2. In order for the city, as the last center of red resistance in the Baltic, to be destroyed as quickly as possible without major casualties on our part, it is forbidden to storm the city with infantry forces. After defeating the enemy's air defense and fighter aircraft, his defensive and vital capabilities should be broken through destruction waterworks, warehouses, power supplies and power plants. Military installations and the enemy's ability to defend must be suppressed by fires and artillery fire. Every attempt by the population to escape through the encircling troops should be prevented, if necessary, with the use of weapons...”
On September 4, the headquarters of Army Group North was visited by von Brauchitsch and Halder, who the next day at a meeting at headquarters convinced the Fuhrer that the goal had been achieved: “From now on, the Leningrad area will be a “secondary theater of military operations.”
Leningrad turned into a huge concentration camp, and the German 18th Army of the North group was destined to play the role of overseers.
On September 8, German troops took Shlisselburg, closing the blockade ring around Leningrad. The emphasis was placed on exterminating Leningraders by starvation, preventing fighting within the city itself. As recorded on September 20 in the combat log of Army Group North: “Regarding the city of Leningrad, the principle remains the same: we do not occupy the city and do not feed its population.”
Then they admitted that they were unable to carry out a complete blockade due to the fact that Lake Ladoga remained under the control of Soviet troops, in the winter, as we know, a road was installed on November 20-21, and this communication, especially at night, was inaccessible to the Germans, which was later admitted by the Commander-in-Chief of Army Group North, von Leeb.
IN besieged Leningrad with a population of 2.5 million, the death toll was at least 750 thousand. Not counting those who died during the evacuation. Or on the road: at some stations they were taken off trains and buried in the thousands.
At the same time, a significant German group remained near Leningrad, which did not go to Moscow, it was possible to preserve the Baltic fleet, which was the main goal of the Germans after the start of the blockade, it was possible to preserve the Murmansk railway, along which supplies were carried out, well, it is politically extremely important that Leningrad remained Soviet.
This directive was included in the list of evidence for the prosecution from the USSR at the Nuremberg trials under the number USSR-113 (see: Nuremberg trial of the main German war criminals. Collection of materials (in seven volumes). M., 1961, vol. 7, p. 625)".
OKH Directive No. 1571/41 on the procedure for the capture of Moscow and the treatment of its population
October 12, 1941
Army Group Center
The High Command of the Ground Forces ordered:
“The Fuhrer again decided that Moscow’s surrender should not be accepted, even if it were proposed by the enemy. The moral justification for this event is quite clear in the eyes of the whole world. Just as in Kyiv, troops may face extreme dangers from time-delayed mines. Therefore, it is necessary to take into account to an even greater extent the similar situation in Moscow and Leningrad. The fact that Leningrad is mined and will be defended to the last man was announced on Russian radio.
It is necessary to keep in mind the serious danger of epidemics. Therefore, no German soldier should enter these cities. Anyone who tries to leave the city and pass through our positions is to be fired upon and driven back. Small unclosed passages providing the opportunity for mass exodus of the population into internal Russia, you can only welcome. And for other cities the rule should be that before they are captured, they should be crushed by artillery fire and air raids, and the population should be put to flight.
It would be completely irresponsible to risk the lives of German soldiers to save Russian cities from fires or to feed their population at the expense of Germany.
The more the population of Soviet cities flows into inner Russia, the more chaos in Russia will increase and the easier it will be to control and exploit the occupied eastern regions.
This instruction from the Fuhrer must be brought to the attention of all commanders."
Addition of the main command of the ground forces:
“The city should be cut off from communications connecting it with the outside world as soon as possible. Further instructions will be given later.
Main Command of the Ground Forces
General base
Operations department
2. Directive of the Chief of Staff of the German Navy on the destruction of Leningrad
September 22, 1941
Berlin
Secret
The future of the city of St. Petersburg
1. In order to have clarity about the actions of the navy in the event of the capture or surrender of St. Petersburg, the chief of staff of the naval forces raised the question with the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces about further military measures against this city.
The results are hereby communicated.
2. The Fuhrer decided to wipe the city of St. Petersburg off the face of the earth. After the defeat of Soviet Russia, the continued existence of this largest settlement is of no interest. Finland similarly declared its disinterest in the existence of this city directly on its new borders.
3. The previous demands of the Navy for the preservation of shipbuilding, port and other structures important for the Navy are known to the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, but their satisfaction is not possible due to the general line adopted in relation to St. Petersburg.
4. It is proposed to surround the city with a tight ring and, by shelling from artillery of all calibers and continuous bombing from the air, raze it to the ground.
If, as a result of the situation created in the city, requests for surrender are made, they will be rejected, since the problems associated with the stay of the population in the city and its food supply cannot and should not be solved by us. In this war being waged for the right to exist, we are not interested in preserving even part of the population.
5. The High Command of the Naval Forces will in the near future develop and issue a directive on changes in already ongoing or prepared organizational and personnel measures related to the upcoming destruction of St. Petersburg.
If the army group command has any proposals in this regard, they should be sent to the naval headquarters as soon as possible.”
Despite the fact that all this has long been known, some people place emphasis differently. For example, here is an article from Novaya Gazeta. Daniil Granin, who once wrote a book about the blockade together with Adamovich, decided to add a little to it for the anniversary. Now he presents a photograph of rum baba baking and claims that it was taken at the height of the blockade. Those. The city leadership not only ate much more nutritiously than the average siege survivor, but also consumed delicacies.
http://www.novayagazeta.ru/arts/61924.html
At the same time, they remember terrible stories about how corpses were dug up everywhere, how one mother fed her children with blood from her vein, another fed one child with the body of another who had died, and someone even hunted living people.
