“I look at my I-16 with love. Thank you, my dear “donkey”! You turned out to be much better than the Japanese I-97 fighter. Both in speed and strength. You saved me more than once, took enemy bullets upon yourself. Thanks to your creator Nikolai Nikolaevich Polikarpov!”
Vorozheikin A.V., pilot of the 22nd IAP
Brief history of events
On March 1, 1932, the “independent” state of Manchukuo appeared on the territory of Manchuria, created by the Japanese as one of the springboards for a future invasion of Soviet Primorye and Eastern Siberia. After the unsuccessful conflict for the Kwantung Army on Lake Khasan, it was from here that it was decided to launch another strike.
The formal reason for the outbreak of the conflict was the claims of Manchukuo to the Mongolian People's Republic. The leaders of the first country (in fact, the Japanese behind them) in the spring of 1939 began to demand a revision of the state border between the states along the Khalkhin Gol River. The Japanese military began to lay a railway line directed to the USSR border. Due to the nature of the terrain, the road could only pass in an area close to the Mongolian border. Thus, in the event of a war with the Soviet Union, it could easily be blocked by artillery fire from the Mongolian side, which, naturally, was unacceptable for the Kwantung Army. Moving the border close to the Khalkhin Gol River, that is, several tens of kilometers deep into Mongolian territory, would solve the problems of the Japanese. Mongolia refused to satisfy the demands of Manchukuo. The Soviet Union, which concluded a Protocol on Mutual Assistance with the Mongolian People's Republic on March 12, 1936, stated that it would “defend the borders of Mongolia as its own.” Neither side was going to compromise. The first shots were fired on May 11, 1939. By May 14, Japanese-Manchurian troops occupied the entire “disputed” territory up to Khalkhin Gol; the Japanese government did not react in any way to the actions of the Kwantung Army and did not respond to the note sent by the Soviet Union. The war has begun.
Composition of forces
At the beginning of the conflict in Mongolia, according to the Protocol, the Soviet 57th Special Corps was stationed, consisting of 30 thousand military personnel, 265 tanks, 280 armored vehicles and 107 combat aircraft. The fighter forces were represented by the 70th IAP, which had 14 I-15bis and 24 I-16 as of May 1939. All the “donkeys,” which were far from being the newest, belonged to the already outdated type 5 and did not have armored backs. The level of combat readiness of the fighters was low: by May 20, only 13 I-16s and 9 I-15bis could take off. The regiment's personnel consisted of inexperienced pilots who mainly knew only piloting techniques; They were not trained in either group combat or shooting. Discipline was seriously lame; due to poor living conditions, many fighter pilots wrote letters asking to be sent to the Union. The Japanese fighter force, numbering 20 vehicles Nakajima Ki.27(two squadrons), were equipped with experienced pilots, many of the Japanese had experience fighting in China. This balance of forces was not slow to affect the results of the first battles.
Air battles
The first loss of the Red Army Air Force was a liaison R-5Sh, shot down by Japanese fighters on May 21. And the next day the first air battle between fighters took place: 3 I-16s and 2 I-15bis met with five Ki-27s. One "donkey", which broke away from the group and rushed to attack, was instantly shot down (pilot I.T. Lysenko died), the rest did not enter the battle. At this time, the Soviet Union began to pull up forces in the conflict area. On May 23, 1939, the 22nd IAP arrived in Mongolia, which, in addition to thirty-five I-15bis (one of them went missing during the flight), included 28 I-16 type 10, and the aircraft were in good technical condition. However, the level of training of the pilots of this regiment also left much to be desired, which did not allow, as it turned out later, to turn the situation in the air in their favor. In addition, the Japanese, in turn, transferred another 20 Ki-27s to Manchuria (two squadrons of the 11th Sentai). On May 27, the very unsuccessful “debut” of the I-16 of the 22nd IAP took place. Near Lake Buin Nur, a battle between six “donkeys” and nine Ki.27s took place. One Soviet pilot was killed, two were wounded; two I-16s were shot down, three were seriously damaged. The Japanese had no losses.
If even the I-16, which was close in its characteristics to the Japanese fighter, suffered huge losses, then it can be reasonably assumed that there was no point in flying the I-15bis pilots at all. Actually, that’s almost what happened. Our pilots, accustomed to the exceptional maneuverability of their biplanes, were surprised to discover during battles with the Japanese that they no longer had an advantage in this characteristic (the maneuverability of the Ki.27 was no worse). So, on May 28, the I-15bis flight of the 70th IAP was completely destroyed in battle, all the pilots were killed. On the same day, in a battle between nine biplanes from the 22nd IAP and the 18th Ki-27, six of our aircraft were lost in the air, another was shot down on the ground after an emergency landing, five pilots were killed, one was wounded. The Japanese once again escaped without losses. When it became clear to the Soviet leadership that it would not be possible to seize air supremacy with the existing forces, new aircraft and experienced pilots began to arrive in the battle area. On May 29, 1939, a group of forty-eight people arrived in Mongolia on three Douglas transport aircraft - the most experienced pilots and technicians, many of whom had visited Spain and China. The Japanese also strengthened their group, but were unable to achieve a numerical advantage.
Over time, Soviet pilots began to fight more confidently, and the loss ratios began to improve in our direction. The “transitional moment” can be considered June 22, 1939, when the largest air battle between Japanese and Soviet fighters took place. 18 combat-ready Ki-27s of the 24th Sentai took off to intercept a group of Soviet fighters. From the Red Army Air Force, 105 aircraft took off (56 I-16 and 49 I-15bis). However, they attacked in two waves, and some of the Soviet aircraft did not participate in the battle at all. The Japanese estimate their irretrievable losses at seven aircraft, the Red Army Air Force lost seventeen aircraft (14 I-15bis and 3 I-16), of which thirteen aircraft and eleven pilots were lost in the air. Four I-15bis were set on fire on the ground during landing, but their pilots escaped. Despite the fact that the losses of the Red Army Air Force significantly exceeded the losses of the Japanese, the battlefield remained with the Soviet pilots: the Japanese were forced to retreat.
It is noticeable that the units that fought on Polikarpov biplanes suffered significantly more than those armed with the I-16: the obsolescence of the I-15bis made itself felt. Already at the end of July, these aircraft were withdrawn from the first line units (a number of them remained in the air defense of airfields), and new I-153 biplanes with retractable landing gear and a more powerful M-62 engine arrived in their place. Among other new products of the Soviet aircraft industry that were “noted” at Khalkhin Gol, mention should be made of the I-16P (I-16 type 17) - cannon versions of the widely used I-16 type 10, as well as “donkey” variants with M-62 engines. The first such vehicles were obtained by upgrading the I-16 type 10 in the field (the engines were taken from stocks for the I-153); subsequently, factory versions began to arrive, called I-16 type 18... Meanwhile, Japanese troops, under pressure from Soviet-Mongolian forces, began to retreat. On August 20, a decisive offensive operation began to encircle and destroy the Kwantung Army group east of the Khalkhin Gol River. By this day, the strength of the Soviet aviation group had reached its maximum. In the August battles, Japanese aircraft tried in vain to seize the initiative, but they failed. Strikes on Soviet airfields also did not bring the desired results. The air units of the imperial aviation were losing equipment and pilots.
In this difficult situation The impossibility of quickly restoring the fleet of Ki-27 fighters was especially affected: the Nakajima plant could produce only one aircraft per day. As a result, the Japanese had to use the 9th Sentai, armed with outdated biplanes, in battles Kawasaki Ki.10. On September 2, 1939, these fighters first appeared in the skies of Khalkhin Gol and immediately began to suffer significant losses. Soon, the defeated Japanese requested a truce. On September 15, an agreement was signed between the USSR, the Mongolian People's Republic and Japan to cease hostilities from 13.00 on September 16. Before this, the Kwantung Army aviation attempted to launch large-scale attacks on Soviet airfields. Their idea failed: as a result, the attackers suffered greater losses than the attacked. The repulse of the Japanese raid on September 15, during which ten Japanese planes were shot down against six Soviet ones (one I-16 and five I-153), can be considered the last air battle in the skies over Khalkhin Gol.
The number of serviceable fighters is given in parentheses, if known.
| Period | I-15bis | I-153 | I-16 | I-16P |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 20.05-31.05 | 13 (1) | - | 5 (1) | - |
| 1.06-30.06 | 31 (2) | - | 17 (2) | - |
| 1.07-31.07 | 16 (1) | 2 (1) | 41 (2) | - |
| 1.08-31.08 | 5 (1) | 11 (4) | 37 (16) | 2 (0) |
| 1.09-16.09 | - | 9 (1) | 5 (1) | 2 (0) |
| Total | 65 (5) | 22 (6) | 105 (22) | 4 (0) |
Non-combat losses are given in parentheses.
Enemy fighters
As mentioned above, the main Japanese fighter in the conflict area was the army Ki-27 (aka “type 97”, Soviet name - I-97) from Nakajima. At first, Soviet pilots mistook it for a Mitsubishi A5M, which debuted in China. The mistake was eventually revealed: this happened after the arrival of war veterans in China to the theater of operations. As A.V. Vorozheikin recalled, at the end of June, Corporal Smushkevich, Colonel Lakeev, Major Kravchenko and some other pilots studied the wreckage of a Japanese fighter and discovered the absence of struts on the chassis, characteristic of a Mitsubishi product.
In its structure, the Ki-27 is very similar to the A5M, but its engine power is lower. However, due to better aerodynamics and lower weight, it is superior in basic characteristics (except range) to its “brother” from the Imperial Navy Air Force. The armament remained the same: two rifle-caliber machine guns. Both existing modifications of the “type 97” were used at Khalkhin Gol: Ki-27-Ko(other name options: Ki-27a, Ki-27-I) and Ki-27-Otsu(Ki-27b, Ki-27-II). The latest version featured a “canopy” with all-round visibility, a redesigned oil cooler, as well as the ability to install underwing fuel tanks and a suspension of small-caliber bombs. The Type-97 was superior in its characteristics to both the I-15bis and the I-153. With the I-16 the situation was somewhat more complicated. Horizontal
The maneuverability of the Ki-27 was better than that of any version of the donkey. In addition, I-16s with M-25 engines were inferior to the Japanese fighter in terms of climb speed and altitude, but had better weapons and armor protection. “Donkeys” also had a more durable design and could reach higher speeds in a dive. An important advantage of the Ki-27 was its high stability, which partly compensated for the low per second weight of the salvo when firing. Even after the arrival of the I-16 Type 18 fighters, superior to the Ki-27 in speed and climb rate, the Japanese fighters remained dangerous opponents. The shortcomings of the aircraft were compensated by the merits of their pilots: according to the recollections of Soviet veterans who managed to fight in Spain, the Japanese were superior to the Italians in experience, and the Germans in aggressiveness. From the interrogation of the captured Japanese pilot Miajimo:
“It’s best to fight with the I-15 on horizontal and vertical turns, with the I-16 it’s the same. He believes that the I-16 fighter is more dangerous, explaining this by the speed and maneuverability of the I-16.
