Everyone knows about the huge losses of our aviation, which she suffered in the first days of the war. However, paradoxically, it was the combat losses of our aircraft that were not as significant as they seem to most. And paradoxically, the combat losses of our aviation are commensurate with the combat losses of German aviation.
In total, by June 23, 1941, the Germans claimed 322 aircraft destroyed in the air and 1489 on the ground, as a result of air strikes. Ours claimed to have destroyed about 300 enemy aircraft on June 22.
Although the Germans recognize the combat loss of a much smaller number of aircraft. Explaining most of the losses of this day to technical reasons and the human factor. Enemy air raids on our airfields also took place in the future. But with much less efficiency. And at the same time, the numbers of our aircraft destroyed by the Germans are much less than the losses of our aviation. Which, only in the western districts and fleets, had about 16,000 aircraft. Of these, about 11,000 are part of the covering troops. But already on July 10, the Air Force of the active army totaled only about 2200 vehicles. And the Germans, for this number, announced the destruction of about 3200 of our aircraft.
One of the aircraft of the Romanian Air Force on June 22, 1941. 
Paradoxically, our aviation suffered the main losses, about 9000 aircraft, not in the air, but on the ground. It turned out that these planes were simply abandoned at the airfields. No, most of the cars were unusable. What honors our grandfathers. And the Germans sent them to be melted down. But the fact remains. Yes, and in the report to Goering, based on the results of the first day of the war, it was indicated about the wreckage of 2000 Soviet aircraft in the territory occupied by the Wehrmacht.
One of the German planes they recognized as shot down. 06/22/1941. Aircraft that fell on their territory are not recognized as shot down. 
And it's pretty easy to explain. The main targets in the attack on airfields at dawn on June 22 were by no means aircraft. And warehouses, primarily fuel and lubricants, runways, control and communication centers, parking lots for special equipment, barracks for personnel, and only last but not least, aircraft. Usually the strike was carried out by three German bombers, accompanied by a pair of Messerschmites. The bombers, usually loaded to capacity with small fragmentation bombs, up to 40 50-kilogram bombs on board, attacked the designated targets first. And only after the destruction of these targets, they dumped the remnants of ammunition on the parking lots. Often it was only machine-gun fire from their riflemen. The Messer, on the other hand, was usually attacked by duty aircraft, and then they blocked the airfield, preventing our aircraft from rising. And suppressing anti-aircraft fire. And after the strike of the bombers, they usually finished off the targets not hit by the bombs with cannons and also passed through the parking lot. Moreover, according to this scheme, units of our aircraft were destroyed. But a lot of aircraft were damaged, and they, in need of repair, could not take off immediately. And the rapid advance of the German ground forces, so in one place in the Baltic states, the Germans traveled 80 km on June 22, which did not give our aviation time to recover. 
So, let's imagine the situation, at our airfield, after the first German strike. The headquarters and the flight control center were destroyed. No communication with command. Warehouses with fuel, ammunition and spare parts are on fire. All mobile workshops and tankers have been destroyed. Runway in funnels. And the planes themselves are with holey planes, without fuel and ammunition. Pilots living outside the airfield and alerted were shot down by German saboteurs. Or local nationalists. Moreover, if the Ukrainian or Baltic were fed by the Germans, then here are the Polish ... The Polish obeyed the government in exile and were allies of Great Britain. However, this did not prevent them from 06/22/1941 to speak in the same ranks with the Germans.
And those pilots who were at the airfield were filled up in the barracks. Only one of the listed factors is enough for the planes not to take off, but they were in the aggregate. And on the horizon, German columns were already gathering dust. So there was only one thing left, to destroy the planes and go east. True, an attempt was made to evacuate the aircraft. Where there were pilots, the remaining airworthy aircraft were taken away in a general direction to the east. But, finding themselves on the rear airfields without command and proper maintenance, in the conditions of the rapidly advancing German troops, these vehicles turned out to be abandoned. Sometimes without making a single sortie. 
Of course, all this is rather exaggerated and collectively. It is quite possible that at each individual airfield the situation was not so monstrous. But everywhere she was quite fatal. So several of our airfields were fired upon by German artillery in the first minutes of the war. In addition, our maybe helped the enemy. As early as June 19, orders were issued to the Air Force, ordering to disperse aviation, camouflage objects, and provide cover for airfields with anti-aircraft weapons. By the 20th, he got into the troops, but everywhere his implementation was postponed until later. And then they canceled it. At best, aircraft and objects were lightly overlaid with branches. As if the order was fulfilled, the planes and objects were, as it were, disguised. Without even bothering to evaluate how this “disguise”, in the form of pyramids of tree branches standing in even rows, looks from the air. 
But this is one, clear side of the coin. The other is well disclosed by the data on the Red Army website. Where information is provided on all aircraft of the Red Army Air Force intended to cover the state border. True, only the Red Army Air Force, fleet aviation is not indicated, and only on 06/01/1941.
Today it is quite certain that the USSR had about 16,000 combat aircraft by the beginning of the war. At the time of the attack, the USSR had about 10,700 aircraft of all types in the western districts, the enemy, on the line of contact, had about 4,800 German aircraft alone. That is, the preponderance of the paper USSR was more than 2 times. But that's paper. The presented tables give information completely different information. About 8342 Air Force aircraft allocated to cover the border (excluding fleet aviation). For which 7222 crews were trained. True, 1173 aircraft needed repairs. Which is basically normal. Planes should always be with a margin. So, theoretically, only 53 pilots could not take off at the same time as everyone else. But only formally. In reality, only 5007 aircraft could take off. One and a half times less than they were! Let me remind you only the Germans, without allies, concentrated 4800 aircraft on the state border line, with a slightly smaller number of pilots. Once again I will clarify 4800 combat-ready aircraft. And again I specify - at the border. We, having 8342 aircraft scattered from the border to Zaporozhye, raise 5007 theoretically combat-ready against them. Ask why so? And you look at the 5th and 39th iad of the Leningrad district. In 5 IADs there are 269 aircraft (5 out of order) and 84 pilots. For each more than 3 serviceable fighters. In the 39th 111 aircraft (also 5 faulty) and 209 pilots! 2 pilots per plane! I remind you of the Gulf of Finland between them! Thanks to the organization of "wise men" from the Red Army Air Force in 2 divisions, 380 aircraft and 293 pilots. And only 125 aircraft can be raised to cover Leningrad from an air strike! And then only in small groups, without interaction between them. Such a mess cannot be explained by any negligence. 
But it is necessary to reveal this side from this phrase: “Tymoshenko,“ a friend of the pilots ”, decided: why do the infantry clean their rifles, artillerymen and tankers clean their guns, - why are the pilots indulgence ?! The tanker washes his car. Why wash for pilots? We had an aircraft and engine mechanic, an armaments mechanic, a mechanic, that's all. Now on the link (three aircraft - K.O.): an instrument mechanic and a mechanic for special equipment, and also an armament mechanic for a link. Flight technician and aircraft technician for each aircraft. And then they left on the link: a gunsmith (instead of four, we had one armament mechanic per link). Aircraft mechanic - instead of four, there was one left. Motorists - none. Like this! Cut off! We thought - what kind of idiocy? We fly off, all tired. ... "(Interview: A. Drabkin. Lit. processing: S. Anisimov. Site" I remember ")
In 1940, order No. 0200 of the People's Commissar of Defense Tymoshenko was issued. According to this order, commanders with less than 4 years of service in the Red Army were obliged to live in hostels in the barracks position ... Timoshenko - firstly, forced not only pilots to parachute, but also technical composition, ostensibly in case of war, assuming their use as gunners. Secondly, at his suggestion, until 1940, pilots were released as junior lieutenants, and from 1941 they began to be released as sergeants.
What do these "reductions" of technical personnel mean just before the war? Neither more nor less - an additional guarantee of the possible defeat of our aviation at the time of the attack, and in the first days of the war. Even a one-time loss of 1,200 aircraft on the first day of the war could not destroy the entire aviation of the western districts to such an extent. On the first day, no. Yes, and during the first 2-3 days - also not. But the next week, another - finished off. How? And including due to the absence of those same mechanics and gunsmiths in our air units. The fact is that it was precisely the good organization of maintenance and repair of damaged equipment during the hostilities that distinguished the German military machine. Both in aviation and in the same tank units. Before the war, our "wise men" reduced technical and maintenance personnel in the Air Force and, especially in the western districts, but the Germans did not. It was higher for them even after the gunsmiths were returned (remember who, according to the recollection of the pilots, were gunsmiths in our air regiments, especially fighter regiments - women). And it turned out that even during the war, when the gunsmiths and mechanics were returned, the Germans made twice as many sorties a day as our pilots. And it turned out that the multiple superiority of our Air Force in numbers was offset by the number of sorties of German pilots.