Whatever happens to our leadership, Hitler is to blame for the blockade. It was an absolutely cynical decision to get rid of a large part of the Russian population without putting in much effort. What would he achieve by storming? Many of his soldiers would have died, but the Leningraders would still not have been able to kill them all. And it’s so good here.
And, as you can see, they would not accept surrender either. But the Leningraders didn’t ask for it.
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Thematic table of contents (Politics)
The website of the Zvezda TV channel publishes a series of articles about the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945 by the writer Leonid Maslovsky, based on his book “Russian Truth”, published in 2011.
In his original materials, Maslovsky, in his words, exposes “myths about the events of the Great Patriotic War, invented by Russia’s ill-wishers.” Patriotic War and shows the greatness of our Victory." The author notes that in his articles he intends to “show the unseemly role of the West in preparing Germany for war with the USSR.”
In October 1941, the 7th Army under the command of K. A. Meretskov, after 3 months of fighting and retreats, stopped the Finns, reinforced by German troops, on the Svir River on the eastern side of Lake Ladoga, preventing them from connecting with German troops and completely closing the encirclement ring Leningrad. The plans of the German command were thwarted. They did not allow the Finns and the Germans to approach Vologda from Lake Onega.
German troops were unable to crush the Red Army and take Leningrad, but German troops remained under it. Thus, the connection between the city of Leningrad and the Leningrad Front with the country by land was interrupted. Supply across Lake Ladoga was complicated by the fact that a group of German troops crossed the Volkhov River, cut the Tikhvin-Volkhov railway and captured Tikhvin on November 8, 1941.
Famine came to Leningrad. The bread ration, which averaged approximately 800 grams per day, was rapidly declining. On October 1, the bread ration was reduced for the third time - workers and engineers received 400 grams of bread per day, employees, dependents and children received 200 grams. From November 20 (5th reduction), workers received 250 g of bread per day. All the rest - 125 g each. Sick and weak people began to die from hunger and cold, since the amount of food delivered did not meet the needs of the city residents, despite the significant number of people evacuated from the city.
In total, more than half of the pre-war population was evacuated from Leningrad - 1.7 million people. But for a relatively short time, German troops interrupted the supply of the city along Ladoga. On December 9, our troops liberated Tikhvin and drove the Germans across the Volkhov River, ensuring the movement of trains to the station. Voyglass. Cargoes went to Leningrad in a continuous stream. From December 25, 1941, food distribution standards began to increase.
At the end of December, Red Army troops captured several bridgeheads on the left bank of the river. As a result of the Tikhvin offensive operation, Soviet troops advanced 100-120 km and liberated significant territory.
Successfully carried out military operation By the end of January 1942, railway workers allowed the railway workers to lay an additional railway line all the way to Lake Ladoga, and cargo from the cars began to be unloaded directly into the bodies of trucks that stood on the ice of the lake. Further, along the ice of the lake and highways, cargo was delivered to Leningrad, which made it possible to significantly increase the nutritional standards of city residents and soldiers of the Leningrad Front, as well as improve the supply of troops with weapons and ammunition.
Since February 1942, the supply of food to the city residents in quantities sufficient to live was established and maintained until the blockade was broken.
A. M. Vasilevsky wrote that day and night, a continuous stream of cars went to Leningrad, loaded with food, medicine, fuel, equipment, ammunition, and on return flights they took away women, children, old people, the wounded and sick.
K.A. Meretskov pointed out that even before the spring thaw (spring of 1942 - L.M.) more than 300 thousand tons of all kinds of cargo were delivered to Leningrad on Ladoga and about half a million people in need of care and treatment were taken out from there.
During navigation, cargo continued to be delivered by water transport of the North-Western River Shipping Company, as well as by ships of the Ladoga Military Flotilla.
In my opinion, the contribution of river workers to supplying the city and the Leningrad Front is underestimated. Both in winter, car drivers, and during navigation, day and night, around the clock, they transported cargo to Leningrad and took people out of Leningrad, and from the summer of 1942, also the products of industrial enterprises.
In documentary footage, in particular from the film “The Unknown War,” Leningraders going to the front, working in factories and cleaning the city streets in the spring of 1942 do not look emaciated, like, for example, prisoners of German concentration camps.
Someone really wants to turn the hero city of Leningrad into a concentration camp city, Leningrad. The tendency to turn Soviet heroes into victims is visible in all liberal works, and the number of these victims of the besieged Leningrad, published in the media, is growing from year to year. In reality, the city worked, fought, children went to school, theaters and cinemas worked.
Leningrad was defended by the Volkhov and Leningrad fronts. The Leningrad Front was under blockade, the Volkhov Front was with outside blockade rings and stretched for 250 km along the Volkhov River, crushing the Nazi troops thrown at Leningrad and not giving them the opportunity to connect with the Finnish troops stopped north of the Svir River.
In this regard, it is unacceptable to consider besieged Leningrad in isolation from the Leningrad Front. It was possible to get to the front positions by tram. Leningrad and the Leningrad Front fought together and represented a single fortress.
It was during the evacuation and to the Leningrad Front that the bulk of the inhabitants of Leningrad left, and did not die of hunger. Soldiers and commanders of the Leningrad Front, militias are buried along with the dead and deceased residents of the city in Leningrad cemeteries.
Considering Leningrad in isolation from the Leningrad Front means deliberately making a mistake and coming to conclusions that do not correspond to reality.