When an I-16 attacks head-on, the I-97 goes up followed by a ranversman. When I-16 attacks I-97 from above, I-97 goes into a turn.
The pilot states that Japanese pilots do not like front attacks, they are afraid of damage to the engine, and consider it best to attack the I-16 from above from behind. As a rule, exiting a battle with a corkscrew is not used.”
Another Japanese fighter that fought at Khalkhin Gol was the Kawasaki Ki-10 biplane. In general terms, it was an analogue of the Soviet I-15bis and by 1939 it was irrevocably outdated. Here is a description of one of the first battles between the I-16 and the Ki-10:
Captured Ki-10-II, tested at the Air Force Research Institute
“On one of the first days of autumn, Senior Lieutenant Fedor Cheremukhin, deputy commander of the 22nd IAP, flew out on a combat patrol. Soon he noticed that a group of Japanese planes appeared from across the river. Cheremukhin, giving a sign to his wingmen, turned his I-16 towards the enemy. This was not the first battle for him, and he studied well the appearance of the main Japanese fighter Ki-27. But this time the Soviet pilots encountered completely different machines. The elegant, sharp-nosed biplanes vividly reminded the deputy commander of the old Polikarpov I-3, on which he once began his career as a combat pilot. The ensuing “aerial carousel” immediately showed that the Japanese fighters were superior to the “donkeys” in turns, noticeably inferior to them in speed and rate of climb. Our pilots quickly figured out that it was better to start hitting biplanes from long distances, and, without getting involved in close combat, leave to repeat the attack on the vertical. Soon Cheremukhin managed to get behind one of the Japanese and fire a targeted burst. A jet erupted from the fuselage of an enemy aircraft white steam. “The radiator is broken,” the senior lieutenant noted to himself and sharply released the gas so as not to overshoot the enemy. At random, the Japanese pilot was either confused or wounded, but he did not even try to maneuver to get out of the fire, but continued to “pull” in a straight line while descending, leaving a long plume of steam behind him. Taking careful aim once again, Cheremukhin fired a long burst at the engine of the damaged car. Instead of steam, thick black smoke poured out of the “Japanese”, and it, increasing its dive angle, crashed almost vertically into the ground.”
Interestingly, according to Japanese data, only one Ki-10 was lost during the conflict.
| Camouflage schemes | |
|---|---|
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Nakajima Ki-27-Ko st. Sergeant Kashida, 2nd Chutai, 59th Fighter Sentai |
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Nakajima Ki-27-Otsu commander of the 2nd Chutai of the 11th Fighter Sentai |
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Against bombers
The Japanese bombers used in the conflict area gave the Soviet aviation leadership another reason for thought: the speed of any of them (not counting the light reconnaissance aircraft and the Ki-36 bomber) exceeded that of the biplane fighters of the Red Army Air Force. Thus, the situation characteristic of the war in Spain was repeated: the I-16 became the main means of intercepting bombers. The main medium bomber in the theater of operations was the aircraft Mitsubishi Ki.21(according to the Japanese classification it was considered heavy). The Mitsubishi product had a very good speed of 432 km/h, which, however, did not exceed the I-16 type 10. Considering the low level of security characteristic of Japanese aircraft of that time, the Ki-21, in theory, was supposed to become an easy target for the donkeys, but only six aircraft were lost during the conflict. Another common Japanese attack aircraft at Khalkhin Gol was a single-engine Mitsubishi Ki.30 with a fixed landing gear with a maximum speed of 430 km/h. It was he who suffered the greatest losses among Japanese bombers during the conflict. Another Japanese aircraft, a single-engine reconnaissance aircraft, should be noted Mitsubishi Ki.15-Ko Karigane. Thanks to good aerodynamics (despite the non-retractable landing gear) and light design, this aircraft could reach a maximum speed of 481 km/h, which made it difficult to reach even for the I-16 with M-62 engines. However, seven aircraft of this type were still shot down. The next modification of the reconnaissance aircraft, Ki-15-Otsu, reached 510 km/h, but it did not arrive in time for the battles at Khalkhin Gol.
The use of unguided rockets
From August 20 to 31, a flight of missile-carrying fighters took part in the hostilities, which included five I-16s (flight commander Captain N. Zvonarev, pilots I. Mikhailenko, S. Pimenov, V. Fedosov and T. Tkachenko), armed with installations RS-82. On August 20, 1939, at 16:00, the pilots over the front line met with Japanese fighters and launched the RS from a distance of about a kilometer. As a result, 2 enemy aircraft were shot down. The success was due to the fact that the Japanese flew in close formation and at a constant speed. In addition, the surprise factor was at work. The Japanese did not understand who was attacking them (they attributed their losses to the actions of Soviet anti-aircraft gunners). In total, the missile carrier flight took part in 14 battles, shooting down 13 Japanese aircraft without losses. The Japanese military, having studied the wreckage of their equipment, came to the conclusion that large-caliber guns were installed on our fighters.| Camouflage schemes | |
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I-16 type 5 commander of the 2nd squadron of the 70th IAP Art. Lt. M. P. Noga, autumn 1938. The blue star instead of a number on the vertical tail was obviously the emblem of the command vehicle. Artist - Sergey Vakhrushev. |
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The author of the second drawing is Andrey Yurgenson. |
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I-16 type 10 of the 70th IAP. The green protective color was applied in the field over the factory silver-gray paint. Artist - Sergey Vakhrushev. |
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I-16 type 10 of one of the Soviet aviation formations. The color of the propeller spinner and rudder tip is indicated tentatively. Artist - Sergey Vakhrushev. |
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I-16 type 10 Vitta Skobarikhin. 22nd IAP, Tamtsag-Bulak airfield, summer 1939. |
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| I-16 type 10 | I-16 type 17 | I-16 type 18 | Kawasaki Ki.10-II | Nakajima Ki.27 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Manufacturer country | USSR | USSR USSRJapan | Japan | ||
| 1938 | 1938 | 1939 | 1935 (1937**) | 1937 | |
| Wingspan, m | 9.00 | 9.00 | 9.0010.02/n. d.* | 11.31||
| 6.07 | 6.076.07 | 7.55 | 7.53|||
| Height, m | 3.25 | 3.25 | 3.253.00 | 3.25 | |
| Wing area, m2 | 14.54 | 14.5414.54 | 23.00 18.56|||
| Engine | M-25VM-25V | M-62 Kawasaki Ha-9-IIb"Army Type 97" | |||
| Power, hp | 750 | 750 | 800 | 850 | 710 |
| Aircraft weight, kg. | |||||
| - empty | 1327 | 14261434 | 1360 | 1110||
| - takeoff | 1716 1810 18301740 | 1790 | |||
| Speed, km/h | |||||
| - near the ground | 398 | 385 | 413 n. d.n. d. | ||
| 425 | 461400 | 470||||
| Rate of climb, m/min | 882688 | 1034 | n. d. | 920||
| Practical ceiling, m | 8470 | 8240 | 9300 | 11150 | 10000|
| Range, km | 525 | 417485 | 1100 627|||
| Turn time, s | 16-18 | 17-18 | 17 | n. d. | 8 |
| Armament | 4 7.62 mm ShKAS machine guns | 2 20-mm ShVAK cannons, 2 7.62-mm ShKAS machine guns | 4 7.62 mm ShKAS machine guns | 2 7.7 mm synchronized machine guns "type 89" | |
| Pilot's name | Subdivision | Number of victories on I-16 (personal + group) | Notes|
|---|---|---|---|
| Rakhov V. G. | 22nd IAP | 8+6 | - |
| Vorozheikin A.V. | 22nd IAP | 6+13 | Flew on I-16P |
| Kravchenko G. P. | 22nd IAP | 5 | Commander of the 22nd IAP since July 1939 |
| Trubachenko V. P. | 22nd IAP | 5 | Squadron commander I-16P |
| Krasnoyurchenko I. I. | n. d. | 5 | Flew on I-16P |
| Smirnov B. A. | n. d. | 4 | - |
| Skobarikhin V. F. | 22nd IAP | 2+6 | - |
| Zvonarev N. I. | 22nd IAP | 2+5 | Flew I-16 with RO-82 |
| Antonenko A.K.* | n. d. | 0+6 | - |
| Glazykin N. G. | 22nd IAP | 1 | Commander of the 22nd IAP, died 06/22/1939 |
Information sources Kondratyev V. Khalkhin-Gol: War in the air. - M.: “Technicians - Youth”, 2002. Stepanov A. Air war on Khalkhin Gol. // “Corner of the Sky” Astakhova E. Kawasaki Ki-10 fighter. // “Planes of the World” No. 03 (23), 2000. Kondratyev V. Battle over the steppe. Aviation in the Soviet-Japanese armed conflict on the Khalkhin Gol River. - M., 2008. Mikhail Maslov. Polikarpov I-15, I-16 and I-153 aces. Osprey Publishing, 2010.
“And I, if you want to know,” said a member of the Military Council when the upset Shmelev left, “I don’t believe in a big war in the near future at all.” Far East.
- Why?
- Because by beating them here, we thereby appealed to their common sense!
- Do you think they called? – the commander interrupted ironically.
– I think, to some extent, they called. I'm even sure.
Konstantin Simonov. "Comrades in Arms"
Since the end of the 19th century, Japan has desperately sought to establish itself as a power of the “first magnitude”. But the Japanese claims to full equality with “white people” caused at best a smile in Europe and the United States. Therefore, Japan expanded its sphere of influence step by step - carefully but relentlessly, at every opportunity. By the end of the 30s, this policy brought Japan Taiwan, Korea, Port Arthur, Qingdao, and Manchuria. Finally, in 1937, Japanese troops began an open invasion of central China.
The European powers did not approve of such a war, but were too far away and were busy with other problems - like the United States. Although descriptions of a future war in the Pacific regularly appeared in the US press, the Japanese even got away with accidentally sinking the gunboat Panay on the Yangtze.