Of course, during the war, women were placed as gunsmiths and due to the fact that men were needed at the front, but at the beginning of the war, there were no gunsmiths and minders on planes at all. "Controlled" by the forces of the pilots! That is why the Germans finished off our border aviation in a few days, having formally almost half as many aircraft - they simply could take to the air more often and finished off our airfields in several passes, while our pilots refueled and serviced their own aircraft! Plus - the absence of alternate airfields, to which the aviation of the western districts could not fly with the start of hostilities. 
And there were also interesting orders from NGOs for pilots under Tymoshenko. Here is what Marshal Skripko writes:
“The fulfillment of the requirements of NPO order No. 303 dated November 4, 1940 “On the transition to flying from wheels in winter conditions". The skis were removed, but there was nothing to roll the snow, there were not enough tractors (252 were needed, but only 8 were received). During the winter, the pilots actually did not fly out for combat use ... ".
That is, the pilots' flight skills lost over the winter certainly did not contribute to an increase in the overall combat readiness of the flight crew before the war. But even in the spring they also flew a little - until the earth dries out after the spring thaw ...
And here the memories of the pilots who started the war on the border are very interesting. For example, with Lieutenant General S.F. Dolgushin, who met the war as a fighter pilot in the Western OVO. And Dolgushin talks about these "strange" abbreviations in more detail:
«
However, even until that day, much had been done as if “by order” (of the Germans): - the repair of the base airfield in the city of Lida began, - spare sites were not prepared ..., - the number of mechanics and gunsmiths was reduced to one per link. Not only did Timoshenko transfer us to the position of a soldier in December 1940, they also removed the gunsmith and minder from the plane! And before it was like - for 1 plane (relied - V.B.):
- a technician (it was an officer, as a rule, a lieutenant technician - V.B.);
- mechanic;
- minder and
- gunsmith.
Total for the plane: 6 people, because 4 trunks.
And then we considered that:
- the artilleryman cleans his cannon,
- the infantry is cleaning their rifle ...
- why don't the pilots scrub?! (2 servicemen left for the plane - a technician and a mechanic. - K.O.)
And they took it from us! And then - immediately in the very first months of the war, everything was introduced! They immediately entered: they felt that they had done an idiocy! 
“Everything was wrong” - this note by A.I. Pokryshkina on the margins of the official publication "Soviet Air Force in the Great Patriotic War" became a verdict on communist propaganda, which for almost half a century kept talking about the "superiority" of the red-star aviation, which "threw the Nazi vultures from the sky" and won complete air supremacy.
This sensational book, based not on agitation, but on reliable sources - combat documentation, authentic materials for recording losses, uncensored memoirs of front-line soldiers - leaves no stone unturned from Stalinist myths. After analyzing the combat work of Soviet and German aviation (fighters, dive-bombers, attack aircraft, bombers), comparing operational art and tactics, the level of qualification of command and personnel, as well as the performance characteristics of combat aircraft of the USSR and the Third Reich, the author comes to disappointing, shocking conclusions and answers the the most acute and bitter questions: why did our aviation operate much less efficiently than the German one? Whose fault is it that "Stalin's falcons" often looked almost like "whipping boys"? Why, having an overwhelming numerical superiority over the Luftwaffe, did the Soviet Air Force achieve much less success and suffer incomparably greater losses?
2. HOW MANY FIGHTERS DID GERMANY LOSE IN THE FIGHT AGAINST EACH OTHER?
Let's start with establishing the magnitude of the losses, because this question is somewhat easier to find out: the data we have on the losses of Soviet and German fighter aircraft in all cases were made public by the side that suffered these losses. It hardly needs proof that she has incomparably more complete information about her losses than the enemy who inflicted them on her. In air combat, where the situation changes in a matter of seconds, the pilot has no time to follow the fate of the aircraft hit by his fire; he usually cannot say with certainty whether they fell or still made it to their airfield; he does not know and cannot know how many of those who survived were destroyed during landing or written off as beyond repair, how many of the enemy vehicles that landed on an emergency were destroyed or turned out to be not on their territory, and how many the enemy managed to evacuate and repair. The ground troops, who check the reports of the pilots about those who were shot down, cannot know this either: the territory of the enemy (at least in the first hours after the air battle, or even days) is inaccessible to them; as a rule, they also do not have the strength and opportunities for continuous combing of their location. They are not always able to distinguish the remains of their aircraft from the wreckage of the enemy ... And anti-aircraft gunners often do not even see the one whose fire hit the falling or smoking enemy aircraft - their battery or the neighboring one. For this reason alone, the number of destroyed and damaged enemy aircraft in their reports doubles, triples, etc.: the same machine is entered into their account by several units at once ...
True, some researchers (for example, D.B. Khazanov) believe that reliable information about the losses of the enemy can be obtained without referring to the documents of the hostile side - from the testimony of prisoners of war. However - not to mention the fact that it is not always possible to capture prisoners (and even well-informed ones) - one cannot but agree with Yu.V. Rybin that this source is extremely unreliable (if not obviously unreliable). In fact, being at the mercy of the enemy and seeking to alleviate his plight, the prisoner voluntarily or involuntarily begins to “adjust” to the interrogator, to say what the interrogator wants to hear - and he, naturally, wants to hear that the enemy is running out of steam, suffering heavy losses, etc. .P. “Russian pilots are trained and fight well,” said, for example, during interrogation, Ober-sergeant major W. Pfrenger from the II group of the 5th fighter squadron “Eismeer”, shot down on May 17, 1942 near Murmansk. - German pilots are also good, but now there is a large percentage of young people who [so in the text. - A.S.] do not have sufficient training” 32 . “It turns out that in the spring of 1942 our pilots were the best? So why did we have such horrendous losses during this time?” Yu.V. Rybin rightly asks the question 33 . (In only six air battles between Soviet and German fighters, which took place in the Arctic between April 23 and May 17, 1942, Soviet aviators irrevocably lost, according to their reports, 17 aircraft - while the Luftwaffe, according to German data, lost only two 34. ) After viewing a large number of protocols of interrogations of German pilots shot down in the Arctic and comparing the testimonies of the latter with Soviet reports on air battles, the researcher came to the conclusion that “the fighting qualities of our pilots and aircraft, their successes, starting from 1942”, were “exalted in every possible way” by the prisoners, exaggerated... 35 Here's another example. Shot down on July 8, 1943 over the southern face of the Kursk Bulge, Lieutenant G. Lyuti from the III group of the 52nd fighter squadron showed that during the first three days of the Battle of Kursk (July 5-7), the units of the squadron participating in it irretrievably lost 35 aircraft. According to the German documents that most took into account the losses of their Air Force - the reports of the service of the quartermaster general of the Luftwaffe - this number was only 22 36.
We cannot exclude the deliberate misinformation of the enemy by captured aviators. Scouts of the Soviet ground forces came across prisoners of war-disinformers then more than once 37 ; Luftwaffe Lieutenant A. Kruger, shot down in January 1943 near Leningrad, turned out to be a clear conscious disinformer, who said that he was serving in the IV group of the 100th Viking bomber squadron, which, together with the II group of the 30th Adler bomber squadron, was based on airfields of the Pskov air hub. The fact is that the first of the groups he named did not leave the French airfield of Chartres in January 43, and the second did not leave the Sicilian airfield of Comiso ...
Here we can be pointed out that in the First world war German prisoners of war were distinguished precisely by the exceptional truthfulness of their testimony. Unlike the soldiers of the Austro-Hungarian army, he emphasized who served in 1914-1916. in the headquarters of the 3rd Finnish Rifle Brigade and the 40th Army Corps of the General Staff, Colonel B.N. Sergeevsky, the Germans “always gave absolutely accurate and definite testimony. Almost every German, as it were, was proud that he knew everything and could accurately report everything to "Mr. Captain." “A German soldier knows everything that a soldier should know”, “A German soldier cannot lie to an officer” - I heard such phrases many times from captured enemies, and they, without any coercion, told everything they could tell. Throughout the war, having interviewed thousands of prisoners, I met only two who tried to lie, and even then retreated from this tactic at the first shout. However, it is not in vain that they say that it was in 1914 that the 20th century began - not as idealistic and patriarchal as the 19th ... In the years that have passed between the two world wars, the concept of soldier's honor among the German military has undergone changes, the essence of which is visible, for example, from the protocol of interrogation of sergeant major Hartle from the 217th long-range reconnaissance squadron shot down on June 23, 1941 near Slonim: “He refused to give data on the Heinkel-111 aircraft for two reasons: as a devoted soldier of Germany, he does not want to lose his conscience before his homeland. When asked if it was about honor or fear, he replied that only honor did not allow him to reveal military secrets. Secondly, the Heinkel-111 aircraft were transferred to the Soviet Union and therefore do not represent any secret for the Russian command. Therefore, it would be an insult to demand from him the loss of honor without any reason. The German tanker, who was captured in September 1941 near Yelnya and interrogated by the commander of the Reserve Front, G.K. Zhukov, reasoned in exactly the same way. "Why do not you answer?" He is silent, - Zhukov said after the war. - Then he declares: “You are a military man, you must understand that I, as a military man, have already answered everything that I had to answer you: who I am and what part I belong to. And I can't answer any other questions. Because he took an oath. And you have no right to ask me, knowing that I am a military man, and you have no right to demand from me that I violate my duty and lose my honor.