Our troops carried out three operations to break the blockade, and only the last of them was successful. In the period from January 7 to April 30, 1942, the forces of the Volkhov and 54th Army of the Leningrad Front carried out the Lyuban operation with the aim of releasing Leningrad, but it was not possible to push the Germans back from Lake Ladoga.
Only 16 kilometers separated the troops of the Volkhov and Leningrad fronts. To break the blockade, these troops had to meet. On August 19, 1942, the troops of the Leningrad Front, and on August 27, the troops of the Volkhov Front, with the assistance of the forces of the Baltic Fleet and the Ladoga Military Flotilla, went on the offensive towards each other. The Sinyavinsk military operation began, which was also carried out with the goal of releasing Leningrad. Our troops were confident of victory.
Meretskov wrote: “The troops intended for the offensive gave us in the chosen direction more than three times superiority over the enemy in manpower, four times in tanks, two times in artillery and mortars. This is what we thought, not knowing about the arrival of Manstein’s divisions from the south.”
These divisions of Manstein arrived from near Sevastopol for the assault on Leningrad as having experience in the assault on a large coastal city during the six-month battle for Sevastopol. But they did not have to storm Leningrad. The offensive of our troops disrupted the prepared new German assault on Leningrad. E. Manstein wrote: “And so, instead of the planned attack on Leningrad, a battle unfolded south of Lake Ladoga.”
When describing the events of the Sinyavinsk operation, most historians cite Manstein’s description of it. But it was not E. Manstein who spoke honestly and clearly about it, but K. A. Meretskov, who wrote the following about the results of the operation: “The bulk of the troops finished reaching the eastern bank by dawn on September 29. The remaining units left on the night of September 30. After this, active hostilities ceased. Our troops, as well as the enemy troops, returned approximately to their old positions. The artillery duel and mutual air raids, as if by inertia, continued for several days, but no offensive actions were taken.”
Neither the commander of the Volkhov Front, K. A. Meretskov, nor the Chief of the General Staff, A. M. Vasilevsky, mentions the encirclement of German or our troops in the Sinyavinsk operation. The Neva operational group fought until October 6. The fascist command made a lot of efforts to throw the units that crossed the Neva into the water, but the glorious warriors of the Leningrad Front, thanks to the courage of the fighters and the artillery that fired across the Neva, managed to hold two small bridgeheads. This was the end of the Sinyavinsk operation. The Volkhov and Leningrad fronts failed to break the blockade of Leningrad at that time. However, the plans of the Nazi command to take Leningrad by storm suffered a complete collapse.
In the song “Volkhov Table” there are lines about the Sinyavin operation: “Our bayonets on the heights of Sinyavin, our regiments near Mga will be forever glorified in legends under a machine-gun blizzard.”
The losses of German troops in killed and captured amounted to about 60 thousand people, and in equipment - 260 aircraft, 200 tanks, 600 guns and mortars. According to the testimony of prisoners, the companies of most divisions had 20 people left in the ranks. “It’s better to visit Sevastopol three times than to stay here,” the prisoners said. The soldiers and commanders of the Red Army, with their counterattacks and two major offensives, protected the inhabitants of the besieged city. Leningrad continued to live, work and fight.
Cargo continued to be delivered to Leningrad around the clock in a continuous stream by rail and then by road or river transport (depending on the time of year) along a 25 km route across Lake Ladoga.
Not only the city, but also the entire Leningrad Front was supplied with weapons, shells, bombs, cartridges, spare parts and food. Cars and river boats returned back to the railway with people, and, from the summer of 1942, with products produced by Leningrad enterprises.
It should be noted that the degree of risk of both the winter and summer routes along the lake is exaggerated - this route did not exceed 25 kilometers and was reliably protected from enemy aircraft and ground forces. There were losses, of course, but compared to the amount of cargo delivered, the losses were insignificant.
“In the summer, Leningrad received the first tons liquid fuel along a 25-kilometer pipeline laid to supply the city and the front along the bottom of Ladoga. Later, current began to flow here again via an underwater cable from the partially restored Volkhov hydroelectric station. This allowed a number of enterprises to resume production of military products,” points out K. A. Meretskov.
Thus, in 1941-1942, the army and government did everything possible to supply the city and the Leningrad Front, protect the inhabitants of Leningrad and break the blockade by land.
On December 28, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command approved the third plan for the operation to break the blockade and gave it the name “Iskra”. “The idea of this operation was to defeat the enemy group in the Shlisserburg-Sinyavinsky ledge with counter strikes from two fronts - Leningrad and Volkhov, break the blockade and restore land communications between Leningrad and the central regions of the country.
Our soldiers near Leningrad had to fight in difficult conditions: in the summer there are a huge number of mosquitoes that give soldiers no rest either day or night, in winter very coldy and snow drifts. There are forests and swamps all around, which are difficult for a person to walk through, not to mention the traffic of cars, artillery pieces, tanks and other equipment.
After careful consideration of all options, it was decided to break through the German fortifications somewhat north of the place where they tried to break the blockade from August 19 to October 10, 1942 during the Sinyavinsk operation. “This direction was the most difficult due to the presence of extremely powerful enemy fortifications here, but it was also the shortest. We only had to cover a 12-kilometer strip between Shlisselburg and Lipki, or six kilometers for each of our two fronts,” wrote K. A. Meretskov.
The Leningrad Front could deliver a counter strike only in the place where the troops of the Volkhov Front were closest. The Leningrad Front did not have enough strength for a deeper operation, since all supplies to the front and the city were carried out along the Road of Life, that is, along the ice of Lake Ladoga.