The Soviet Union, on the contrary, saw troops hostile to itself nowhere closer - in the south of Sakhalin, in the Kuril Islands and in Manchuria - Manchukuo. Plus, there was already the sad experience of Japanese intervention in the Far East. Some Japanese were not averse to “coloring the waters of the Amur the color of blood,” but Japan as a whole was still cautious. Naturally, the USSR, without waiting for a big war, took measures to ensure that these dreams never came true. Since 1936, in the Mongolian People's Republic (MPR), under a mutual assistance agreement, there was the 57th Special Corps with headquarters in Ulaanbaatar, which had about 20 thousand people, 109 guns, 364 tanks, 365 armored vehicles, 113 aircraft. Since 1938, Soviet T-26 tanks were unloaded in Chinese ports, and Soviet pilots fought in the Chinese skies. However, clashes regularly occurred near the border of the USSR, and in 1938 there was a serious conflict near Lake Khasan. The area of the Khalkhin Gol River in the east of the Mongolian People's Republic became a new place for Japan to test its strength.
On Japanese maps, the border between the MPR and Manchukuo ran along the river; on Chinese, Manchu and Mongolian maps, it was 12–18 km east of the river.
The area east of Khalkhin Gol was flat, but intersected by continuous sandy hillocks - the sites of future stubborn battles. If the Japanese could quietly, without much effort, take control of the area east of the river, then they could control the entire surrounding area.
This plan had a chance of success - the railway stations from which ammunition for the Soviet troops were unloaded were located at a distance of up to 700 and even 800 km from the battle site. And then the steppe began with directions instead of roads.
A machine gunner of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Army covers his troops
On May 11, a group of “Japanese-Manchurians” (according to the latest data, Manchurian cavalry) with mortars and light machine guns attacked the post of the Mongolian border guards. On May 14, a new battle took place - Japanese aircraft were used. Due to the remoteness of the skirmishes and the “criminal” state of communication lines in Mongolia, even the command of the Special Corps learned about the first battles only on May 14 - almost simultaneously with Moscow.
On May 20–21, Soviet units and Mongolian cavalry were able to push the Japanese back into Manchurian territory.
New forces were pulled up to the battlefield on the eastern bank - in total, the group of Soviet-Mongolian troops numbered about 2,300 people (of which 1,257 were Mongols), 24 towed and 4 self-propelled guns, 8 T-37 light tanks, 5 HT-26 flamethrowers and 39 FAI armored cars and BA-6. There was a lack of operational communications and intelligence.
Therefore, on May 28, the units, repelling new Japanese attacks, fought “on their own,” depending on the situation on the spot. A squadron of Mongolian armored vehicles (9 BA-6) went on the attack six times during the day, losing two armored vehicles burned out and three stuck in the sand.
By the end of May, the Soviet Air Force had 203 aircraft at Khalkhin Gol versus 76. But Soviet fighter pilots did not study the battle experience of their colleagues in Spain and China. Therefore, the first air battles took place, in fact, “with one goal” - instead of operating in squadrons, I-15 and I-16 took off one by one, and, not having time to gain altitude, came under attack by compact groups of Japanese fighters - from the direction of the sun or from the clouds. Japanese aircraft dominated the air, inflicting heavy losses on ground troops, especially cavalry. However, according to Soviet estimates, the Japanese had practically no artillery until the end of the May battles.
Briefing Japanese tank crews at the Yi-Go tank (Type 89) during the offensive in the Mongolian steppe. A Chi-Ha (Type 97) tank is visible in the background.
On May 29, it was possible to restore at least some order, and the Soviet units went on the offensive. The trump card was a platoon of flamethrower tanks that defeated a Japanese reconnaissance detachment, its commander, Lieutenant Colonel Azuma, was killed.
Both sides, taking a break, began to prepare for new battles. Serious problems were revealed in the training and equipment of Soviet troops. It happened that units arrived at the battlefield, leaving machine guns in the same place. Many soldiers and even officers were untrained. Cars and tractors came from civil organizations on the principle of “take what they give” - often faulty and without spare parts. In the unbearable summer heat, water had to be transported 20–70 or more km from the Khalkhin Gol River, the only source.
A major battle took place on July 2–3, when two Japanese tank regiments, supported by artillery and infantry, tried to cut off and destroy Soviet units at Khalkhin Gol with a strike from the north. On the night of July 3, the Japanese crossed the river unnoticed and in the morning reached Mount Bain-Tsagan. A delay in response risked the encirclement and destruction of the Soviet group, or at least the consolidation of the Japanese on lines advantageous for defense.
From the morning until the evening of July 3, hastily deployed Soviet tanks and armored cars (about 200 vehicles in total) rammed Japanese positions. The tankers advanced in separate battalions, without any reconnaissance or communications, and naturally suffered heavy losses. However, the Japanese were simply stunned by the sight of the rolling wave of Soviet armor, counting a thousand tanks - when in China they were rarely attacked by a dozen tanks at the same time. The Japanese group was evacuated across the bridge back to the eastern bank.
Soviet Douglas DC-3 aircraft at Ulaanbaatar airfield
The protracted and dangerous conflict had to end. New tank units were driving across the Mongolian steppes. The vehicles did an incredible job. For ground troops, 6 ammunition and fuel refills were concentrated, for SB bombers - 5, for fighters - 12–15 refills. Tankers learned to interact with infantry, and the noticeable handrail antennas of command vehicles were replaced with whip antennas. False radiograms were sent about preparations for defense. The Japanese were therefore quietly preparing to launch an offensive on 24 August when they were suddenly caught off guard by a Soviet attack on the morning of 20 August.
The commander of the Soviet T-26 tank briefing the crew
The training of the Japanese army was very specific. “As long as you are alive, you should be shocked by the great imperial mercy. After death, you must become a guardian angel of the Japanese Empire,” the memo to the soldiers said. Propaganda described how a seriously wounded soldier, whose arm and leg were cut off, “rose up, prayed into the distance to the imperial palace, proclaimed three times “Banzai!” and died. What a truly beautiful demise.” The Soviet military praised the high training of the Japanese infantry, which fought stubbornly at night and even when surrounded. The Japanese quickly and skillfully dug in, were excellent at camouflage, and managed to secretly build fortifications from concrete bricks and beams in the open steppe. Ahead of the main forces were single snipers, suicide bombers with bottles of gasoline and mines on poles to fight the tanks. Despite the dunes and bushes, the entire space in front of the trenches was under fire. At night, the Japanese managed to understand about the impending attacks by the great noise made by the Soviet units while moving.
Red Army Air Force officers S. I. Gritsevets, I. A. Prachik, G. P. Kravchenko, P. M. Korobov, A. I. Smirnov, who participated in the battles at Khalkhin Gol
But the Japanese army’s limited experience in modern warfare took its toll. Accustomed to smashing brave but disorganized and poorly equipped Chinese units, the Japanese positioned their guns in such a way that Soviet observers could easily see the flashes of most batteries. Moreover, having lovingly equipped firing positions, the Japanese artillerymen were then very reluctant to change them. Such behavior would have been unthinkable even on the fields of the First World War, let alone the war in Spain. Therefore, the Soviet artillerymen took aim a few days before the decisive offensive, surely knowing that the enemy guns would not go anywhere. And so it happened - on August 20, after the Soviet artillery barrage, the enemy artillery was almost completely silent, and the Japanese anti-aircraft guns did not fire a single shot at the attacking aircraft. After the end of the fighting, many “very successful hits” were discovered on Japanese positions; most of the captured guns were cut by shrapnel, and often had direct hits from shells. Already in the July battles, the fire of Soviet heavy artillery terrified the Japanese.
Having assembled a powerful air group (376 fighters, 181 SB bombers and 23 TB-3 - 580 aircraft), transferring experienced pilots from all over the country, Soviet aviation achieved a turning point in the air. On August 20, 166 tons of bombs fell on the Japanese. On August 25, fighters announced 48 Japanese aircraft shot down - without losses on their part.
The crew of a Soviet SB bomber near their aircraft at an airfield in Mongolia. In the photo from left to right: pilot senior political instructor K. S. Shvetsov, engine mechanic A. N. Kovalev, navigator senior lieutenant S. B. Isaev, gunner-radio operator A. Ya. Mylnikov, technician K. N. Balakin
The Japanese army was sorely short of armored vehicles. Although Soviet intelligence counted the enemy's 150 tanks and 284 armored vehicles, the Japanese used only about 70 tanks, losing more than half of them in just a couple of battles and taking the survivors to the rear. Major Ogata's dark joke came true that the coffins of tankers cost one hundred thousand yen each - so the fate of tankers is much better than that of ordinary infantry who receive the cheapest box. As a result, at the decisive moment, the Japanese troops simply did not have tanks.
Soldiers of the 8th motorized armored brigade near armored vehicles BA-20 and BA-10 during the battles at Khalkhin Gol
In long and difficult battles against a stubborn, but much less equipped enemy, Soviet troops acquired invaluable combat experience and a lot of food for thought. But an even more important result was that Japan in subsequent years did not dare to test the strength of the USSR again - even in the most difficult years of the Great Patriotic War.
A Soviet officer and soldiers inspect the remains of a Japanese aircraft during the fighting at Khalkhin Gol
After several armed incidents provoked by Japan (1935-1936) on the border of the Mongolian People's Republic (MPR) and the puppet state of Manchukuo in the first half of 1939 in the area of the river. Khalkhin Gol began the concentration of large military formations of the Japanese armed forces and Soviet-Mongolian troops. A limited military contingent of the Red Army was located on the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic in accordance with the protocol on mutual assistance of March 12, 1936, signed between the USSR and Mongolia.
I-16 fighter from the 70th IAP at the Tamsag-Bulak airfield
The total strength of the Japanese Air Force stationed in Manchukuo (as of May 1, 1939) was 355 aircraft. The 57th Special Corps of the Red Army, located in Mongolia, had 82 aircraft (100th mixed air brigade). By the end of May, their number increased to 203 aircraft due to the additional transfer of the 23rd air brigade to the theater of operations from Transbaikalia. General leadership The Red Army Air Force in the conflict zone was entrusted to the head of the ZaBVO Air Force, Corps Commander V.I. Izotov. The enemy's aviation group (by the end of May) did not exceed 76 aircraft (68.5% fighters).
The fighting began on May 11, 1939. The first air battle (according to Japanese sources) took place on May 20. On May 21 (according to our data), Soviet aviation suffered its first losses - the R-5 communications plane (pilot Stepan Pavlovich Suprun) was shot down. During air battles for the period (May 20(21)-31), the Red Army Air Force lost 17 combat vehicles.
The crew of the SB bomber are combat participants. From left to right: pilot K.S. Shvetsov, navigator S.B. Isaev, motor mechanic A.N. Kovalev, gunner-radio operator N.Ya. Mylnikov, technician K.N. Balakin.