Another thing is that the numbers of combat irretrievable losses of aircraft, published by the parties that suffered these losses, are also not absolutely accurate in our case. Thus, the relevant information on the Soviet side was published on the pages of the 1993 Russian Ministry of Defense statistical collection "Secret Classification Removed" - and the methodology of its compilers raises many doubts and complaints. At least in a number of cases, this technique had nothing to do with science at all: the compilers of the collection have already been convicted of falsification more than once, of understatement - in order to maintain the prestige of the domestic Armed Forces - the losses suffered by the Red Army in the Great Patriotic War 41 . For our part, we will point out the facts that make it possible to suspect the compilers of underestimating the losses of the Soviet Air Force. According to the collection, in the Crimean operation (April - May 1944), the Soviet side lost 179 aircraft; according to the documents of the war years, studied by M.E. Morozov, the 8th Air Army of the 4th Ukrainian Front alone lost 266 vehicles at that time 42 . But the Air Force of the Black Sea Fleet, the 4th Air Army, and part of the long-range aviation forces also participated in the Crimean operation ... In the Petsamo-Kirkenes operation (October 1944), according to the collection, 62 Soviet aircraft were lost, and according to Yu.V. Rybin, who independently carried out an archival search - 142 43 (although the collection gives figures of losses for October 7-29, and Rybin - for October 7 - November 1, but it is impossible to assume that two or three days after the actual the cessation of aircraft combat was lost more than in three weeks of intense combat work ...).
However, the figures given in the collection of irretrievable combat losses of Soviet fighters can, apparently, be considered unfalsified. According to the list of losses of combat aircraft of the Red Army Air Force for 1944 compiled during the war (and published by V.I. Alekseenko already in 2000), the combat irretrievable losses of fighters of this Air Force then amounted to 3571 aircraft 44 . And this is quite consistent with the data of the collection, which gives here a rounded figure of 4100 aircraft 45 (the "shortage" in the statement of about 500 fighters is easily explained by the fact that it does not take into account the losses of the Navy Air Force and air defense fighter aircraft). Thus, there is no question of underestimating losses; the figure of 500 fighters lost in 1944 for combat reasons by fleet and air defense aviation seems even overestimated. The discrepancies with the data of M.E. Morozov and Yu.V. Rybin can be explained by the fact that the collection in all cases indicates the amount of irretrievable losses, and the named authors, perhaps, give numbers not destroyed, but downed aircraft - some of which were after a forced landing renovated. It is known, for example, that during the air battles over the Taman Peninsula in April-October 1943, out of 851 Soviet aircraft that landed on a forced plane, only 380 (44.7%) were written off, and 471 aircraft were written off by the repair brigades of the 4th Air Army of the North Caucasian Front managed to return to service 46 .
But if the suspicions of falsification in our case should most likely be discarded, then the confidence that the figures of losses of Soviet aviation given in the collection “Secrecy Removed” are not underestimated (even without malicious intent and to a very small extent) - such Still no certainty. After all, we do not know what kind of documents were used by the compilers to calculate losses, whether the peculiarities of compiling these documents were taken into account, whether the information from one source was checked against another. Meanwhile, for example, in the reports on military operations compiled by the headquarters of the air regiments for a given period, their losses were sometimes underestimated. So, from the daily reports of the headquarters of the 900th Fighter Aviation Regiment of the 288th Fighter Aviation Division of the 8th Air Army of the South-Eastern Front, it can be seen that, fighting from August 24 to September 3, 1942 in the Stalingrad region, the regiment irretrievably lost for combat reasons 14 their Yak-7b; these machines were either completely destroyed as a result of air combat, or went missing 47 . However, in the final report on the actions of the 900th fighter near Stalingrad, only 8 aircraft appear irretrievably lost during the indicated days - and it was from this figure that the regiment later proceeded when compiling reports on combat work for a particular period ... 48 As far as the compilers of the collection managed “Secrecy stamp removed” to restore the true picture in all such cases is unknown.
Part of the documents of the Wehrmacht is also characterized by incomplete data on its losses. In particular, diaries of combat operations of air fleets are unreliable in this respect. According to these sources, the 6th Air Fleet for July 5-11, 1943 irretrievably lost 33 aircraft, and the 8th Air Corps of the 4th Air Force for July 4-23 - 111. According to the 6th department of the service of the quartermaster general Luftwaffe (who was in charge of accounting for losses), these losses amounted to 64 and about 170 vehicles, respectively 49 . Accordingly, the weekly reports of the Wehrmacht command (OKW), based on the reports of the headquarters of the air fleets, are also unreliable. According to these latter, from June 22 to December 27, 1941, the Germans irretrievably lost 2212 aircraft on the Soviet-German front (including those beyond repair due to too much damage) 50 - and according to the service of the Luftwaffe Quartermaster General, these losses have already reached On August 31, they amounted to 2631 units ... 51 For the period December 7-31, 1941, the weekly reports of the OKW give a figure of 180 aircraft irretrievably lost on the Soviet-German front, and according to the data processed by D.B. Khazanov, the German historians O. Gröler and K .Becker, it turns out 324 ... 52 As R. Larintsev and A. Zablotsky, who studied this issue, note, individual errors can also be found in the materials of the service of the quartermaster general 53 . And indeed, after all, their information is based on reports from units and formations - and these latter, like in the Soviet Air Force, sometimes underestimated their losses. So, according to the documents of the 1st group of the 28th bomber squadron, it turns out that from July 22 to December 31, 1941, 33 aircraft 54 were killed or damaged in its 2nd and 3rd detachments, and according to the report of the 2nd air corps, in which consisted of these detachments then - 41 ... 55
So, in principle, we cannot have absolutely exact figures for the irretrievable combat losses of Soviet and German aircraft on the Soviet-German front. Let us take into account, however, that the figures of their losses published by both sides, if they differ from the actual ones, then in the same direction (decrease) - so that they should still reflect the ratio of the losses of the parties with a sufficient degree of accuracy. In addition, the degree of inaccuracy of information from such a German source as the documents of the service of the quartermaster general of the Luftwaffe, according to R. Larintsev and A. Zablotsky, is "very small." “Copies from the relevant materials for 1943, which one of the authors managed to get acquainted with,” these researchers point out, “allow us to judge their sufficient completeness ...” 56 . This information is fragmentary only for four months of 1945, when the system of centralized accounting for losses in the agonizing Reich went wrong. It seems that the information about the losses of the Soviet Air Force published in the collection “The Classification Removed” can also be considered quite complete; in any case, the opposite (we are now talking only about aviation losses) has not yet been proven.
Based on the information of these two sources, we will try to establish the approximate value of the irretrievable combat losses of Soviet and German fighter aircraft on the Soviet-German front.
For Soviet aviation, the collection "Secrecy Removed" gives a figure of 20,700 fighters irretrievably lost for combat reasons 57 .
As for the German fighter aviation, such a final figure for it has not yet been published in the Russian-language literature. However, one can try to determine it by calculation, based on the information at our disposal of the service of the quartermaster general of the Luftwaffe:
- on the magnitude of the total (i.e., both combat and non-combat) irretrievable losses of German fighters on all fronts from June 22 to October 31, 1941 (1527 vehicles);
- on the magnitude of the total irretrievable losses of German fighters on the Eastern Front for January - November 1943 (1084 vehicles) and
- on the magnitude of the irretrievable combat losses of German fighters on the Eastern Front in 1944 (839 aircraft) 58 .