The Germans tried to cut off the road to life, but were defeated at Suho Island. Due to the position of the Leningrad Front and the difficulty of moving equipment in swampy areas, it was necessary to plan an attack on the most German-fortified area of the Shlisselburg-Sinyavinsky ledge. The Germans had a density of troops in this area twice as high as that provided for in their regulations.
But the Headquarters was also able to provide an average of 160 guns and mortars for every kilometer of the front. This allowed our troops to create an extremely high density of fire, sufficient to destroy German fortifications. All front-line aviation as part of the 14th Air Army under Major General I.P. Zhuravlev was redirected to the offensive area. The long-range aviation of Colonel General A.E. Golovanov was also involved in the operation. The offensive of our troops was supported by the Baltic Fleet and the Ladoga Military Flotilla.
On January 12, 1943, aviation and artillery training began. Our artillery destroyed German fortifications for about 2 hours. Tens of tons of metal rained down on the enemy thoroughly destroyed German positions and suppressed many firing points. Our troops went on the offensive.
The enemy offered maximum resistance in the area of the Kruglaya Grove. All day there was close combat, which repeatedly turned into hand-to-hand combat. By evening, the indicated resistance point was taken. The 327th division was renamed Guards for the accomplished feat. On January 13 and 14, Lipki and Rabochy settlement No. 8 were isolated and cut off. All attempts by fresh German formations to break through to them from Mga were unsuccessful.
Only two, the most difficult, kilometers remained for our fronts to cover to break the blockade. And they passed them. On January 18, 1943, troops of the Volkhov and Leningrad fronts met. The blockade of Leningrad, which lasted 500 days and nights (1 year, 4 months and 10 days), was broken, and the city's connection with the country by land was restored.
Exactly millions heroic deeds Soviet people at the front and in the rear ensured our victory. The history of the Great Patriotic War has a great many examples of mass manifestations of heroism. No country or army in the world has known such mass heroism.
“When formations of the Volkhov and Leningrad fronts turned south at the end of January 1943, taking up positions along the Sinyavin line, work was already in full swing in their rear: in the corridor north of Sinyavin they began to build a railway to Leningrad. The railway brigades followed the advancing troops. The local population came to their aid, and then the fronts allocated a number of military units... A temporary ice-pile bridge was erected on the Neva, which connected the branch with the track from the Black River to the village named after Morozov.
Already on February 2, as soon as the last rails were lowered and secured from the repair and construction railcars, a trial train passed, and four days later it raced along the 36-kilometer line freight train long distance. The road to victory, the result of two weeks of heroic labor, has entered into operation,” writes the commander of the Volkhov Front, K. A. Meretskov. Roads were built parallel to the railway.
The Germans began to shell the constructed section of the railway, but the railway workers laid another branch of the railway in a safer place, and the large-caliber artillery of both our fronts and the guns taken from the ships of the Baltic Fleet destroyed the German batteries, and they fell silent.
For almost twelve months, the troops of the fronts waged battles that flared up and then died down in the direction of the Mga station, trying to expand the strip of liberated land, and not allowing the Germans to return their conquered native land. But our armies did not have forces sufficient to break through the German defenses. But Headquarters could not allocate additional troops, since the main reserves went to Stalingrad and Kursk, where the fate of the entire war was decided.
In the battles after breaking the blockade on January 18, 1943, Soviet artillery and aviation gave the Germans no rest. A.E. Golovanov writes that German troops in the Sinyavino area were bombed massively by large groups of aircraft, which gave the most tangible results. Thus, 1299 aircraft of Long-Range Bomber Aviation alone took part in eleven raids on this area. German troops and front-line aviation bombed massively.
It is known that during the attack on Leningrad, the siege of the city and the retreat, not only ours, but also German military units suffered huge losses. But our historians and politicians are silent about them, thereby making our losses at Leningrad unjustified.
Some even write that there was no need to defend the city, but that it was necessary to surrender it to the enemy, and then the Leningraders would have avoided starvation, and the soldiers would have avoided bloody battles. They write and talk about it, knowing that Hitler promised to destroy all the inhabitants of Leningrad.
I think they also understand that the fall of Leningrad would mean the death of a huge number of the population of the northwestern part of the USSR and the loss of a colossal amount of material and cultural values.
In addition, the liberated German and Finnish troops could be transferred to Moscow and other parts of the Soviet-German front, which in turn could lead to victory for Germany and the destruction of the entire population of the European part of the Soviet Union.
Only haters of Russia can regret that Leningrad was not surrendered to the enemy. Hitler was going to take Leningrad in 4 weeks by July 21, 1941 and send the liberated troops to storm Moscow, but he could not take the city by January 1944.
Hitler ordered proposals to surrender the city to German troops not to be accepted and to wipe the city off the face of the earth, but in fact, the German divisions stationed near Leningrad were wiped off the face of the earth in January 1944 by the troops of the Volkhov and Leningrad fronts.
Hitler stated that Leningrad would be the first large city captured by the Germans in the Soviet Union and spared no effort to capture it, but did not take into account that he was fighting not in Europe, but in Soviet Russia. I did not take into account the courage of the Leningraders and the strength of our weapons.
To be continued…
The opinions expressed in the publications of Leonid Maslovsky are the opinions of the author and may not coincide with the opinions of the editors of the Zvezda TV channel website.
Historians from Russia, Belarus, the USA, Great Britain, Finland, Canada, Denmark shared information found in declassified archives different countries over the last 10 - 15 years. The participants still “on the shore” agreed: the conference is not public, but scientific, so we will do without political appeals and leave emotions - only facts.