Soviet fighter I-153 "Chaika"
To improve the leadership of aviation units as part of the Soviet air group in the Mongolian People's Republic, a reorganization was carried out: instead of the 100th and 23rd mixed air brigades, a fighter (22nd and 70th IAP, Colonel T.F. Kutsevalov) and bomber ( 38th and 150th SBP, Colonel V.E. Nestertsev) brigade.
The units sharply intensified flight and combat training, and at the headquarters of the air group, instructions and recommendations were developed for flight personnel on conducting battles with Japanese aircraft.
Much attention was paid to organizing the VNOS service. On August 18, 1939, in the combat area, the Air Force command organized 25 VNOS posts in the theater of operations at a distance of 10-15 kilometers from each other.
To solve this problem, the following were involved: a separate communications company and a telephone and cable company of the 57th special corps (from July 15 - 1st Army Group), the 20th separate radio company, 5 separate communications companies (60th, 64th , 82nd, 85th and 597th), 123rd separate VNOS company, two separate (123rd and 139th) and 756th cable-pole companies, two separate telegraph-operational companies (672- me and 673rd).
Later, the commander of the 1st Army Group (created on the basis of the 57th Special Corps), Corps Corps G.K. Zhukov, approved a special “Instruction for VNOS posts.” Material support for personnel stationed at VNOS posts was provided through the Air Force and military units.
Pilot V. Skobarikhin near his I-16
The leadership of the VNOS service was actually carried out by the Air Force headquarters of the 1st Army Group through the 7th Headquarters Department and the Chief of Communications. To protect some VNOS posts, armored vehicles were assigned.
Due to the lack of command radio stations on fighter aircraft (radios were installed only on bombers and some R-5Sh), it was decided to organize guidance points at the forward VNOS posts, from which target designation was carried out to fighter crews using signal communications (sets of signal panels and guidance booms) in the air. 9 out of 25 VNOS posts were equipped with guidance points.
All elements of the control system were interconnected by wired communication lines, along which security and emergency teams were located; All available radio equipment was prepared for duplicating wired communications, but they were inactive for reasons of radio camouflage. For covert control of units, negotiation tables and conditional call signs were developed officials. There was a single coded map of the combat area, divided into squares numbered with three-digit numbers.
Anti-aircraft artillery units were brought in to cover troop groups, transport networks, airfields and other facilities. Already in May 1939, the following were operating in the theater of operations: a separate anti-aircraft artillery division (ozad) of the 6th cavalry brigade, the 37th, 67th and 150th airborne battalion and the 64th anti-aircraft battery. However, the increased activity of Japanese aviation required the strengthening of the Soviet air defense in Mongolia. On June 1, 1939, the 3rd battery of the 66th Regiment (commander - Senior Lieutenant Shakhaloshvilli) arrived at the front with the task of covering the central crossing across the river. Khalkhin Gol. The battery coped with the task well - the crossing was saved (one day it shot down 2 enemy aircraft).
In the first months of the military conflict, anti-aircraft artillery units solved primarily the tasks of protecting ground targets and crossings across the river from Japanese air strikes. Khalkhin Gol, command post of the 1st Army Group, airfield hubs, tank and artillery groups.
Soviet aviation, first of all, sought to inflict maximum damage on the enemy's manpower, weaken his air force (on the ground and in the air), and destroy the enemy's military infrastructure in the combat zone. On June 17, three squadrons of the 22nd IAP carried out an assault on the positions of Japanese troops deep into Manchurian territory, subjecting the Halun-Arshan transport hub to machine-gun fire.
V. Skobarikhin in the cockpit of his fighter with a wing damaged during an air ram
June 22 over the lake. Buir Nur took place the first major air battle, in which 105 Soviet aircraft (56 I-16 and 49 I-15) and “more than 120” from the Japanese side simultaneously participated. During the battle, our losses amounted to 17 vehicles, the Japanese - 10.
On June 24, SB bombers received their first baptism of fire. 23 aircraft (150th SBP) bombed Japanese troops on the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol. As a retaliatory move (in order to weaken the Soviet air force), on June 27, Japanese aviation (104 aircraft) carried out raids on the airfields of the 22nd and 70th fighter air regiments. As a result, our losses (the largest during the entire military conflict) were: 22 fighters (9 I-15bisi 13I-16), 11 people were killed, 20 people were wounded. The losses of the Japanese side amounted to 6 vehicles.
In July 1939, new types of aircraft began to enter service with Soviet aviation in Mongolia: I-153 “Chaika” and I-16 type 17 (I-16P). The total strength of the Red Army Air Force in the Mongolia (as of July 1) was 280 aircraft, the enemy had 100-110 aircraft.
Logistics support for aviation units was carried out by six air bases: 144th Air Base - 22nd IAP; 703rd Air Base - 70th IAP; 145th Air Base - 56th IAP; 108th and 218th air bases - 38th, 56th and 150th bap. The 103rd Air Base supported the operation of two forward airfields.
From the beginning of hostilities, the airfield network began to develop rapidly, and by the end of the events, Soviet aviation had ten airfield hubs. The rapid development of the airfield network was favored by the terrain. In order to mislead the enemy, in the area of forward airfields, south of Mount Khamar-Daba, false airfields were equipped with mock-ups of I-16 aircraft located on them.
The locations of the false airfields changed periodically, and the mock-ups on them were rearranged.
As a rule, each air base provided combat aviation operations from one air hub, which consisted of 4-6 airfields (sites) with corresponding warehouses and communications. The air base commander was in all respects subordinate to the commander of the aviation regiment stationed at this air hub.
The leadership of ensuring the combat activities of aviation at each airfield or site was carried out by the commandant, who had at his disposal all available forces and means of support. He was also entrusted with the protection of the airfield and equipment, the organization of air defense and chemical defense.
The anti-aircraft group was strengthened by the anti-aircraft battery of the 36th motorized rifle division (from June 5) and the 266th separate anti-aircraft artillery division (from June 10).
Soviet aviators - participants in the battles at Khalkhin Gol. Far left - Deputy Chief of the Red Army Air Force Ya.V. Smushkevich, next to him is fighter pilot I.A. Lakeev.
In the first days of July, the Japanese military command began the operation “Second Period of the Nomonhan Incident.”
On the night of July 2-3, the troops of General Kobayashi crossed the river. Khalkhin Gol and, after a fierce battle, captured Mount Bayan-Tsagan on its western shore, located 40 kilometers from the Manchurian border. Immediately after this, the Japanese concentrated their main forces here and began to intensively build fortifications and build layered defenses. In the future, it was planned, relying on Mount Bayan-Tsagan, which dominated the area, to strike in the rear of the defenders on the eastern bank of the river. Khalkhin-Gol Soviet troops, cut off and subsequently destroy them. The actions of the ground troops were supported from the air by Japanese bombers. Our fire and fighter attacks shot down 6 enemy aircraft.
During the day, our aircraft repeatedly carried out bombing and assault attacks on the positions and crossings of Japanese troops.
On July 6, the pilot of the 2nd squadron of the 22nd IAP V. Skobarikhin carried out the first aerial ramming among Soviet pilots at Khalkhin Gol. During the air battles (July 2-6), the enemy lost 32 aircraft (the losses of the Red Army Air Force amounted to 20 aircraft).
On the night of July 7-8, the first combat sorties on Khalkhin Gol were carried out by TB-3 heavy bombers (3 aircraft), dropping up to 1.6 tons of bombs on the city of Ganchzhur. By the end of the month, an entire TB-3 squadron (23 aircraft, commander - Major Egorov) was operating in the theater of operations.
On July 15, in accordance with the order of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, the 57th Special Corps was transformed into the 1st Army Group (AG, commander - corps commander G.K. Zhukov). Colonel A.I. Gusev became the commander of the 1st AG Air Force, and Major Ivan Alekseevich Lakeev became the commander of fighter aviation.
Y. Smushkevich shows the command staff of the 1st AG a piece of skin from a downed Japanese aircraft.
At the same time, the enemy concentrated in the river area. Khalkhin Gol 2 aviation brigades (148 aircraft). The power of Soviet aviation also increased noticeably (replenished with fresh forces, including the 10 best pilots of the Baltic and Black Sea fleets).
On July 21, the second major air battle took place: 157 Soviet aircraft (95 I-16, 62 I-15bis: 22nd and 70th IAP) and 40 Japanese fighters. The enemy managed to shoot down 6 of our I-15bis, losing 3 of their own aircraft.
By August 1, the total strength of the Red Army Air Force group in Mongolia was 532 aircraft (including 7 aircraft of the Mongolian air squadron).
The Japanese aviation forces looked much more modest - about 200 combat vehicles.
By this time, the ZA group in the combat zone had received a complete form. During July 23 - August 9 in the area of the river. Khalkhin Gol 2 anti-aircraft artillery regiments arrived (85th and 191st). In total, in the theater of operations there were 3 separate anti-aircraft artillery divisions (63rd, 66th and 150th), two anti-aircraft artillery divisions of the 85th zenap and two separate zenabatr (36th and 57th) - a total of 16 batteries.
On August 20, Soviet-Mongolian troops began an offensive operation to encircle and destroy the Japanese group on the eastern bank of the river. Khalkhin Gol. Massive air strikes were carried out against enemy positions by 150 (according to other sources - 153) SB high-speed bombers, covered by 144 fighters. At the same time, assault groups (46 I-16 aircraft) suppressed Japanese anti-aircraft artillery fire. In just one day, 166 tons of bombs were dropped on enemy positions, rear facilities and transport communications.
Downed Japanese Ki-21 bomber.
Colonel A. Gusev and commander of the 22nd IAP Major G. Kravchenko
During the preparation and conduct of the operation, Soviet anti-aircraft artillery was used on a wide front. An area of more than 1,000 square kilometers was to be covered, and with the available anti-aircraft weapons it was possible to cover only about 600 km 2 . The divisions had the task of covering individually selected targets. Wide intervals between batteries (7-8 km) when organizing battle formations within divisions did not ensure multi-layered fire; moreover, as a rule, only two anti-aircraft batteries had fire communication. In general, the battle formation of the created anti-aircraft artillery group (AAG) was linear and, accordingly, the battle formations of the divisions were linear and at wide intervals the distance of the flank anti-aircraft divisions from the group headquarters reached 30-35 kilometers.
There was no interaction between our fighter aviation and air defense during the operation, since this issue was missed by the air defense department of the 1st AG and there was no interaction plan. This, of course, reduced the effectiveness of anti-aircraft artillery combat operations. For example, on August 29, Soviet anti-aircraft gunners opened fire on a group target (25 fighters and 9 bombers), but unexpectedly a small group of our fighters got involved in battle with enemy aircraft. Anti-aircraft fire was stopped and the enemy escaped with virtually impunity.