Let us first try to determine the magnitude of the total irretrievable losses of German fighters on the Soviet-German front in 1941 and 1943. In the case of the 41st, it is necessary first of all to establish how many Luftwaffe fighters were irretrievably lost from June 22 to October 31 on other fronts. According to German data, the 2nd and 26th Fighter Squadrons, which were then fighting the British over the English Channel, lost 103 aircraft in combat from 14 July to 31 December. Let us assume that these losses were evenly distributed over the months; then we can assume that from June 22 to October 31, the irretrievable combat losses of these formations amounted to about 80 vehicles. Let's assume that the value of non-combat irretrievable losses related to this figure as 47 to 53: approximately such was then (see below) the structure of the total irretrievable losses of the German Air Force. Then it turns out that from June 22 to October 31, the total irretrievable losses of the 2nd and 26th squadrons amounted to about 150 aircraft. Night fighters, covering Germany from British raids, could lose about 10 aircraft during this period of time: in the first nine and a half months of 1941, their total irretrievable losses amounted to only 28 units 60 . To the share of German fighters who fought in June - October 41st over the North and Norwegian Seas (detachments of the 1st and 77th fighter squadrons) and in North Africa (I group of the 27th squadron, 7th detachment of the 26th, and in October also the II group of the 27th), let's leave 100 irretrievably lost aircraft: near the coast of Germany and Norway, air battles were then isolated, and in North Africa the Germans were opposed by less combat-strong units of British fighters than over the English Channel. As a result, out of 1,527 fighters irretrievably lost by the German Air Force from June 22 to October 31, approximately 1,270 fighters should fall on the Soviet-German front. let's assume that about 200 of them were fighters. Then the total irretrievable losses of German fighters on the Soviet-German front in 1941 can be estimated at about 1470 aircraft.
Since 1943, it is much easier: if for 11 months of this year the total irretrievable losses of German fighters in the East turned out to be equal to 1084 aircraft, then we are unlikely to make a big mistake, assuming that for the whole year they amounted to 12/11 of this number, i.e. . about 1180 cars.
Let us now calculate the magnitude of the irretrievable combat losses of German fighters on the Eastern Front in 1941 and 1943. R. Larintsev and A. Zablotsky, based on data published in foreign literature, determine the share of these losses in the total irretrievable losses of the Luftwaffe on all fronts at 53% for 1942 and 55% for 1943 - and accept that in 1941- m it was the same as in the 42nd 62 . On the Eastern Front, with its frosts, mudslides, unpaved airfields, supply difficulties due to off-road and a small number of landmarks in flight over flat, sparsely populated plains, the percentage of non-combat losses should have been higher than in other theaters of military operations, but - for lack of relevant specific figures - let's take the average figures of Larintsev and Zablotsky. Then it turns out that in 1941 the irretrievable combat losses of German fighters on the Soviet-German front amounted to about 780 vehicles, and in 1943 - about 650. By the way, for 1944, the figure of 839 aircraft must be reduced to approximately 800: after all, from fighters lost by the Germans in 1944 in the East, about a few dozen were destroyed not by the Armed Forces of the USSR, but by US aircraft - during its raids on industrial facilities in Romania and Poland.
For 1942 and 1945, the desired value can only be calculated very, very approximately. It is known that the average monthly number of groups of single-engine Luftwaffe fighters on the Soviet-German front (where the overwhelming majority of German fighters were precisely single-engine) in 1943 was approximately 12.4, and in 1942 - approximately 15.5 63 , i.e. 1.25 times more. We venture to suggest that the total irretrievable losses of German fighter aircraft in the East in 1942 were 1.25 times greater than in 1943, i.e. amounted to about 1480 cars. Then the magnitude of its irretrievable combat losses on the Soviet-German front in 1942 can be determined (taking it as 53% of the total) at about 780 aircraft. Losses for the four months of 1945 will be calculated by analogy with 1944. However, let's take them equal not to 33%, but to 40% of losses for 1944. This will to some extent take into account the fact that in 1945 the number of German fighters operating against the Soviet Armed Forces increased. As a result, we will determine the approximate number of irretrievable combat losses of German fighters on the Soviet-German front in 1945 at 320 aircraft.
Table 1COMBATIVE LOSSES OF SOVIET 64 AND GERMAN FIGHTERS ON THE SOVIET-GERMAN FRONT IN 1941-1945
However, it would not be entirely correct to compare the figures of losses of one side given in Table 1 with the figures of losses of the other. Indeed, in addition to the German armed forces, the losses of the Soviet Air Force in the Great Patriotic War were also inflicted by the Armed Forces of Finland, Hungary, Romania, Italy, Slovakia and Croatia. Thus, the Finns claim 2787 Soviet aircraft shot down by them 65 , the Romanians - about 1500 66 , the Hungarians - judging by what is known about the activities of their aviators and anti-aircraft gunners - about 1000 67 , the Italians - apparently, 150-200 68, Slovaks - not less than 10 69 . In addition, 638 downed Soviet aircraft are listed on the combat accounts of the Slovak, Croatian and Spanish fighter squadrons, which were organizationally part of the German Air Force and were called, respectively, the 13th (Slovak) detachment of the 52nd fighter squadron, the 15th (Croatian) detachment 52 th fighter squadron and the 15th (Spanish) detachment, first the 27th and then the 51st fighter squadron ... 70 recognized as irretrievably lost at least 322 (apparently, about 350) 71 . Some of them could, however, land on enemy territory due to malfunctions not related to combat damage, or due to loss of orientation in the usual inclement weather for winter, i.e. could actually refer to non-combat losses. Let's accept, therefore, that in the "Winter War" the irretrievable combat losses of the Soviet Air Force were not one and a half, but two times less than the number of vehicles that the Finns declared as downed. Then, by analogy, we can assume that in 1941-1944. The Finnish Armed Forces managed to destroy about 1,400 Soviet aircraft. As for the rest of Germany's allies, let's assume that they, like the Germans, overestimated the number of aircraft they shot down by about 2.5 times (see Section 3 of this chapter for the rationale for this coefficient) and that the Soviet side managed to return about 25% of those shot down to system (in the Kuban, in the 43rd, this percentage, as we saw, reached 45 - but there almost all the battles took place over the territory occupied by Soviet troops, and those who sat down on the forced more often found themselves among their own). With such assumptions, it turns out that the Romanians, Hungarians, Italians, Slovaks, Croats and Spaniards destroyed about 1000 Soviet aircraft, and together with the Finns - about 2400. It is known that fighters accounted for 45% of the irretrievable combat losses of the Soviet Air Force in the Great Patriotic War 72 . Therefore (under the assumptions we have made), it can be assumed that about 1100 Soviet fighters were destroyed not by the Germans, but by their allies, and the Germans accounted for about 19,600.
On the other hand, not all of the German fighters destroyed on the Soviet-German front were victims of the USSR Armed Forces. In addition to the latter, the French Normandie fighter regiment, the Armed Forces of Poland and Czechoslovakia, and from August-September 1944, the armed forces of Romania and Bulgaria, which had sided with the USSR, also fought with German aviation. In particular, the Normandy pilots are responsible for about 100 downed German fighter aircraft 73 . The check carried out by A.N. shoot down 25 German fighters. Polish and Czechoslovak pilots were counted respectively 16 and about 25 German aircraft shot down on the Soviet-German front 75; how many anti-aircraft gunners were credited is unknown, but certainly not less than 100. Let us assume that Polish and Czechoslovak aviators and anti-aircraft gunners - most of whom were trained in the USSR - like the Soviet ones, overestimated their successes by at least 5 times (see about this in section 3 of this chapter); then we can assume that in reality they shot down about 30 German vehicles, of which about 10 could be fighters. Romanians claim 101 downed German and Hungarian aircraft 76 ; in reality, they apparently shot down 2.5 times (see above) less, i.e. about 40, of which about 30 could be German, including about 10 fighters. As for the Bulgarians, the 3-5 German fighters they destroyed in 1944 in Serbia and Macedonia did not belong to the air units of the Eastern Front 77, and in Hungary in 1945 Bulgarian pilots and anti-aircraft gunners hardly shot down more than 5 German fighters. Taking into account the fact that a small part of the downed German aircraft could be recovered, it can be concluded that about 40 German fighters on the Soviet-German front were destroyed by the allies of the USSR; by the Soviet Armed Forces - about 3240.
Thus, in the confrontation between the Armed Forces of the USSR and Germany (without taking into account the actions of their allies on the Soviet-German front), the ratio of combat irretrievable losses of Soviet and German fighters is, according to our calculations, approximately 19,600: 3,240, i.e. approximately 6: 1. Considering the large number of assumptions we made when calculating and the resulting significant error (much exceeding, in particular, the number of German fighters destroyed by us on the Soviet-German front by the allies of the USSR), we will assume for simplicity this ratio equal to 6 : one.
05/23/2018 - last, unlike reposts, topic update
Each new message at least 10 days highlighted in red, but NOT NECESSARY
located at the beginning of the topic. The section "SITE NEWS" is being updated REGULARLY, and all its links - ACTIVE
NB: active links to similar topics: "Little Known Facts about Aviation", "Double Standards in Allied Bombing"
The theme consists of sections for each of the major participating countries. At the same time, I cleaned up duplicates, similar information and information that caused frank doubts.