– I was in the ranks of the People’s Militia. More than 60 years have passed since then, but I just can’t cope with the feeling of the strangeness of what was happening,” began Daniil Granin, the initiator of the conference, chairman of the board of the Likhachev Foundation (this organization together with the St. Petersburg Institute of History of the Russian Academy of Sciences and with the support of the Konstantinovsky Foundation called a conference). – On September 17, 1941, my regiment, by order, left Pushkin and headed towards Leningrad. The space between Pulkovo and the city was filled with refugees and retreating units - it was a terrible sight. I was stunned by the fact that along the way we did not encounter any fortifications, no barriers... I got to the house, and when I woke up the next day, I thought that the Germans were already in the city - because access to Leningrad was open. At least in one area.
In the winter of 1941 - 1942, according to the writer, who at that time was in the fortified area near Shushar, he was not the only one who was not clear: what was the enemy trying to achieve?
“The Germans knew very well the state of our defense, but did not try to capture the city,” recalls Daniil Granin. “And the fighting seemed to be carried out only to justify their presence here.” Serious battles then took place only near Sinyavin.
“Why was the city not taken back in August and September?”, “Why was the city blocked?”, “Why was the city blocked for so long?”– those gathered tried to answer these questions “not in the way that was customary in Soviet historiography.” As one of the conference participants noted, in the study of the causes and course of the Second World War, for some reason we do not use the methods that are used in the study of the causes of the First World War.
“Hitler wanted to wipe Leningrad off the face of the earth, but when German troops approached the city, it turned out that it was impossible to enter it,” says Doctor of Historical Sciences Valentin Kovalchuk. – There was an order: if the city receives offers for surrender, under no circumstances should they be accepted. Of course, this displeased the German soldiers and commanders: we approached the city - and then what? In October, Hitler received a directive, so to speak, explanatory: Leningrad could be mined, so troops cannot be sent there.
Once upon a time, Valentin Kovalchuk, together with his colleague Gennady Sobolev, were the first to publish terrible data: in besieged Leningrad with a population of 2.5 million, about 800 thousand people died - contrary to the official “632 thousand 253”. Now historians believe that there were at least 750 thousand dead. Not counting those who died during the evacuation. Or on the road: at some stations they were taken off trains and buried in the thousands.
At one time, the Finnish historian Ohto Mannien was upset by this very thing: the lack of detailed information about those who died in Leningrad - how many died not from hunger, but were executed for crimes? How many committed suicide?
“Initially, Hitler wanted to destroy Leningrad and Moscow, but in practice difficulties arose: the country is large, there are many people, and the danger of street fighting is great,” says Manninen. “That’s why the decision was to strictly blockade the city.” Germany tried to shift the problem of governing Leningrad onto Finland, but the Finns did not accept this burden and avoided direct action against the Russians. The task of the small country of Finland at that time was to prevent the Russian army from moving forward.
For British historian John Barber, numbers are not enough.
“It’s bad that researchers usually focus on statistics: they find out the number of deaths and limit themselves to that,” Barber regrets. – It is also necessary to study how people experienced this famine - what could have weakened it and what aggravated it. This mainly concerns the distribution of food, and therefore the actions of the government, right or wrong.
On both sides
There were no German historians at the conference. As the organizers said, not for any reason - it just happened that way. Some were unable to come due to ill health.
Yuri Lebedev, chairman of the Reconciliation center and author of the book “On Both Sides of the Blockade Ring,” tried to fill the lack of a “German scientific side.”
Lebedev speaks German - and therefore there is no language barrier for him in working with German archives (“Unfortunately, our young historians do not delve into German archives simply because they do not know the language,” says Lebedev. “There is a lot of material for dissertations there!”) . In addition, Lebedev is a military man, and, as such, finds only one answer to the question “why didn’t the Germans enter the city.” Yes, because there was an order from Hitler: do not take Leningrad.
– In Soviet historiography, the emphasis was on Hitler’s plan to destroy Leningrad. And what was usually overlooked was that this plan nevertheless did not provide for ground combat operations on the part of the German army in Leningrad, notes Yuri Lebedev.
The German command, says Lebedev, considered different ways: from blocking the city and exhausting it with hunger (especially since even before the attack on the USSR, the German Ministry of Food Supply stated that the problem of food supply for Leningrad was insoluble) to the option in which the population was released from the city (saving face in front of civilized countries).
Everyone knows which option was chosen.
“Leningrad turned into a huge concentration camp, and the German 18th Army of the North group was destined for the role of overseers,” stated Lebedev. According to the historian and military man, this role was unfamiliar to the soldiers. They came to fight an armed enemy, and not to watch civilians die of hunger. This situation did not improve morale at all.
“You can’t make a criminal out of some army,” summed up the director of the Reconciliation center. – Specific people are criminals.
An interesting study was carried out by historian Alexander Rupasov, a senior researcher at the St. Petersburg Institute of History of the Russian Academy of Sciences: he traced the attitude of Leningrad residents to life as a value from a source that, it seems, had not been taken up before - materials from the city prosecutor’s office, which became military during the war.
In the summer and early autumn of 1941, business mainly concerned the purchase of antiques, gold, and escaped prisoners. Judging by the texts of the interrogations, as Rupasov says, the defendants did not cling to their lives: things couldn’t get any worse. But a sharp change in the nature of affairs, according to Rupasov, occurred in the spring of 1942. The overwhelming majority of materials now concerned denunciations of neighbors and superiors.