Despite this, the anti-aircraft artillery coped with the task quite successfully. In the zone of its fire, Japanese pilots dropped bombs without reaching the target, and turned back, trying to get out of the fire, or, to the detriment of the main task, began to perform an anti-aircraft maneuver. In general, the combat operations of the anti-aircraft artillery and the fulfillment of its assigned tasks by the Military Council of the 1st AG were generally assessed as “good.” Anti-aircraft artillery shot down 33 enemy aircraft (of those that were activated, destruction certificates were issued), and 646 aircraft were shot down by fighter aircraft.
On August 21, the Japanese Air Force attempted to repeat a massive raid on Soviet airfields, using 41 bombers for this purpose, covered by 88 fighters. The enemy was promptly detected by our VNOS posts, and Soviet fighters flew out to intercept him. An air battle unfolded 15-20 kilometers north of Tamsag-Bulak, in which 184 Red Army Air Force aircraft and more than 120 Japanese combat vehicles took part (losses: 13 enemy aircraft and 5 our fighters).
Long-range bomber DB-3
In the same month, RS-82 rockets were used for the first time in a combat situation, mounted on I-16 fighters of the air group (commander - Captain N.I. Zvonarev), which was organizationally part of the air regiment of the Hero of the Soviet Union, Major G.P. Kravchenko.
In total, during the period from August 8 (the day of the first flight of aircraft with suspended RS-82s) to September 15, 1939, the group made 59 sorties and participated in 16 air battles, using rockets, and in 6 battles, using machine-gun fire. At the same time, Soviet pilots shot down 17 enemy aircraft (I-97 - 14, SV-96 - 2 and LB-97 -1). 413 shells were used in air battles (24.3 shells per aircraft shot down).
The use of RS-82 missiles in air combat against fighters and bombers has fully justified itself. Compared to other means, shells turned out to be the most powerful type of aviation weapons, safe to use, and trouble-free in combat. After the events at Khalkhin Gol, 82 mm rockets were included in the armament of attack aircraft and SB bombers.
On August 31, Soviet-Mongolian troops completed the defeat of the encircled Japanese ground group. During the offensive operation (August 20-31), the total losses of Japanese aviation amounted to 57 aircraft.
In June, on the sand dunes east of Khalkhin Gol, only occasionally
Rifle shots and machine gun fire were heard. Both sides, durable
Having dug in, they temporarily did not conduct active hostilities and accumulated forces.
Only occasionally, usually at night, did scouts conduct searches. Then darkness
was illuminated by the deathly light of rockets, the air shook with disorderly
shooting, loud explosions of hand grenades.
However, in the high Mongolian sky almost every day they tied
air battles. The first ones in May were unsuccessful for Soviet aviation...
At the beginning of the conflict, the Mongolian People's Republic was home to the 100th
mixed aviation brigade. The 70th Fighter Regiment had 38
fighters, and the 150th Bomber Command has 29 high-speed bombers.
Almost half of the fighters were out of order, and the bombers had only just
mastered by pilots.
Japanese aviation was located at well-equipped airfields in
areas of Hailar. It consisted of 25 - 30 fighters. In addition, there was
up to 40 reconnaissance aircraft and bombers. Japanese aviation personnel had
experience of fighting in China. Long before the attack on the MPR, the headquarters of the Kwantung
The army organized a series of flight exercises, the Japanese carried out reconnaissance
field airfields in the area of future military operations, compiled special
aviation maps.
fighters met over Mount Hamar-Daba with five Japanese,
those who violated the border. On both sides the losses amounted to one fighter.
On that day, Soviet aviation in the Mongolian People's Republic received reinforcements. From
Trans-Baikal Military District the 22nd fighter arrived in Bain-Tumen
aviation regiment under the command of N.G. Glazykin consisting of 63 fighters
I-15 and I-16. Then the 38th high-speed bomber regiment arrived in the Mongolian People's Republic,
numbering 59 SB aircraft.
Three passenger planes took off. A group flew to Mongolia on them
experienced Soviet combat pilots who fought the enemy in the skies of Spain and
China. Among them were 17 Heroes of the Soviet Union. The senior was the deputy
commander of the Soviet air force, corps commander Ya.V. Smushkevich.
He received the Gold Star of the Hero of the Soviet Union for personal courage and
skillful management of the actions of Soviet volunteer pilots who fought in
ranks of the Spanish Republican Army against the Francoist rebels and their
fascist German-Italian patrons. There Smushkevich - General Douglas
was a senior advisor on aviation issues.
Immediately upon arrival in Tamtsag-Bulak, the pilots of Smushkevich’s group
went to the airfields. Here they began to teach the young by personal example,
not fired air fighters. Instilled in them the need to fight
compact group, in close cooperation, reminded again and again about
the need for mutual gain. The number of airfields was sharply increased
and landing sites. Most of them were located much closer to
place of hostilities than before. Almost there empty space was organized
clear air surveillance, warning and communications service. All this was done in
extremely tight deadlines.
made reconnaissance flights.
The results of the great work done were immediate. In
In some places they started a battle with 120 Japanese fighters. The enemy is here for the first time
used its newest I-97 fighter. At first, accustomed to winning,
The Japanese moved aggressively. However, having met a skillful rebuff, they were somewhat at a loss.
When, leaving black ribbons of smoke, about two dozen
enemy vehicles, the Japanese began to withdraw from the battle. Soviet fighters
rushed to chase them. In total, the enemy lost more than 30 that day.
airplanes. Soviet aviation - 14 fighters and 11 pilots. In the same battle
The commander of the 22nd Fighter Regiment, Major N.G. Glazykin, died heroically.
Here is what writer V. Stavsky wrote about this fight:
Over 200 aircraft took part (95 of them were ours). Our heroes shot down 34
Japanese fighter; this victory is the result of a new spirit and new methods,
which appeared in our aviation here with the arrival of a group of experienced
hero pilots led by Corporal Smushkevich.
Orlov's unit met with seven samurai who had violated
border of the Mongolian People's Republic. The commander shook his wings, and the pilots, gathering closer to
him, rushed at the enemy... Orlov, aiming the entire body of the plane at
samurai, gave full fire from all his machine guns. And the samurai instantly
curled up...
unprecedented battle, which lasted three hours and twenty minutes... And it was his
the first air battle... Having caught the samurai in his sights, Yudaev gave a burst and
I saw the wings of the enemy plane catch fire... But another samurai had already
went into the tail of Yudaev's plane... Only on the ground, after the battle, did Yudaev find out
that he was saved by Hero of the Soviet Union Gerasimov..."
For the first time in the battles at Khalkhin Gol, victory in the air remained with the Soviets
pilots.
16 Japanese vultures, losing only two I-15 fighters.
air battle. It shot down 10 Japanese fighters and three Soviet ones.
Hero of the Soviet Union Major S.I. Gritsevets especially distinguished himself. He planted
his single-seat fighter on Manchurian territory and took it out from there
commander of the 70th fighter regiment, Major V.M. Zabaluev, who jumped out from
parachute from a burning plane.
Suffering heavy losses in air battles, Japanese aviation
the command decided to defeat Soviet aviation at airfields. Was
the order of the commander of Japanese aviation operating in the area was captured
said: “In order to put an end to the main air forces with one blow
forces of Outer Mongolia, who are behaving defiantly, I order surprise
attack with all forces to destroy enemy aircraft at airfields in
area Tamtsag-Bulak, Bain-Tumen, lake Bain-Burdu-Nur."
regiment in the Tamtsag-Bulak area flew 23 bombers and about 70
enemy fighters. Due to the delay in notification, the Soviet
The fighters took off unorganized, alone and in teams. Also
They entered the battle unorganized. Two Japanese were shot down
bomber and three fighters. Our losses are three fighters and two
The commander of the 22nd regiment, Hero of the Soviet Union, did not return to the airfield
Major G.P. Kravchenko. He came only three days later, swollen from bites
mosquitoes He shot down his opponent already over the territory of Manchuria. Because of
lack of fuel, I had to land about sixty kilometers from the airfield and
get there on foot...
The situation was much worse in the 70th Fighter Regiment. Enemy
took him by surprise, as the saboteurs managed to cut the telephone lines
wires from observation posts. About seventy Japanese fighters
The regiment's airfields were attacked. Soviet pilots took off under enemy fire and
were forced to engage in battle without gaining sufficient height. Was shot down
Fourteen Soviet vehicles and two were burned on the ground. The enemy does not lose
This was the last success of Japanese aviation during the battles over
Khalkhin-Golom. And even then it’s quite relative. In July, the initiative and
air superiority firmly passed to Soviet aviation. Tense
air battles occurred almost every day in the first half of the month.
Soviet pilots shot down 24 Japanese fighters, losing only one
car. On the 8th, 21 enemy fighters were shot down, losing two of our own. After two days
70 Soviet fighters stormed enemy positions on the right bank
Khalkhin Gol. They were attacked by about a hundred I-97s. More people came to our aid
30 cars. In the air in a relatively small space at the same time
180 aircraft fought! In this battle, the Japanese lost 11 fighters. Was
One Soviet was also shot down...
The Japanese fought stubbornly, but the skies of battle remained with the Soviet pilots.
The success was greatly facilitated by the clear interaction between
high-speed, but relatively unmaneuverable fighters I-16 and
maneuverable but slower I-15 biplanes. The enemy has already fought
not as skillfully as in previous battles, it was felt that his best pilots
are already out of order.
Then there were no air battles for 10 days. The enemy is not active
showed...
As it became known, the Japanese command was hastily bringing in new
again tried to hit our airfields. About 150 people violated the border
fighters. They were met by approximately the same number of ours. The enemy fought
skillfully. Used the clouds well. It was clear that in his ranks again
experienced pilots appeared. However, the courage and skill of Soviet pilots
won this time too. The enemy lost 12 fighters. Our losses
amounted to five I-15s.
The success of air battles was greatly facilitated by the arrival of a new
aviation technology. New fighters appeared at Mongolian airfields
I-16. By appearance they were almost no different from their predecessors.
However, their weapons were much more powerful: if the “old” ones had two
machine guns, these had two more 20-mm ShKAS cannons.
Special attention Soviet pilots were attracted by the latest fighters
biplanes I-153 "Chaika". The new aircraft were superior to the Japanese in both
speed and maneuverability.
Major S.I. Gritsevets was appointed commander of the first squadron of "Chaikas". IN
In the first battle, he decided to use military stratagem. Having taken off, the Seagulls did not
remove the landing gear. In this form they resembled obsolete I-15 fighters, with
which the Japanese willingly entered into battle.