Air Force of Tsarist Russia:
- during the years of WW1, 120-150 captured German and Austrian aircraft were captured. Most - double reconnaissance, fighters and twin-engine aircraft were rare (Note 28 *)
- at the end of 1917, the Russian army had 91 squadrons of 1109 aircraft, of which: available at the fronts - 579 (428 serviceable, 137 faulty, 14 obsolete), 237 loaded for the front and 293 in schools. This number did not include up to 35 aircraft of the Squadron of Air Ships, 150 aircraft of naval aviation, aircraft of rear services, 400 aircraft of air fleets and in reserve. The total number of aircraft was estimated at 2200-2500 military aircraft (Note 28 *)
- in the summer of 1917, there were 71 aircraft (28 out of order) and 530 military personnel in the aviation of the Baltic Fleet, of which 42 officers (Note 90 *)
USSR Air Force:
- in 1937 there were 18 aviation schools in the Red Army, in 1939 - 32, as of 05/01/1941 - already 100 (Note 32 *). According to other sources, if in 1938 (Note 64 *) and 1940 there were 18 aviation schools and schools, then in May 1941 aviators were trained by 3 Air Force academies, 2 higher schools for navigators, 88 flight and 16 technical schools (Note 57 *), and in 1945 - 130, which made it possible to train 60 thousand pilots for the Second World War (Note 64 *)
- order No. 080 dated 03.1941: the training period for flight personnel is 9 months in peacetime and 6 months in wartime, flying hours for cadets on training and combat aircraft is 20 hours for fighters and 24 hours for bombers (a Japanese suicide bomber in 1944 was supposed to have 30 flight hours) (Note 12*)
- in 1939, the Red Army had 8139 combat aircraft, of which 2225 were fighters (Note 41 *)
- in 1939 the USSR daily produced 28 combat aircraft, in 1940 - 29 (Note 70 *)
- by the beginning of WW2 - 09/01/1939, the USSR had 12677 combat aircraft (Note 31 *)
- on 01/01/1940, there were 12,540 combat aircraft in the western military districts, excluding long-range bomber aircraft. By the end of 1940, these figures were almost doubled to 24,000 combat aircraft. The number of only training aircraft was increased to 6800 (Note 12 *)
- for the summer of 1940, there were 38 air divisions in the Red Army, and by 01/01/1941 they should have become and became 50 (Note 9 *)
- in the period from 01/01/1939 to 06/22/1941, the Red Army received 17745 combat aircraft, of which 3719 were new types, not inferior in basic parameters the best cars Luftwaffe (Note 43 *). According to other data, at the beginning of the Second World War there were 2739 aircraft of the latest types Yak-1 (412 were produced on 06/22/41 - Note 39 *), MiG-3 (1094 were released on 06/22/41 - Note 63 *), LAGG-3, Pe-2, of which half (of which 913 MiG-1\3, which amounted to 1/4 of all fighters - Note 63 *) was in the western military districts (Note 11 *). On June 22, 1941, the Air Force received 917 MiG-3s (486 pilots retrained), 142 Yak-1s (156 pilots retrained), 29 LAGGs (90 pilots retrained) (Note 4*)
- on 01/01/1941, the Red Army Air Force had 26,392 aircraft, of which 14,628 combat and 11,438 training aircraft. Moreover, 10565 (8392 combat) were built in 1940 (Note 32 *)
- on 06/22/41, the Red Army and Red Army Air Forces numbered 32 thousand aircraft, of which 20 thousand were combat: 8400 bombers, 11500 fighters and 100 attack aircraft (Note 60 *)
- on the eve of the Second World War, there were 20 thousand aircraft in the European part of the USSR, of which 17 thousand combat aircraft (Note 12 *), at the same time, 7139 combat aircraft were in the units of the Red Army Air Force of the border military districts, separately 1339 long-range bomber aircraft and 1445 Navy aviation aircraft, which in total amounted to 9917 aircraft
- 1540 new Soviet fighters, not much inferior to the "Messerschmitt" Bf-109, were in the western border districts by the beginning of the war. In total, by 06/22/1941, the USSR had 3719 aircraft of new designs (Note 81 *)
- by 07/22/41, there were 29 fighter regiments in the Moscow air defense system, armed with 585 fighters - about the same as the Germans on the entire Eastern Front (Note 19 *)
- in June 1941, in the western military districts there were almost 1500 I-156 aircraft (1300 I-153 fighters + 6 regiments of I-153 attack aircraft), which out of 4226 was 1/3 of the entire combat aviation of the western districts (Note 68 *)
- on 06/22/41, the RKKF Air Force had 859 seaplanes, of which 672 MBR-2 (Note 66 *)
- on 06/22/41, the RKKF Air Force consisted of 3838 aircraft, 2824 of which were combat (Note 70 *). According to other sources, there were more than 2.5 thousand combat aircraft (Note 66*). According to other sources, in total, there were 6700 aircraft in the aviation of the USSR Navy in three fleets (BF, Black Sea Fleet and Northern Fleet) (Note 77 *): BF - 656 combat aircraft, of which 353 fighters (Note 73 *), Black Sea Fleet - 651 (Note 78 *) or 632 combat aircraft: 346 fighter aircraft, bomber - 73; mine-torpedo - 61; reconnaissance - 150 (Note 80 *)
- on 06/22/41, Soviet naval strike aviation: Baltic Fleet - 81 DB-3\3F, 66 SB and 12 AR-2; Northern Fleet - 11 SB; Black Sea Fleet - 61 DB-3 and 75 SB (Note 62 *)
- in June 1941, there were 108 I-153s in the naval aviation of the Baltic Fleet, 73-76 in the Black Sea Fleet and 18 in the Northern Fleet (Note 68 *)
- on the eve of the Second World War, 1/4 of the naval aviation of the RKKF were seaplanes, so there were 54 cars in the Northern Fleet, 131 in the Baltic Fleet, 167 in the Black Sea Fleet, 216 in the Pacific Fleet (Note 89 *)
- with the beginning of the Second World War, 587 aircraft of the Civil Air Fleet were at the front as special-purpose air groups, and then were consolidated into air regiments (Note 92 *)
- at the beginning of the Second World War, 79 air divisions and 5 air brigades were formed, of which 32 air divisions, 119 air regiments and 36 corps squadrons were part of the Western Military District. Long-range bomber aviation in the western direction was represented by 4 air corps and 1 separate air division in the amount of 1546 aircraft. The number of air regiments by June 1941 increased by 80% compared to the beginning of 1939 (Note 11 *)
- The Second World War was met by 5 heavy bomber corps, 3 separate air divisions and one separate regiment of Soviet long-range bomber aviation - about 1000 aircraft, of which 2/3 were lost during the six months of the war. By the summer of 1943, long-range bomber aviation consisted of 8 air corps and numbered more than 1000 aircraft and crews. (Note 2*)
- by the spring-early summer of 1944, the Red Army Air Force ADD consisted of 66 air regiments, united in 22 air divisions and 9 corps, which approximately amounted to 1000 long-range bombers (Note 58 *)
- at the beginning of the Second World War, 1528 long-range DB-3 bombers (Note 44 *) and 818 heavy bombers TB-3 (Note 41 *) were produced
- by the spring of 1942, the USSR reached the pre-war level of aircraft production - at least 1000 combat aircraft per month, from the second half of 1942 reached the production line of 2500 aircraft per month with a total monthly loss of 1000 aircraft. From June 1941 to December 1944, 97 thousand aircraft were produced (Note 9 *)
- as of March 1942, the Red Army Air Force had 19,700 combat aircraft, of which 6,100 were on the fronts and in air defense, 3,400 in rear districts, reserve and march regiments (without schools), 3,500 in the Far East, 6,700 in flight and technical schools Of the new types: 2920 aircraft at the fronts, in reserve and marching regiments, 130 in the Far East, 230 in the rear districts and 320 in flight schools. On this date, there were 4,610 defective machines in the Air Force (Note 96 *)
- 34 thousand aircraft were produced in the USSR in 1943, 40 thousand in 1944, and in total for the Second World War - 125 thousand aircraft (Note 26 *). According to other sources, 115,600 combat aircraft were produced in 1941-45, of which about 20 thousand bombers, 33 thousand attack aircraft and almost 63 thousand fighters (Note 60 *)
- from the second half of 1942, reserve aviation corps were created in the Red Army, so from September to the end of 1942, 9 such corps were created, and later - 23 more, each of which consisted of 2-3 divisions (Note 48 *)
- on 06/22/1942, 85% of all Soviet long-range bomber aviation was 1789 DB-3 aircraft (from the DB-3f modification it was called IL-4), the remaining 15% - SB-3. These aircraft did not fall under the first German air strikes, as they were based relatively far from the border (Note 3 *)
- over the years of production (1936-40) 6831 Soviet SB bombers were built (Note 41 *)
- 79 (93 - Note 115 *) four-engine Pe-8 bombers were produced during the Second World War (Note 104 *) and 462 also four-engine bombers Er-2 (DB-240) were produced during the Second World War (Note 115 *). All of them were used exclusively in the ADD (Note 115 *)
- 10292 I-16 biplanes and its modifications were produced from 1934 to 1942
- a total of 201 (600 - according to Yakovlev) Yak-2 and Yak-4 aircraft were produced (Note 82 *)
- 16 thousand Yak-9s were produced during the war
- 6528 LAGG-3 fighters were produced during the Second World War (a controversial aircraft in many respects)
- 3172 MiG-1 \ 3 were built in total (Note 63 *)
- 36 thousand Il-2 attack aircraft were produced in 1941-45 (Note 41 * and 37 *) Losses of attack aircraft during the Second World War amounted to about 23 thousand.