For example. The guard of the artel on Nevsky Prospekt reported on her boss: she called for surrender to the Germans. The boss defended himself: I was sick, I was hit by a tram, I received a head injury. And so the prosecutor’s office did not consider it difficult to ask hospitals: whether at such and such a time such and such a citizen was admitted with such and such an injury. Answer: I did, and the citizen probably has schizophrenia, so you shouldn’t apply Special attention to his statements. The case was closed.
Another case. Frontier 1942 - 1943. Leningraders believed that they would survive. In addition to the need for food, there was a need for some kind of delicacy: to at least listen to music. The district police officer found a radio in the apartment where two old women lived, which should have long been handed over for reasons of state security. And here is a five-lamp one. Crime? Yes sir. But the prosecutor's office became concerned: they ordered an examination of the radio receiver to find out whether it could be used to transmit encryption. The examination lasted two months. Answer: the receiver is good, acceptable for communication; however, all five lamps are burnt out, so it is impossible to use. The case is closed.
“There was no indiscriminate hand grabbing,” the historian concludes, and as another revealing touch, he cites a note to one of the opened cases: “The case is being closed due to the severe exhaustion of the accused.” The value of life has increased.
“Political control during the blockade: “total and effective” was the title of the report by Nikita Lomagin, a professor at St. Petersburg State University. After all, in historiography, among others, there is the concept of totalitarianism: they say that victory was ensured not by heroism, but by total control by state security agencies.
– The control was not total. Because it was impossible,” says Lomagin. – The number of NKVD employees in Leningrad was not very large: many went to the front, their places were taken by ideological, but less experienced people. For a city with a population of 2.5 million people, 1,200 NKVD officers, even taking into account 30 thousand informant agents, are not enough for total control.
Lomagin also listed other reasons for the weakening of supervision: in a besieged city with extremely low mobility, it was difficult to obtain information, transmit it, and verify it; the pre-war developments of the NKVD were practically inaccessible (the archives were prepared for evacuation and fell out of operational work).
But were the actions of the NKVD effective in this case? It turns out that yes, Nikita Lomagin answers: a serious act of sabotage has not been recorded anywhere - although during the blockade and the battle for Leningrad, the population’s critical attitude towards the authorities grew.
Conclusion: The NKVD bodies played an exceptional role in the defense of Leningrad - without this institution, chaos would have erupted in the city: neither the party nor the Soviets, according to the historian, would have been able to cope with the situation. And after the war, the party had to work a lot to return to the top level of the hierarchy, pushing down representatives of state security and the military.
It was impossible to do without emotions. For example, the British scientist John Barber was shocked by the statement that the blockade, alas, was gradually becoming some kind of local topic - not even on an all-Russian scale, but simply an event in the life of the city, and nothing more.
“In my opinion, the history of the Siege of Leningrad is of interest to people all over the world,” Barber insisted.
And since it is impossible to take heroism out of the list of reasons why we won, and it is difficult to talk about heroism with restraint, Doctor of Historical Sciences Nikolai Baryshnikov (he was in the regular troops during the Great Patriotic War) spoke out very emotionally:
– Avoiding the topic of heroics is a profound mistake. And the deepest mistake is to believe that the troops were not capable of holding the defense.
Nikolai Ivanovich once again called (as he had already done in our newspaper on September 7) to pay attention to the date September 25, 1941. This is the first victory of the defenders of Leningrad in defensive battles. And she deserves not to be forgotten.
Discussing “disputable and indisputable,” everyone agreed that decisive role played in the victory, as it was said awkwardly, but correctly - “the presence large quantity good Soviet people,” and the common denominator for both Soviet and “not particularly Soviet” people was patriotism.
It is clear that it will not be possible to continue “without emotions”. Because mutual language They are looking for those who understand what it is like not to know when the famine will end or whether it will end at all, and those who, thank God, have never gone hungry a day in their lives. And which of these sides will be more difficult is the question.
But the intention with which the conference was organized—“the formation of a common scientific space between the leading historical schools of different countries”—remained in force. Detailed conference materials are expected to be published.
At the initial stages of the war, the German leadership had every chance of capturing Leningrad. And yet this did not happen. The fate of the city, in addition to the courage of its inhabitants, was decided by many factors.
Initially, the Barbarossa plan envisaged the rapid capture of the city on the Neva by Army Group North, but there was no unity among the German command: some Wehrmacht generals believed that the city should be captured, while others, including the Chief of the General Staff, Franz Halder, assumed that we can get by with a blockade.
At the beginning of July 1941, Halder made the following entry in his diary: “The 4th Panzer Group must set up barriers to the north and south of Lake Peipus and cordon off Leningrad.” This entry does not yet allow us to say that Halder decided to limit himself to blockading the city, but the mention of the word “cordon” already tells us that he did not plan to take the city right away.
Hitler himself advocated the capture of the city, guided in this case by economic rather than political aspects. The German army needed the possibility of unhindered navigation in the Baltic Gulf.
The Soviet command understood the importance of the defense of Leningrad; after Moscow it was the most important political and economic center of the USSR. The city was home to the Kirov Machine-Building Plant, which produced the latest heavy tanks of the KV type, which played an important role in the defense of Leningrad. And the name itself - “City of Lenin” - did not allow it to be surrendered to the enemy.
So, both sides understood the importance of capturing the Northern capital. The Soviet side began construction of fortified areas in places of possible attacks by German troops. The most powerful, in the Luga area, included more than six hundred bunkers and bunkers. In the second week of July, the German fourth tank group reached this line of defense and could not immediately overcome it, and here the German plan for the Leningrad blitzkrieg collapsed.
Hitler, dissatisfied with the delay in the offensive operation and the constant requests for reinforcements from Army Group North, personally visited the front, making it clear to the generals that the city must be taken as soon as possible.