Approaching the Japanese, Gritsevets slightly shook the wings of his car,
and the "Seagulls", picking up the chassis, quickly rushed towards the confused enemy.
Cars with red circles of the “rising sun” began to fall one after another.
on the wings. The rest began to quickly leave the battle...
In the July air battles, victory always remained with the Soviets.
SB bombers. The fighters covering them entered the battle. Was shot down
eight Japanese planes and two of ours. The next day in three big
25 fighters, two bombers and one
enemy scout. Soviet aviation lost seven aircraft, of which four
your first fight.
cars. On the last day of July, four I-97s were shot down without suffering any losses.
In July, the Soviet bomber force also began to operate actively.
aviation, its flights were banned in May - June. For the first time express
of the 150th and 38th Bomber Regiments bombed enemy rear lines
area of Lake Yanhu, Lake Udzur-Nur, Namon-Khan-Burd-Obo heights. During
seven bombers were shot down. Such relatively large losses
were explained by the lack of anti-aircraft maneuver and poor interaction with
cover fighters.
This mistake was taken into account, and the very next day losses from fire
There was no anti-aircraft artillery at all. In an air battle, the Japanese managed to shoot down
two bombers. However, with the fire of their machine guns, the Soviet navigators and
The shooters destroyed five I-97s.
Subsequently, Soviet bombers in large groups carried out
raids on enemy rear lines, railway stations, troop concentrations, fire
artillery positions. The flights were carried out at an altitude of 7000 - 7500 meters, and
due to unclear actions of cover fighters, the Japanese shot down five Soviet
bombers, while losing 11 of their fighters.
Soviet heavy bombers TB-3. They usually flew alone
and bombed from a height of one and a half to two kilometers. Enemy aircraft at night
flew. His anti-aircraft artillery usually did not open fire either. Therefore for
during combat operations, a group of night bombers consisting of 23 vehicles
TB-3 had no losses.
In the skies of Mongolia, Soviet pilots showed selfless courage and
V.F. Skobarikhin noticed that two people boarded the plane of the young pilot V. Vuss
Japanese fighter. One of them was already behind the Soviet car.
Saving his comrade, Skobarikhin decided to ram him. Left plane
The "hawk" cut into the chassis, and the propeller into the tail and fuselage of the enemy vehicle.
Skobarikhin lost consciousness. Having come to his senses, he saw how from the ground, from the place
a Japanese plane crashed, a column of fire and smoke rose.
With great difficulty Skobarikhin managed to bring the crippled car to
airfield. Fellow pilots were quite surprised when they examined the plane: the propeller
bent, the wing is damaged and part of the wheel of a Japanese fighter sticks out of it.
Senior Lieutenant Skobarikhin repeated the immortal feat of the Russian
pilot Nesterov, who was the first to carry out an aerial ramming. However, now he
was done on collision courses and on planes that were approaching
speed of about 900 kilometers per hour - this is three times faster than in 1914
56th Fighter Regiment Captain V.P. Kustov. On this day the enemy wanted
launch a powerful air strike on the positions of Soviet troops. Japanese Armada
The bombers and fighters were intercepted by Soviet planes. Already
several enemy vehicles fell to the ground in flames. However, some
The bombers stubbornly rushed forward. One car was attacked by the captain
Kustov. At the decisive moment, the Soviet pilot ran out of ammunition.
In a few seconds, bombs could rain down on Soviet soldiers... With a screw
the captain of his fighter hit the fuselage of a Japanese bomber,
it flared up and, falling apart, fell down... Upon collision
Viktor Kustov also died, the first in the history of aviation to destroy a
strike by an enemy bomber.
fighter pilot A.F. Moshin. In the air that began over Mount Khamar-Daba
During the battle, Soviet pilots shot down eight enemy aircraft. One of them destroyed
Lieutenant Moshin. While chasing the second car, he got behind it. However,
Moshin ran out of ammunition. Skillfully maneuvering, he came close to
enemy aircraft and hit the stabilizer with the propeller. Japanese fighter
crashed into the ground!
Moshin landed safely at his airfield. Except a little
bent propeller, his I-16 had no damage.
bomber regiment, student of the Military-Political Academy named after
V.I. Lenin, battalion commissar M.A. Yuyukin.
The regiment was led to carry out a combat mission by its commander, Major
M.F. Burmistrov. Having dropped bombs on the target, the regiment turned around and went into reverse.
well. Suddenly the commissioner's plane shuddered: under the left engine it exploded
anti-aircraft shell. With enormous efforts, Yuyukin tried to keep the plane in
horizontal flight, but the altitude dropped quickly. Fellow pilots saw how
Yuyukin's bomber, engulfed in flames, went into a steep dive and
crashed into a Japanese artillery battery.
The Motherland highly appreciated the exploits of the pilots who rammed the enemy in battles
at Khalkhin Gol. By decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to Captain Victor
Pavlovich Kustov, Lieutenant Alexander Fedorovich Moshin and Sr.
Lieutenant Bit Fedorovich Skobarikhin was awarded the high rank of Hero
Soviet Union. Battalion Commissar Mikhail Anisimovich Yuyukin posthumously
awarded the Order of Lenin.
The unparalleled courage of Soviet pilots, high quality
domestic aircraft made it possible to firmly maintain air supremacy.
However, the Japanese air command did not want to accept defeat.
According to our aviation reconnaissance, by the beginning of August, in the areas closest to the Mongolian People's Republic
airfields in Manchuria, the enemy concentrated a large number of aircraft
various types.
There were new fierce battles ahead.
By the beginning of the fighting, the Soviet air group in Mongolia consisted of Polikarpov I-15bis and I-16 fighters, multi-purpose R-5 biplanes in attack and reconnaissance versions, as well as high-speed Tupolev SB bombers.
I-16 of the 70th IAP belonged to the early series (types 5 and 6) and were equipped with 700-horsepower M-25 or 730-horsepower M-25A engines. The armament consisted of two non-synchronized rapid-firing ShKAS machine guns in the center section with 900 rounds of ammunition per barrel. These planes were badly worn out and played almost no role in the war. In the summer they were all written off.
With the arrival of the 22nd regiment at Khalkhin Gol, newer I-16s of the 10th type appeared with uprated 750-horsepower M-25V engines and increased airframe strength. Their armament was reinforced by two synchronized ShKAS with 650 rounds of ammunition per barrel, located above the engine. The aircraft were also equipped with pneumatic brake flaps and 8-mm armored seat backrests. All this caused an increase in take-off weight, and therefore, despite the increase in engine power, the flight characteristics even decreased slightly.
The biplane fighter I-15bis (I-152) by the spring of 1939 was a morally obsolete machine. With the same engine as the I-16 type 10, it was much inferior to it in speed at all altitudes, had approximately the same rate of climb and slightly better horizontal maneuverability. The armament consisted of four PV-1 machine guns (a lightweight version of the famous Maxim).
The Encores were inferior to the Japanese fighters in all respects except firepower, and their low speed did not even allow them to catch up with the bombers.
I-15bis fighter.
However, until about the end of July, I-15bis and I-16 type 10 formed the backbone of Soviet fighter aircraft at Khalkhin Gol. Subsequently, the "encores" were gradually forced out of the first line units by the newer "Chaikas", and in place of the "donkeys" with M-25V engines, vehicles with M-62 engines began to arrive. But we'll talk about this a little later.
The main and until the end of the summer the only opponent of the “Stalinist falcons” was the Japanese fighter “Nakajima” Ki-27 (or “Type 97”, allied code name “Nate”). When creating it, Japanese designers set themselves the goal of achieving a harmonious combination of speed and maneuverability. To do this, they made the car as light as possible, gave it a well-streamlined shape, and equipped it with a wing of large span and area with an aerodynamic twist at the ends.
Japanese Ki-27otsu fighter with a fully glazed canopy.
An earlier modification of the Ki-27ko. Please note that the sliding part of the canopy has been removed from the aircraft.
Unlike Soviet fighters, the aircraft had an all-aluminum construction and a closed cockpit canopy. The aerodynamically clean form of the fighter was somewhat spoiled by the non-retractable landing gear, but this was largely compensated by weight reduction, simplicity and ease of operation. And the Japanese tried to minimize the inevitable increase in drag by carefully hooding the wheels and struts.
The plane was equipped with a 9-cylinder star-shaped geared engine “Nakajima” Ha-1-Otsu with a take-off power of 710 hp. With. The presence of a reduction gear made it possible to install a two-blade propeller of large diameter. As a result, due to a slight decrease in the maximum speed, thrust at low speeds increased, and, accordingly, the rate of climb and acceleration characteristics.
The horizontal maneuverability of the vehicle was excellent. According to many Western experts, the Ki-27 was generally the most maneuverable monoplane fighter in the world. During testing, it performed turns with a radius of 86 m in 8.1 seconds! And at the same time, the aircraft was distinguished by its high stability and ease of piloting ‹36›.
Despite the desire for comprehensive weight reduction, which was even expressed in the rejection of the armored seat back, Japanese designers considered it necessary to equip the fighter with a radio station. All planes had receivers, and every third one also had transmitters. Command vehicles were required to be equipped with transmitters, starting with the commanders of the shotai (unit).
Soviet pilots could only dream of something like this. Radios were only installed on bombers. And in fighter aviation, archaic methods of issuing commands by visual signals (swinging wings and gesturing) were still widely practiced. Naturally, in an air battle, control of the group was immediately lost, and the leader turned into an ordinary pilot. Guiding fighters from the ground was carried out by laying out white panels of fabric in the shape of arrows, with the tip directed in the direction where the air enemy was spotted.
But, let's return to the Ki-27. To his negative aspects it is necessary to include the insufficient rigidity and strength of the wing (as a consequence of the struggle to save weight) and the armament, which was too weak for the late 30s, consisting of only two synchronized Vickers-Arisaka type 89 machine guns of rifle caliber with ammunition of 500 rounds per barrel.
Air battles at Khalkhin Gol showed that the I-16 with the M-25 engine, and even more so the I-15bis, are inferior to the Japanese fighter in terms of overall flight and combat characteristics. The Ki-27 demonstrated high speed, better altitude and climb rate, and its phenomenal maneuverability was noted not only by donkey pilots, but also by those who flew encores.
Here are lines from the reports of Soviet pilots:
Lieutenant Astafiev - “The I-97 aircraft is very maneuverable and quickly approaches the tail.”
Senior Lieutenant Sutuev - “It is possible to conduct an air battle with the I-97, although this plane is very nimble and under all circumstances is higher...”