- 4863 ADD Li-2 night bombers (Soviet military version of the licensed American Douglas DC-3-186 "Dacota") were produced from the beginning of 1942 until the end of the Second World War (Note 115 *). According to other sources, 11 thousand aircraft of this type were produced during this period.
- during the years of the Second World War, 11 thousand Soviet attack pilots died (Note 25 *)
- in 1944, in parts for each Soviet attack pilot, there were two aircraft (Note 17 *)
- the life of an attack aircraft lasted an average of 10-15 sorties, and 25% of the pilots went down on the first flight, while at least 10 sorties were required to destroy one German tank (Note 9 *)
- about 19537 combat aircraft entered the USSR under Lend-Lease, of which 13804 fighters, 4735 bombers, 709 transport aircraft, 207 reconnaissance seaplanes and 82 training aircraft (Note 60 *)
- by the beginning of 1944, the USSR had 11,000 combat aircraft, the Germans - no more than 2,000. During the 4 years of the war, the USSR built 137,271 aircraft (there is also evidence that 97,000 combat aircraft were produced from June 1941 to December 1944) and received 18,865 under Lend-Lease aircraft of all types, of which 638 aircraft were lost during transportation. According to other sources, at the beginning of 1944 there were 6 times more Soviet combat aircraft than all German aircraft (Note 8 *)
- on the "heavenly slug" - U-2vs fought during the Second World War about 50 air regiments (Note 33 *)
- from the monograph "1941 - lessons and conclusions": "... out of 250 thousand sorties carried out by Soviet aviation in the first three months of the war against enemy tank and motorized columns ..." June 1942 was a record month for the Luftwaffe , when it was performed (according to the Soviet VNOS posts) 83,949 sorties of combat aircraft of all types. In other words, "destroyed and destroyed on the ground" Soviet aviation flew in the summer of 1941 with an intensity that the Germans were able to achieve in only one month during the entire war (Note 13*). So, only on August 16, 1941, the forces of the Red Army Air Force (464 combat aircraft, of which 100 YES bombers) made 2860 sorties (Note 115 *)
- during 1942, 6178 (24%) Soviet military pilots died, which is more than 1700 people more than died in 1941 (Note 48 *)
- The average survivability of Soviet pilots in years Patriotic War:
fighter pilot - 64 sorties
attack aircraft pilot - 11 sorties
bomber pilot - 48 sorties
torpedo bomber pilot - 3.8 sorties (Note 45 *)
- the number of combat sorties per combat loss of one aircraft increased for fighters from 28 in 1941-42 to 194 in 1945, for attack aircraft - from 13 to 90, and for bombers - from 14 to 133 (Note 112 *)
- the accident rate in the Red Army Air Force on the eve of the Second World War was huge - on average, 2-3 aircraft crashed per day. This situation was largely preserved during the war. It is no coincidence that during the war non-combat losses of aircraft were over 50% (Note 9 *)
- on the first day of the Second World War, 1200 aircraft were lost (Note 78 *), 800 of them at airfields (Note 78 *, 94 *), and in two days - 2500 (Note 78 *)
- in the first week of the Second World War, the Red Army Air Force lost 4000 aircraft (Note 64 *)
- for 6 months of the Second World War, the USSR lost 20159 aircraft of all types, of which 16620 combat aircraft
- "unaccounted for loss" - 5240 Soviet aircraft remaining at the airfields after they were captured by the Germans in 1941
- the average monthly losses of the Red Army Air Force from 1942 to May 1945 amounted to 1000 aircraft, of which non-combat ones - over 50%, and in 1941 combat losses amounted to 1700 aircraft, and total - 3500 per month (Note 9 *)
- non-combat losses of Soviet military aviation in the Second World War amounted to 60,300 aircraft (56.7%) (Note 32 *)
- in 1944, the losses of Soviet military aviation amounted to 24,800 vehicles, of which 9,700 were combat losses, and 15,100 were non-combat losses (Note 18 *)
- from 19 to 22 thousand Soviet fighters were lost in the Second World War (Note 23 *)
- ADD losses during the years of the Second World War amounted to 3570 aircraft: in 1941 - 1592, in 1942 - 748, in 1943 - 516, in 1944 - 554, in 1945 - 160. More than 2 thousand crew members died (Note 115 *)
- in accordance with the Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 632-230ss of March 22, 1946 "On the rearmament of the Air Force, Air Defense Fighter Aviation and Navy Aviation with modern aircraft domestic production": "... withdraw from service in 1946 and write off: foreign-type fighter aircraft, including Aircobra - 2216 aircraft, Thunderbolt - 186 aircraft, Kingcobra - 2344 aircraft, Kittyhawk - 1986 aircraft , "Spitfire" - 1139 aircraft, "Hurricane" - 421 aircraft. Total: 7392 aircraft and 11937 obsolete domestic aircraft (Note 1 *)
German Air Force:
- during the German offensive of 1917, up to 500 Russian aircraft became German trophies (Note 28 *)
- according to the Treaty of Versailles, Germany had to scrap 14 thousand of its aircraft after the end of WW1 (Note 32 *)
- serial production of the first combat aircraft in Nazi Germany began only in 1935-1936 (Note 13 *). So in 1934, the German government adopted a plan to build 4,000 aircraft by 09/30/1935. Among them there was nothing but junk (Note 52 *): Do-11, Do-13 and Ju-52 bombers had very low flight characteristics (Note 52 *)
- 03/01/1935 - official recognition of the Luftwaffe. There were 2 regiments of Ju-52 and Do-23 (Note 52 *)
- 771 German fighters were produced in 1939 (Note 50 *)
- in 1939, Germany produced 23 combat aircraft daily, in 1940 - 27, and in 1941 - 30 aircraft (Note 32 *)
- 09/01/1939 Germany began WW2 with 4093 aircraft (of which 1502 bombers (Note 31 *), 400 Ju-52 (Note 75 *). According to other sources, the Luftwaffe at the time of the attack on Poland consisted of 4000 combat aircraft: 1,200 Bf-109 fighters, 1,200 He-111 (789 - Note 94 *) and Do-17 medium-range bombers, about 400 Ju-87 attack aircraft and about 1,200 military transport aircraft, liaison aircraft and retired obsolete aircraft , which could come in handy in battles with Polish aircraft (Note 26 *)
- in 1940, 150 aircraft per month were produced in Germany (Note 26 *). By the spring of 1942, the production reached 160 aircraft per month.