As a result of the Fuhrer's visit, the Germans regrouped their forces and in early August broke through the Luga defense line, quickly capturing Novgorod, Shiimsk, and Chudovo. By the end of the summer, the Wehrmacht achieved maximum success on this section of the front and blocked the last railway going to Leningrad.
By the beginning of autumn, it seemed that Leningrad was about to be taken, but Hitler, who focused on the plan to capture Moscow and believed that with the capture of the capital, the war against the USSR would be practically won, ordered the transfer of the most combat-ready tank and infantry units from Army Group North near Moscow. The nature of the battles near Leningrad immediately changed: if earlier German units sought to break through the defenses and capture the city, now the first priority was to destroy industry and infrastructure.
The withdrawal of troops turned out to be a fatal mistake for Hitler's plans. The remaining troops were not enough for the offensive, and the encircled Soviet units, having learned about the enemy’s confusion, tried with all their might to break the blockade. As a result, the Germans had no choice but to go on the defensive, limiting themselves to indiscriminate shelling of the city from distant positions. There could be no talk of a further offensive; the main task was to maintain the siege ring around the city. In this situation, the German command was left with three options:
1. Capture of the city after completion of the encirclement;
2. Destruction of the city with the help of artillery and aviation;
3. An attempt to deplete the resources of Leningrad and force it to capitulate.
Hitler initially had the highest hopes for the first option, but he underestimated the importance of Leningrad for the Soviets, as well as the resilience and courage of its inhabitants.
The second option, according to experts, was a failure in itself - the density of air defense systems in some areas of Leningrad (taking into account the assets of the fleet withdrawn to Leningrad from Tallinn and generally from the entire Baltic) was 5-8 times higher than the then density of air defense systems in Berlin and London, and the number of guns deployed by the Germans did not allow them to cause fatal damage to the city’s infrastructure. Although the Germans tried.
Thus, the third option remained Hitler's last hope for taking the city. It resulted in two years and five months of fierce confrontation.
By mid-September 1941, the German army completely surrounded the city. The bombing did not stop: civilian targets became targets: food warehouses, large food processing plants.
From June 1941 to October 1942, many city residents were evacuated from Leningrad. At first, however, very reluctantly, since no one believed in a protracted war, and certainly could not imagine how terrible the blockade and battles for the city on the Neva would be. The children were evacuated to Leningrad region, however, not for long - most of these territories were soon captured by the Germans and many children were returned back.
Now the main enemy of the USSR in Leningrad was hunger. It was he, according to Hitler’s plans, who was to play a decisive role in the surrender of the city. In an attempt to establish food supplies, the Red Army repeatedly attempted to break the blockade; “partisan convoys” were organized to deliver food to the city directly across the front line.
The leadership of Leningrad also made every effort to combat hunger. In November and December 1941, which were terrible for the population, active construction of enterprises producing food substitutes began. For the first time in history, bread began to be baked from cellulose and sunflower cake; in the production of semi-finished meat products, they began to actively use by-products that no one would have thought of using in food production before.
In the winter of 1941, food rations reached a record low: 125 grams of bread per person. There was practically no distribution of other products. The city was on the verge of extinction. The cold was also a severe challenge, with temperatures dropping to -32 Celsius. AND negative temperature stayed in Leningrad for 6 months. A quarter of a million people died in the winter of 1941-1942.
During the first months of the siege, the Germans bombarded Leningrad with artillery almost unhindered. They transferred to the city the heaviest guns they had, mounted on railway platforms; these guns were capable of firing at a distance of up to 28 km, with 800-900 kilogram shells. In response to this, the Soviet command began to launch a counter-battery fight; detachments of reconnaissance and saboteurs were formed, which discovered the location of the Wehrmacht's long-range artillery. Significant assistance in organizing counter-battery warfare was provided by the Baltic Fleet, whose naval artillery fired from the flanks and rear of the German artillery formations.
In addition to the Germans, Finns, Swedes, Italian and Spanish units took part in the siege. Spain did not officially participate in the war against the Soviet Union, with the exception of the volunteer Blue Division. There are different opinions about her. Some note the tenacity of its fighters, others - complete absence discipline and mass desertion, soldiers often defected to the Red Army. Italy provided torpedo boats, but their land operations were unsuccessful.
The final collapse of the plan to capture Leningrad came on January 12, 1943, it was at that moment that the Soviet command began Operation Iskra, and after 6 days of fierce fighting, on January 18, the blockade was broken. Immediately after this it was laid Railway to the besieged city, later called the “Victory Road” and also known as the “Death Corridor”. The road ran so close to the front line that German units fired cannons at the trains. However, supplies and food flowed into the city.
The blockade lasted for almost another year, but the crisis had already been overcome.