Senior Lieutenant Bobrov - “It was striking that the I-97s were always (meaning before the start of the battle - author’s note) were 500-1000 m above us.”
Lieutenant Astafiev - “I-97 is very durable, burns poorly. There was a case when the whole group of us chased one Japanese who was leaving at low level. They attacked for a very long time, and he fell only when the pilot was killed.”
Lieutenant Lukhtionov - “The I-97 plane does not leave the I-16 along the horizon or in a dive, but it leaves by climbing, since it is very light and has a high-altitude engine” ‹5›.
The I-16 with the M-25 was superior to its opponent in the mass of a second salvo, structural strength, which made it possible to implement significant overloads, and also in acceleration speed during a dive (the latter due to its greater weight). However, the better firepower of Soviet fighters was compensated by worse stability, which made it difficult to conduct aimed fire and caused large dispersion of bullets.
Although the Ki-27 could not break away from the “donkey” in a dive, Japanese pilots, especially at first, often used this technique. The calculation was that their vehicles at the exit from the dive would have less drawdown or, as Lieutenant Filippov wrote, “easily break the trajectory.” In such a situation, the heavier and more inert “donkey” sometimes did not have time to repeat the enemy’s maneuver and crashed into the ground. Boris Smirnov recalled that in one of the June battles he witnessed a similar incident. True, this maneuver was mortally dangerous for the Japanese themselves. Some Soviet pilots saw how the wings of the Ki-27 flew off during a sharp withdrawal from a dive...
TB-3 M-17 from the 4th TBB of the Trans-Baikal Military District over the Amur River, photograph taken in 1937. Two years later, these vehicles took part in battles on the Mongolian-Manchurian border.
Transport "Douglas" DC-3 during the fighting at Khalkhin Gol were used to transport wounded soldiers to the Union for treatment (SKM).
The crew of SB-103 of the 105th Brigade. From left to right: crew commander Lieutenant A.P. Churilin, gunner-radio operator A.S. Anisimov and navigator Senior Lieutenant A.V. Egorov.
The June battles showed the need to take measures to improve the flight performance of the I-16. The simplest and most accessible method in the field was to lighten the machine by dismantling “minor” equipment. The 32-kilogram batteries were removed from the planes to start the engines. The electrical wiring was altered in such a way as to use an external battery. They removed the oxygen cylinders, which the pilots did not use anyway, since, according to them, the oxygen mask with a hose hampered movement and prevented them from looking around. In addition, the pilots feared that a cylinder mounted on the side of the cockpit next to the seat would explode if hit by a bullet.
Brake flaps (flaps), one of the purposes of which was to increase maneuverability in air combat, also, according to the pilots, did not justify themselves. Firstly, such a harmful phenomenon as the suction of the flaps in flight was noted, which noticeably reduced the maximum speed. And secondly, in the conditions of a fleeting battle, the pilots simply did not have time to use the flaps. As a result, the flaps on all aircraft were locked, and the pneumatic equipment for their drive was removed ‹4›.
All these measures made it possible to lighten the “donkey” by about 80 kg, which very slightly increased its flight characteristics.
Regarding the I-15bis, the opinion was clear: it is not capable of fighting on equal terms with the I-97, no relief will help here, an urgent replacement is necessary.
An unknown Soviet pilot against the background of an I-15bis fighter equipped with underwing bomb suspensions.
Commissar of the I-15bis attack squadron, senior political instructor P. Selyutin.
And such a replacement arrived in July in the form of a new representative of the Polikarpov biplane series - I-153.
The Chaika, like the Ki-27, was the embodiment of the search for harmony between the speed of a fighter and its maneuverability. Only if the Japanese relied on a more progressive monoplane design did the Soviet designer continue to improve the “good old” biplane design. The Japanese simplified and lightened the car by refusing to retract the landing gear; Polikarpov, on the contrary, decided to increase the speed by retracting the main struts into the fuselage.
Indeed, in comparison with the I-15bis, the maximum speed has increased by about 40 km/h over the entire altitude range, and the rate of climb and ceiling have increased. However, all this was explained not only by the introduction of a retractable landing gear, but also by a more powerful and high-altitude M-62 engine, equipped with a two-speed supercharger. But maneuverability noticeably deteriorated and in this indicator the Chaika was inferior to the Ki-27. It also could not compare with the Japanese car in terms of speed and rate of climb. And the inherent track instability (“yaw”) inherent in all short and thick Polikarpov fighters negated more than double superiority in firepower.
The pilots negatively perceived the deterioration of forward visibility on the Chaika compared to the I-15bis, due to the characteristic shape of the upper wing. Here are the lines from the report of Senior Lieutenant Volin: “The Japanese, taking advantage of the fact that the Chaika had a poor view forward, where the plane was completely blind, were not afraid to attack them from the front.” At the same time, Japanese fighters usually did not dare to go head-on with “donkeys” and I-15bis.
The early Chaikas also had other serious defects. The pilots noted very high loads on the controls, especially on the ailerons, which limited the performance of sharp horizontal maneuvers and led to rapid fatigue. Excessive effort was required when firing machine guns. “The triggers (on I-153 – author’s note) are very tight. There have been cases when pilots were incapacitated due to finger disease from pressing the trigger,” Colonel Kutsevalov writes in his report.
The absence of a fire partition and strong air blowing into the cabin through the landing gear niches were also noted. In the event of a fire, this posed a mortal threat to pilot ‹18›.
But the most dangerous defect was the breakage of the supporting brace tapes in flight. From early July to mid-August, seven such incidents occurred, two of which ended in disasters. On July 29, pilot Orlov crashed during a training flight, and on August 11, during a training battle, the commissioner of the Chaika squadron, Vladimirov, died. On August 14, military engineer 1st rank Prachik wrote in a memo to Smushkevich: “The flight personnel quite legitimately developed a fear and mistrust of flying on Chaika ‹3› aircraft.
Perhaps this explains the fact that in the first ten days of August, about half of all the “Chaikas” sent to Khalkhin Gol were temporarily withdrawn from combat service.
Broken braces, tight triggers, blowing out the cabin and the lack of a fire bulkhead were the result of manufacturing defects and imperfect design of the new aircraft. Subsequently, these shortcomings were eliminated. However, it should be noted that the very concept of a biplane fighter was an anachronism already at the time the “Seagull” was born. In general, the Chaika was inferior to both the Donkey with a similar engine and the Ki-27 with a lower power engine. But, despite all the shortcomings of the machine, the replacement of the hopelessly outdated I-15bis with the I-153 was still an unconditionally positive factor for the Soviet Air Force.
There is one common legend associated with the “Seagulls” on Khalkhin Gol, more like an anecdote. I will present it as it is presented in the popular book by the English author Robert Jackson, The Red Falcons.
“The appearance of these aircraft (I-153 - author's note) over Khalkhin Gol took the Japanese pilots by surprise - especially after the Russian pilots began to use specially developed tactics to mislead the enemy. Soviet planes approached the battle area with their landing gear down, giving the impression that they were slower I-15s and I-15bis, as if inviting the Japanese to attack. As soon as the Japanese rushed into battle, the I-153 pilots retracted the landing gear, gave full throttle and crashed into the middle of the enemy's battle formation, throwing him into complete confusion. Units of the Japanese Air Force suffered heavy losses in battles with the I-153 until Japanese pilots began to understand what was happening.”
Needless to say, nothing like this has ever happened, and if someone had the crazy idea of trying to “mislead the enemy” in this way, it would have ended very quickly and sadly for him. And in general, it seems that Mr. Jackson imagines the start of an air battle as something like a dashing attack of cavalrymen who, spurring their horses, “crashed into the enemy’s battle formation, throwing him into complete confusion”...
The SB crew are participants in battles in the Mongolian People's Republic. From left to right: pilot senior political instructor K.S. Shintsov, navigator senior lieutenant S.B. Isaev, engine mechanic A.N. Kovalev, gunner-radio operator N.Ya. Mylnikov, technician K.N. Balakin.
Let us return, however, to the Soviet aircraft that fought at Khalkhin Gol. Together with the Chaikas, spare 800-horsepower M-62 engines arrived in Mongolia. Their dimensions and mounting components exactly corresponded to the M-25 engines. This prompted the idea of installing new high-power engines on the I-16.
Engines were replaced directly at field airfields by unit technical personnel with the help of repair flights. When installing the M-62 instead of the M-25V, it was necessary to remove the boost regulator, since it rested on the oil tank. Because of this, the engine constantly worked in afterburner, which, of course, reduced the service life. In addition, the lack of variable pitch propellers did not allow the engines to extract maximum power. However, replacing the M-25B with the M-62 provided the “donkeys” with a noticeable increase in flight characteristics.
Some fighters, in addition to new engines, also had bomb racks for two 10-kilogram AO-10 fragmentation bombs, mounted under the fuselage.
At the beginning of August, I-16s began to arrive in Mongolia, the engines of which were replaced at aircraft factory No. 21 in parallel with the modification of the oil system and the installation of protected gas tanks. The new modification received the index I-16 type 18.
A little earlier, I-16s of the 17th type (I-16P) appeared at Khalkhin Gol. These were the same I-16 type 10, but instead of wing-mounted ShKAS guns they were equipped with 20-mm ShVAK automatic cannons. The take-off weight of the vehicle has increased by approximately 90 kg. Flight performance, on the contrary, decreased, so the planes were used as attack aircraft and operated under the cover of “ordinary” machine-gun I-16s.
Another way to increase firepower was to attach unguided rockets (missiles) under the wings. At the beginning of August, an experimental five specially modified I-16 arrived in Mongolia. Based on the surname of the commander, Captain Zvonarev, the group received the code name “ringers.” In addition to Zvonarev himself, it included pilots Mikhailenko, Tkachenko, Pimenov and Fedosov. The group was included in the 22nd IAP.
Under each wing console, these vehicles had four rail guides for RS-82 82 mm powder rockets. To reduce the fire hazard, the fabric lining of the lower surfaces in these places was replaced with duralumin. Electric igniter buttons were installed on the control handles.
On August 16, the “ringers” flew to the front-line airfield in the Tamsag-Bulak area. The group, under the cover of the Chaikas, made its first combat flight on August 18, but did not find the enemy. Only on the third flight, on August 20, were the first missile salvoes fired at enemy fighters. The Missile Carriers were credited with two victories, although the Japanese claim that they did not lose a single aircraft in battle that day.