- by May 1940, the Luftwaffe had recovered from Polish losses and consisted of 1100 He-111 and Do-17, 400 Ju-87, 850 Bf-109 and Bf-110 (Note 26 *)
- in 1940, the Luftwaffe lost 4,000 aircraft and received 10,800 new ones (Note 26 *)
- in the summer of 1941, the German aviation industry monthly produced over 230 single-engine fighters and 350 twin-engine combat aircraft (bombers and fighters) (Note 57 *)
- at the end of June 1941, the Luftwaffe in the West had only 140 serviceable Bf-109E-F fighters (Note 35 *)
- a little more than 500 Bf-109 had the Luftwaffe in the East to attack the USSR, since the remaining about 1300 aircraft were bombers or attack aircraft (Note 81 *), according to the then Soviet classification, out of 1223 bombers there were 917 horizontal bombers and 306 dive bombers (Note .86*)
- 273 (326 - Note 83 *) Ju-87s acted against the USSR, while 348 Ju-87s attacked Poland (Note 38 *)
- on the eve of the Second World War, Germany had 6852 aircraft, of which 3909 aircraft of all types were allocated to attack the USSR. This number included 313 transport aircraft (of which 238 Ju-52 (Note 37 *) or 210 Ju-52 (Note 74 *) and 326 communications aircraft. Of the remaining 3270 combat aircraft: 965 fighters (almost equally - Bf-109e and BF-109f), 102 fighter-bombers (Bf-110), 952 bombers, 456 attack aircraft and 786 reconnaissance aircraft (Note 32 *), which coincides with the data that on 06/22/41 the Luftwaffe included 3904 aircraft to attack the USSR of all types (3032 combat): 952 bombers, 965 single-engine fighters, 102 twin-engine fighters and 156 "pieces" (Note 26*). Bf-109; 179 Bf-110 as reconnaissance and light bombers, 893 bombers (281 He-111, 510 Ju-88, 102 Do-17), attack aircraft - 340 Ju-87 (according to other sources, 273 Ju-87 - Note 38 *), scouts - 120. Total - 2534 (of which about 2000 combat-ready). According to other sources, on 06/22/41, the Luftwaffe against the USSR: 3904, of which 3032 are combat: 93 2 bombers, 965 single-engine fighters, 102 twin-engine fighters and 156 Ju-87 attack aircraft (Note 26 *). And more data on the same topic: 2549 serviceable Luftwaffe aircraft were concentrated against the USSR on 06/22/41: 757 bombers, 360 dive bombers, 735 fighters and attack aircraft, 64 twin-engine fighters, 633 reconnaissance aircraft, including naval ones (Note 70 *). And again about the same thing - according to the Barbarossa plan, 2000 combat aircraft were allocated, of which 1160 bombers, 720 fighters and 140 reconnaissance aircraft (Note 84 *). And also no more than 600 aircraft of the German allies (Note 70 *)
- in the first week of the war with the USSR, the losses of the Luftwaffe amounted to 445 aircraft of all types; on 07/05/1941 - more than 800 combat aircraft (Note 85 *); for 4 weeks of battles - 1171 aircraft of all types, for 10 weeks of battles - 2789 aircraft of all types, for 6 months of battles - 3827 combat aircraft only
- in 1941, the Luftwaffe lost 3,000 aircraft in combat (another 2,000 were non-combat losses) and received 12,000 new ones (Note 26 *)
- if at the beginning of 1941 the number of Luftwaffe was 4500 aircraft, then at the end of the year, as a result of losses and their subsequent replenishment, their number did not exceed 5100 (Note 26 *)
- from 435 single-engine fighters in the first half of 1942, production increased to more than 750 in the first half of 1943 and to 850 in the second half of 1943 (Note 26 *)
- in 1943, the Luftwaffe lost 7,400 aircraft in combat (another 6,000 were non-combat losses) and received 25,000 new ones (Note 26 *)
- if at the beginning of 1943 the number of Luftwaffe was 5400 aircraft, then at the end of the year, as a result of losses and their subsequent replenishment, their number did not exceed 6500 (Note 26 *)
- as of May 31, 1944, the number of single-engine Luftwaffe fighters on the Eastern Front: 444 aircraft of the VF "Reich", 138 - in the 4th VF in Ukraine, 66 - in the 6th VF in Belarus (Note 58 *)
- from 22.06. to 27.09.41 2631 German aircraft on the Eastern Front were damaged or lost (Note 74 *)
- in the summer of 1941, the Germans produced over 230 single-engine fighters per month (Note 26 *)
- by 08/16/41, only 135 serviceable Non-111s remained on the Eastern Front (Note 83 *)
- in November 1941, due to losses, the number of Bf-109s on the Eastern Front was reduced by 3 times compared to their number in July 1941, which led to the loss of air supremacy, first in Moscow, and then in other directions (Note 83 * ), and on 12/01/41 the number of Bf-109Bf-110 became deplorable due to huge losses (Note 55 *)
- after the transfer in December 1941 of 250-300 aircraft of the 2nd Air Corps from the Eastern Front for operations in the region of Malta and North Africa, the total number of Luftwaffe on the Soviet front was reduced from 2465 aircraft on 12/01/1941 to 1700 aircraft on 12/31/1941. In December of the same 1941, the 10th Air Corps arrived in Sicily from the Eastern Front to strike at Malta instead of the Italians who did not justify their hopes (Note 88 *). In January 1942, the number of German aircraft was further reduced after the transfer of aircraft of the 5th Air Corps to Belgium (Note 29 *) Also: starting from the second half of 1941, several elite units of the Lufftwaffe were transferred from the Eastern Front to the Mediterranean theater of operations (Note 54 *)
- at the end of October 1942, the Luftwaffe had 508 fighters (389 combat-ready) on the Eastern Front (Note 35 *)
- in 1942, Germany produced 8.4 thousand (of which 800 single-engine fighters - Note 26 *) combat aircraft. According to other sources, the Germans produced only up to 160 aircraft per month.
- in total, on 06/01/1943, the Germans on the Eastern Front had 2365 bombers (of which 1224 Ju-88 and 760 He-111) and over 500 Ju-87D attack aircraft (Note 53 *)
- in early November 1943, after the landing of the allies in North Africa, the Luftwaffe grouping in Norway, which acted against the Red Army in the north of the USSR, decreased many times (Note 99 *)
- in February 1943, the Germans for the first time were able to produce 2000 combat aircraft per month, and in March - even 2166 (Note 35 *)
- in 1943, 24 thousand aircraft were produced (Note 26 *), of which 849 fighters were produced on an average monthly basis (Note 49 *)
- in June 1944, the Luftwaffe lost 10 thousand aircraft in Operation Overlord and another 14 thousand in the next six months - at the end of 1944, the Luftwaffe had no more than 6,000 aircraft of all types, and only 1,400 of which were fighters (Note 26 *)
- from January to June 1944, the Germans produced 18 thousand aircraft, 13 thousand of which were fighters (Note 71 *). During 1944, about 40 thousand aircraft were produced, but many of them never took to the skies due to the lack of pilots (Note 26 *)
- 5 months before the end of the war, the German aircraft industry was able to produce only 7500 aircraft (Note 26 *)
- in 1945, the share of fighters from all military aviation produced in Germany was 65.5%, in 1944 - 62.3% (Note 41 *)
- 84320 aircraft of all types were produced by the Germans in 1941-45 (Note 24*): 35 thousand Bf-109 fighters (Note 14* and 37*), 15100 (14676 - Note 40* and 37*), Ju bombers -88 (Note 38*), 7300 He-111 bombers (Note 114*), 1433 Me-262 jets (Note 21*),
- in total, 57 thousand German aircraft of all types were destroyed during the years of WW2
- 1190 seaplanes were produced by the German aviation industry during WW2 (Note 38 *): of which 541 Arado 196a
- 2500 "Storch" ("Stork") liaison aircraft were built in total. According to other sources, 2871 Fi-156 "Storch" were produced, and in the summer of 1941 the Germans seized the factory for the production of its Soviet counterfeit copy OKA-38 "Aist" (Note 37 *)
- a total of 5709 Ju-87 "Stuka" were produced (Note 40 *)
- in 1939-45, 20087 (or almost 20 thousand - Note 69 *) FW-190 fighters were produced, while production reached its peak at the beginning of 1944, when 22 aircraft of this type were produced daily (Note 37 * and 38 * )
- 230 (Note 104 *) or 262 (Note 107 *) four-engine FW-200C "Condor" were produced before the end of WW2
in 1941, the loss of transport Ju-52s ("aunt Yu") for the first time exceeded their production - more than 500 aircraft were lost, and only 471 were produced (Note 40 *)
- having released 3225 transport Ju-52s since 1939 (1939 - 145, 1940 - 388, 1941 - 502, 1942 - 503, 1943 - 887, 1944 - 379 - Note 76 *) the German aircraft industry was forced to stop its production in 1944 (Note .40*)
- if in 1943 1028 transport aircraft were produced, including 887 Ju52 / 3m, then in 1944 this figure fell to 443, of which 379 were Ju-52 (Note 75 *)
- over the years of MV, 846 (Note 55 *) or 828 (Note 106 *) FW-189 ("Rama" - "Owl") were produced for the Luftwaffe at the factories of Germany, France and the Czech Republic
- a total of 780 scouts - spotters Hs-126 ("crutch") were released (Note 32 *). On 06/22/41, it was these single-engine parasol biplanes that made up the vast majority of the 417 German aircraft of short-range reconnaissance units, which were attached to army and tank corps (Note 34 *)
- 1433 Me-262 and 400 Me-163 - the total number of Luftwaffe jet combat aircraft produced by Germany during WW2