At the same time that events on the Southern Front were developing around Stalingrad, a key city on the Volga, Leningrad, the other largest city in the USSR, became the center of an important campaign on the northernmost flank of the German front. Leningrad is the most powerful sea fortress in the Baltic, the home base of the Navy, the cultural pearl of Russia, the second most populous city in the Soviet Union with 3 million inhabitants. Everything that happened between the northern seas and Lake Ilmen after September 1941 was related to Leningrad. Instead of taking Leningrad with a powerful tank attack - as prescribed by the plan of Operation Barbarossa - Hitler, around mid-September 1941, unexpectedly stopped the offensive right on the outskirts of the city and ordered Field Marshal von Leeb to limit himself to a blockade. Hitler provided an explanation for this to his officers in a document classified “top secret” dated October 7, 1941: “The Fuhrer confirms his decision that the surrender of Leningrad or subsequently Moscow will be rejected, even if proposed by the enemy. Our moral justification for such a measure is clear to the whole world. In Kyiv, the German troops faced enormous risks when faced with timed mines, and the same, even on a larger scale, was to be expected in Moscow and Leningrad. The fact that Leningrad was mined and would be defended to the last soldier was announced on Soviet radio Moreover, there remains a serious risk of epidemics. Therefore, no German soldier should enter these cities. Any attempts to leave the city in the direction of our positions must be resolutely suppressed. Leave small, not completely closed passages through which the population can retreat into the interior of Russia. Do the same in all other cities: before capturing, weaken with artillery fire and air bombing, encourage the withdrawal of the population... Bring to the attention of all commanding officers that this is the will of the Fuhrer." Perhaps this justification of Hitler does not reveal the true reason. his decision not to take Leningrad. Nevertheless, the arguments he chose apparently made it very easy for him to switch to a blockade strategy. First of all, they allowed Hitler to win over the generals, who, of course, would prefer to capture the city, but it was difficult to refute Hitler's arguments. Indeed, after the occupation of Kyiv in September 1941, German troops suffered significant losses due to time-operated mines planted by the Russians. Entire blocks of houses were mined, resulting in the destruction of the entire central street. Reports of this kind of unusual, risky and "fanatical" action made a deep impression on Hitler, and he was inclined to overestimate them. Four weeks after his secret order, on November 8, 1941, Hitler again gave explanations to the surprised German public and the world at large, why the attack on Leningrad was stopped. They were somewhat different from the document intended for combat commanders, but were filled with the same pathos. In a traditional speech in a Munich beer cellar, he said: "Anyone who has walked from the border of East Prussia to Leningrad can cover the last ten kilometers and enter the city. However, this is not necessary. The city is surrounded. No one is going to liberate it, and it will fall at our feet." He was wrong. And this mistake became the first link in a sad series of events at Army Group North, events that, without a doubt, contributed to the outcome of the war. Hitler forced an entire German army to stand guard outside a single city. It allowed the enemy to retain an important center of military industry and the naval base of the Baltic Fleet. He did not even close the Oranienbaum sack, this large Soviet bridgehead on the southern coast of the Gulf of Finland west of Leningrad. He decided, as the Finnish Field Marshal Mannerheim so well said, “to carry this heavy backpack on his back throughout the war.” It is even more incomprehensible that instead of capturing Leningrad and thus establishing a direct land connection with allied Finland, Hitler blocked his own road and, in addition In addition, he saved the Russians from the loss of approximately forty-two divisions that were in Leningrad and the Oranienbaum pocket. On the northern wing of the Eastern Front, Hitler did not take a decisive step at the end of September 1941. Instead of achieving final victory, he recklessly began a demanding blockade of nine hundred days, which ended in his defeat. What led Hitler to this mistake? Why did he ignore the opinion of the combat commanders? Why did he count on the imminent collapse of Leningrad? Hitler underestimated the resilience and tenacity of the Communist Party in this city. Leningrad was led by Zhdanov, a Ukrainian born in Mariupol in 1892, he was an extraordinary man. His firmness, determination and personal courage inspired the entire city to resist. For the first time in modern history, Zhdanov showed the world what a ruthless total war on a limited territory means. Hitler's dislike of anything to do with water or sea contrasts strangely with his fascination with land warfare. Just as in Dunkirk, in Leningrad he was again let down by his fear of water. He was sure that the city was surrounded, but did not take into account that, although Leningrad was cut off by land from the Soviet front in the summer, its encirclement could not be considered complete. The suburbs of Leningrad overlook the western shore of Lake Ladoga, the width of which in this place is no more than thirty kilometers. No wider than the English Channel between Dover and Calais. And the main line of the Soviet front ran along the eastern shore of the lake. During the day, for example, navigation on the lake was controlled by the Luftwaffe, but at night everything was different. Thus, from the first day of the siege of Leningrad, Lake Ladoga was the road to salvation. Attempts by German mobile formations of the 39th Tank Corps in October and November 1941 to move around the lake, connect with the Finns on Svir and close the blockade ring were unsuccessful. Accordingly, after leaving Tikhvin, the German 18th Army held only a fifteen-kilometer strip on the southern bank of Ladoga, limited by Shlisselburg and Lipka. Access to this strip was carried out through a very dangerous narrow corridor: on the right was the Volkhov Front, which constantly exerted serious pressure, on the left was the Neva, behind which the 67th, 55th and 42nd armies of the Leningrad Front were assigned. In the middle of the corridor, a swampy area was controlled from the hills near Sinyavin. At the southern end of this section was the Kirov Railway, connecting Leningrad to the Urals via Volkhovstroy. However, what would have been true a year ago was now false. Because in the summer of 1942, the strategic center of gravity of the German front was the south, where the offensive was underway in the direction of the Volga and the Caucasus. There, in this decisive place, it was necessary to concentrate all available forces. Including the 11th Army. However, Hitler did not stoop to listen to criticism at that time. Leningrad must fall. Manstein's plan was simple and at the same time cunning: he intended to break through the Soviet positions from the south with three corps, reach the outskirts of the city, then wait for two corps to advance east and cross the Neva. And then they will take the city. Not a bad plan. Until now, everything that Manstein planned had succeeded. However, Leningrad was destined to confirm the well-known saying about “the ebb and flow of the tides in people’s affairs: business undertaken at the tide succeeds; but if the moment is missed, enterprises are doomed to shoals and failure.” Manstein's plan didn't work!