In total, until the end of the conflict, Zvonarev’s group completed 85 combat missions without losses and conducted 14 air battles. The collective score of the group, according to a certificate compiled by the head of the operational department of the 22nd IAP, Major Tsibadze, amounted to 13 victories (10 Ki-27, two Ki-21 and one Ki-4), the last of which was won on September 1. The real number of Japanese aircraft shot down by the group is now, after so many years, impossible to establish.
It is curious that the Japanese never realized that missile weapons were used against them. They believed that the Russians had somehow managed to mount large-caliber artillery pieces on the fighters that fired tracer rounds.
The experience of using the RS-82 against air targets has shown that the advantage of this weapon is its wide radius of destruction, and the main disadvantages are its large dispersion and the absence of a remote fuse on the missile. The pilot was required to very accurately determine the distance to the target, otherwise the rockets would explode either undershot or overshot. But even in the case of correct calculation of the distance, defeat was not guaranteed, since the fuse timer gave a wide range of response times.
“The set of eight rockets available on the aircraft is insufficient to conduct modern intense air combat. A significant drawback of our missiles is that they cannot change their explosion distance in the air,” Zvonarev wrote in his report ‹20›.
But the development of reliable and effective remote fuses turned out to be too difficult at that time.
The passenger Ki-34 (we mistook it for the Douglas) was used by the Japanese as a military transport, ambulance and staff vehicle during the battles at Khalkhin Gol.
The Japanese were also working to improve their main army fighter, the Ki-27. Already during the battles at Khalkhin Gol, its second modification, the Ki-27-Otsu, arrived. True, the engine and armament of the vehicle have not changed, and the flight data also remains the same. The modifications consisted of replacing the oil cooler and installing a fully glazed cockpit canopy with improved visibility. It should be noted that such a canopy appeared on the Ki-27 for the first time in world practice.
When comparing the I-16 with the Ki-27, they usually note the higher security of Soviet vehicles due to the presence of armored seat backs and protectors on gas tanks. Indeed, starting from the 10th type, all “donkeys” had armored backs, and on the 18th type, protected tanks also appeared. However, the actual effectiveness of both turned out to be lower than expected. In July, a coded message was sent from the Khalkingol front: “Moscow, Red Army Air Force, Alekseev. Armored backs make their way in air battles.” This short and expressive message speaks for itself. And Major Kutsevalov, in the final section of the “Description of Combat Operations...”, dedicated to technical issues, states: “the protectors are unsatisfactory, when the tanks are punctured, gasoline leaks out” ‹4›.
The Ki-27 turned out to be a very difficult and dangerous opponent for the Soviet pilots, which cannot be said about another Japanese fighter with which they had to “deal” at Khalkhin Gol - the Kawasaki Ki-10. This biplane fighter, developed in 1935, was equipped with a fairly powerful 800-horsepower liquid-cooled Kawasaki Ha 9-N-Ko engine (a licensed copy of the German BMW-9). However, its flight performance was worse than that of the Chaika, not to mention the I-16. The Ki-10 could have successfully fought against the I-15bis, but by that time the “encores” were no longer participating in battles.
The advantages of the Ki-10 were good maneuverability and good stability, which partly compensated, like the Ki-27, for the weakness of the two-machine gun armament.
According to Soviet pilots, the Ki-10 did not impress them. The plane was considered clearly outdated and uninteresting. No one has compiled a detailed description of the tactics of the Japanese pilots who flew these fighters and the specifics of the battles with them.
Kawasaki Ki-10 fighters at one of the Manchurian airfields. The photo was taken in the fall of 1938. Due to the large losses among the Ki-27s and the impossibility of quickly replacing them, the Japanese had to throw these obsolete biplanes into battle at the final stage of the Khalkhingol conflict.
In a number of Soviet-Russian publications there are stories that in August or already in September a squadron of new two-seat DI-6 fighters was sent to Khalkhin Gol for testing in combat conditions. Some authors described their participation in battles. There were even details given, such as the fact that the Japanese first tried to attack these planes from behind, but came under fire from the tail gunner ‹22›.
The most amazing thing is that in none of the documents of the Russian State Military Archive there is any mention of the presence of DI-6 at Khalkhin Gol! All other vehicles that ended up in Mongolia, including the experimental and highly secret I-16s with missile weapons, are mentioned in one way or another in the documents of this archive. It’s hard to say where the information about the “Hapingol” DI-6s came from in articles and books. I can only state a fact: there is currently no documentary evidence of this information. Therefore, I am forced to treat the stories about the battles of DI-6 with the “air samurai” as just another historical legend.
The main striking force of the Soviet Air Force at Khalkhin Gol was the Tupolev SB high-speed bomber. These vehicles performed well in Spain, but the Khalkhingol battles showed that their age was inevitably coming to an end. The SBs could no longer get away from the fighters due to their speed, and the rather weak defensive weapons were an unimportant defense in battle. In several battles where Ki-27s were able to intercept SB groups moving without cover, our pilots suffered serious losses. In the future, it was necessary to increase the operational ceiling of bombers or accompany them with a strong fighter escort.
At the same time, the SB was distinguished by its high reliability and combat survivability, although the latter may be due to the fact that Japanese fighters did not have cannons or heavy machine guns. Once, in one SB that returned from battle, they counted 160 bullet holes. The list of damage to this aircraft takes up one and a half pages of typewritten text, including bullet holes in all gas tanks, oil tanks, the radiator of one of the engines, wing and stabilizer spars, hydraulic system elements, pilot and navigator cabins, landing gear, and so on. However, the crew landed safely at their airfield, and after repairs, this SB returned to service ‹4›.
Another Tupolev bomber, the heavy four-engine TB-3, has also established itself as a very reliable and trouble-free machine. Despite the fact that the aircraft used at Khalkhin Gol were old, from the first series, produced in 1932-33, all of them, except one, flew off the campaign properly.
The Japanese deployed a wider range of attack vehicles in the conflict - as many as three types of single-engine and two twin-engine bombers, as well as specialized reconnaissance aircraft. The most widely represented was the “light army bomber type 97”, also known as the “Mitsubishi” Ki-30. We called it LB-97.
This relatively new three-seat all-metal monoplane was put into service in 1937 (the 97th year of the “Meiji era” according to traditional Japanese chronology, hence the number “97” in the name). It was equipped with a Mitsubishi Ha 5-Ko radial engine, developed a speed of 430 km/h, which was quite good for those times, and was capable of diving at an angle of up to 60°. Its high speed data made it practically invulnerable to the I-15bis, and when flying without bombs, also to the Seagulls. However, these vehicles account for the highest number of losses among Japanese bombers, which is most likely due to their intensive use.
The “type 98 direct engagement aircraft” aka “Tachikawa” Ki-36 was in service since 1938 and was also used as a light front-line bomber. Some even call it an attack aircraft, although for an aircraft of this class the offensive armament, consisting of one rifle-caliber machine gun, looks, to put it mildly, rather weak.
Being very similar in appearance to the Ki-30 (our pilots often confused them), the Ki-36 was inferior to it in all respects, with the exception, perhaps, of price and takeoff and landing characteristics. The number of these vehicles at Khalkhin Gol was small and never exceeded 10-15 copies. Most of them were destroyed or disabled by Soviet pilots during the attack on the 15th Sentai airfield near Jinjin-Sume on August 2, 1939. At the final stage of the conflict, Ki-36s were no longer listed in first-line units.
The “Light Army Bomber Type 98” or “Kawasaki” Ki-32 appeared simultaneously with the Ki-30, but protracted problems with the fine-tuning of the two-row liquid-cooled Kawasaki Ha 9-I engine led to the fact that it began to enter service with the troops for a year Later. The Ki-32 also arrived at Khalkhin Gol much later than its “colleagues” and actually managed to “check in” only in one operation - the last raid on Soviet airfields on September 15. According to Japanese data, not a single one of them was shot down, and it seems that our pilots did not even notice that some new bomber was used against them. In any case, none of their reports mention this.
The Mitsubishi Ki-15-Ko or “army reconnaissance aircraft type 97 model 1” turned out to be the fastest aircraft of all that fought at Khalkhin Gol. Despite the non-retractable landing gear and the somewhat “archaic” hood in the form of a Townend ring, during tests in 1937 it showed a maximum speed of 481 km/h - higher than most fighters of that time. Undoubtedly, the speed of production aircraft was still lower, otherwise it is difficult to explain how our fighters managed to shoot down at least seven aircraft of this type. However, the high-speed and high-altitude Ki-15s were considered difficult targets. Only I-16s with M-62 engines could intercept them, but they also had to operate literally at the limit of their capabilities. As a rule, the Ki-15 managed to take reconnaissance photographs and evade pursuit.
The main type of twin-engine bomber among the Japanese was considered the “army heavy bomber type 97 model 1”, also known as the “Mitsubishi” Ki-21. Despite the fact that the designation of the aircraft contained the word “heavy” and not “high-speed”, it developed a higher speed than even the SB, while having a much greater range, but with a worse rate of climb and ceiling. The aircraft was equipped with double-row, sprocket-shaped 14-cylinder Mitsubishi Xa 6 Kinsei engines. Crew - 4 people - two pilots, a navigator-bombardier and a gunner.
The Ki-21 was actively used throughout the conflict. However, the losses were surprisingly low - only six aircraft. Perhaps this is due to the good fighter cover that the Japanese were able to provide, or perhaps due to the fact that the Ki-21s usually flew at altitudes where anti-aircraft guns could not reach them, and Soviet fighters could not “operate” effectively due to a drop in power engines and lack of oxygen equipment.
Preparing a twin-engine (“heavy”, according to the Japanese classification) Ki-21 bomber from the 61st Bombing Sentai for a combat mission against Soviet-Mongolian troops. Manchuria, August 1939
Fiat BR-20s from the 12th Bomb Sentai of the Japanese Air Force are participants in the “Nomohan incident.” Manchuria, summer 1937
To conclude the chapter, we present a few more figures.
During the fighting, Soviet aviation expended 990,266 rounds of ammunition for ShKAS machine guns, 75,054 rounds of ammunition for PV-1 machine guns, and 57,979 rounds of ammunition for ShVAK cannons. The PV-1 machine guns turned out to be the most reliable: when firing, they gave only 1% failures. ShVAK guns had a 3% failure rate, ShKAS guns had a 9% failure rate.
Soviet bombers dropped 78,360 bombs weighing a total of 1,298 tons on the enemy. Of these: FAB-250-405, FAB-100-5335, FAB-50-5701 and experimental bomb clusters RRAB-3 (rotational dispersal) - 5 pieces. The rest of the ammunition is of a smaller caliber.
Japanese aircraft fired about 1.6 million machine-gun rounds at Khalkhin Gol, and bombers dropped approximately 970 tons of bombs.