- German failed aircraft adopted by the Wehrmacht: 871 (or 860 - Note 108 *) attack aircraft Hs-129 (1940 release), 6500 Bf-110 (6170 - Note 37 *), 1500 Me-210 and Me- 410 (Note 15*). The Germans retrained the failed Ju-86 fighter into a strategic reconnaissance aircraft (Note 32 *). Do-217 did not become a successful night fighter (364 were produced, 200 of them in 1943) (Note 46 *). Produced in quantities of more than 1000 units (according to other sources, only 200 aircraft were produced, another 370 were at various stages of readiness, and parts and components were produced for another 800 aircraft - Note 38 *) the German He-177 heavy bomber due to numerous accidents often simply burned up in the air (Note 41 *). The Ne-129 attack aircraft turned out to be extremely unsuccessful due to heavy control, weak engine armor, weak stern weapons (Note 47 *)
- during the years of WW2, the Germans launched 198 not entirely successful, heavy six-engine military transport aircraft Me-323 from converted Gigant gliders, which at one time were intended for landing (could carry 200 paratroopers or a certain number of tanks and 88mm anti-aircraft guns) to the territory England (Notes 41* and 38*)
According to other sources, 198 Me-323 "Gigant" of all modifications were produced, another 15 were converted from gliders. Thus, the total number of aircraft built was 213 (Note 74 *)
- for 8 months (08/01/40 - 03/31/41) due to accidents and disasters, the Luftwaffe lost 575 aircraft and 1368 people died (Note 32 *)
- the most active Allied pilots made 250-400 sorties in WW2, while similar figures for German pilots fluctuated between 1000 - 2000 sorties
- by the beginning of WW2, 25% of German pilots had mastered the skill of blind piloting (Note 32 *)
- in 1941, a German fighter pilot, leaving the flight school, had more than 400 hours of total flying time, of which at least 80 hours - on a combat vehicle. After that, in the reserve air group, the graduate added another 200 hours (Note 36 *). According to other sources, each Luftwaffe graduate pilot had to independently fly 450 hours, at the end of the war only 150. Usually, during the first 100 (!) sorties, a novice was only supposed to observe the battle from the side, study the tactics, habits of the enemy and, if possible, evade from the battle (Note 72 *). In 1943, the training time for a German pilot was reduced from 250 to 200 hours, which was half that of the British and Americans. In 1944, the training time for a German pilot was reduced to 20 hours of piloting training (Note 26 *)
- during the Second World War there were 36 German pilots, each of whom shot down more than 150 Soviet aircraft and about 10 Soviet pilots, each of whom shot down 50 or more German aircraft (Note 9 * and 56 *). Another 104 German pilots shot down 100 or more enemy aircraft (Note 56 *)
- the ammunition of the Bf-109F fighter is enough for 50 seconds of continuous firing from machine guns and 11 seconds from the MG-151 cannon (Note 13*)
USAF:
- out of 9584 Aircobra fighters produced before the production was discontinued in 1944, about 5 thousand were delivered to the USSR under Lend-Lease (Note 22 *)
- after WW1, in November 1918, 1172 "flying boats" were in service in the USA (Note 41 *)
- at the beginning of WW2, the USA had 1576 combat aircraft (Note 31 *), of which 489 fighters (Note 70 *)
- over the years of WW2, the US aviation industry produced over 13 thousand "Warhawks", 20 thousand "Wildcat" and "Hellcat", 15 thousand "Thunderbolt" and 12 (or 15 - Note 109 *) thousand "Mustang" (Note .42*)
- 13 (12726 - Note 104 *) thousand B-17 "Flying Fortress" bombers were produced in WW2 (Note 41 *), of which 3219 were shot down in the European theater (Note 59 *)
- 5815 B-25 Mitchell bombers were produced during the war, of which 862 were delivered under Lend-Lease to the USSR (Note 115 *)
- in total, in 1942-44, losses during sorties over Romania amounted to 399 aircraft, incl. 297 four-engine bombers, of which 223 were shot down during raids on Ploiesti. 1706 pilots and crew members died and went missing, 1123 people were captured (Note 27 *)
- by March 1944, the 15th US Air Force (based in England) had about 1500 bombers and 800 fighters (Note 27)
British Air Force:
- 759 (of which 93 monoplanes) aircraft were fighter aircraft of England in 1938 (Note 70 *)
- if in October 1937 England produced 24 "Spitfire" and 13 "Hurrycane" monthly, then in September 1939 already 32 "Spitfire" and 44 "Hurrycane" (Note 79 *)
- at the beginning of WW2, the British Air Force had 1000 fighters, a little more than half of which were modern "Hurrycane" and "Spitfire" (Note 79 *)
- 09/01/1939 England began WW2 with 1992 combat aircraft (Note 31 *)
- the most massive English bomber 2 MB "Wellington" was produced in the amount of 11,461 aircraft (Note 51 *), and Halifax - 6000 vehicles (Note 104 *)
- already in August 1940, England produced 2 times more fighters daily than Germany. Their total number subsequently so much exceeded the number of pilots that it soon made it possible to transfer part of the aircraft for conservation or transfer to other countries under lend-lease (Note 31 *)
- from 1937 until the end of WW2, more than 20 thousand British Spitfire fighters were produced (Note 41 *)
- in total, in 1942-44, losses during sorties over Romania amounted to 44 bombers, while 38 of them were shot down during raids on Ploiesti (Note 27 *)
Air forces of other countries:
- The Hungarian Air Force on 26.06.41 had 363 combat aircraft, including 99 "Falko" CR-42 biplanes purchased from Italy (Note 88 *)
- The Italian Air Force at the beginning of WW2 Italy had 664 bombers, of which 48 Cant Z.506 seaplanes (Note 97 *), 612 SM-79 bombers, which accounted for 2/3 of all multi-engine aircraft of the Italian Air Force (Note 93 *)
- from 07/10/1940 to 09/08/1943, the Italian Air Force (Regia Aeronautica) lost 6483 aircraft, incl. 3483 fighters, 2273 bombers, torpedo bombers and transport aircraft, as well as 277 reconnaissance aircraft. 12,748 people died, went missing or died of wounds, including 1,806 officers. During the same period, according to official Italian data (more than doubtful - ed. note), 4293 enemy aircraft were destroyed during the hostilities, of which 2522 were shot down in air battles, and 1771 were destroyed on the ground (Note 65 * )
- The French Air Force on 09/01/1939 had 3335 aircraft (Note 31 *): 1200 fighters (of which 557 MS-406 - Note 91 *), 1300 bombers (of which 222 modern LeO-451 - Note 98 *) , 800 scouts, 110,000 personnel; According to other sources, by 09/03/1939, France had 3,600 aircraft, of which 1,364 were fighters. These included 535 MS.405 and MS.406, 120 MB.151 and MB.152, 169 H.75, two FK.58 and 288 twin-engine R.630 and R.631. To this we can add 410 obsolete fighters D.500, D.501, D.510, Loire-46, Blériot-Spud 510, NiD.622, NiD.629, MS.225. And already on 05/01/1940, its fighter units consisted of 1076 MS.406, 491 MB.151 and MB.152, 206 (about 300 - Note 103 *) H.75, 44 C.714 and 65 D.520. 420 of these aircraft could fight on equal terms with the German Bf-109E (Note 95 *). 40 V-156F bombers for the French naval aviation arrived from the USA (Note 111 *)
- The Japanese Air Force in 1942 had 3.2 thousand combat aircraft; and during the war years, 2426 G4M Mitsubishi twin-engine bombers were produced (Note 105 *)
- The Polish Air Force at the beginning of WW2 consisted of 400 first-line combat aircraft (in combat units), of which 130 R-11 underbone monoplane fighters and 30 R-7 biplane fighters. In total, with the reserve and training units, there were 279 fighters (173 R-11 and 106 R-7). (Note 100 *) or, according to other sources, had 1900 aircraft (Note 8 *). According to German data, the Poles had 1000 combat aircraft (Note 101 *)
- The Bulgarian Air Force in 1940 was 580 aircraft (Note 27 *)
- Romanian Air Force on 06/22/1941: 276 combat aircraft, including 121 fighters, 34 medium and 21 light bombers, 18 seaplanes and 82 reconnaissance aircraft. Another 400 aircraft were in flight schools. It makes no sense to specify the types of aircraft due to moral and physical obsolescence. On the eve of the war, the Germans retrained 1500 Romanian aviation specialists and agreed to supply modern Bf-109U and He-111E to Romania. On the eve of the war, 3 (2 - consisting of 24 aircraft - Note 87 *) squadrons were re-equipped with the new Romanian IAR-80 fighter (Note 7 *). According to other sources, 672 aircraft were the Romanian Air Force on the eve of the attack on the USSR, of which 253 aircraft were allocated to participate in hostilities on the Eastern Front (Note 27 *). Romanian 250 (205 combat-ready) aircraft (among them 35 He-111 bombers - Note 94 *), allocated against the USSR, were opposed by about 1900 Soviet aircraft (Note 27 *). On the eve of WW2, 48 SM-79 bombers were purchased in Italy (Note 93 *)
- The Yugoslav Air Force on the eve of WW2 had 45 SM-79 bombers purchased before the war in Italy (Note 93 *)
- Belgian Air Force at the beginning of WW2: 30 Hurrycane monoplane fighters (half bought in England), 97 two-seat Fox Vi biplane fighters and 22 English-built Gladiator-2 biplane fighters, 27 CR-42 biplane fighters Italian-built, 50 "Firefly" biplane fighters - an English Belgian-built project (Note 102 *), as well as 16 British-built Battle bombers (Note 110 *)
- The Finnish Air Force at the beginning of WW2 had 50 Fiat G-50 fighters purchased in Italy
- The Dutch Air Force at the beginning of WW2 had 16 Fokker T.V medium bombers, which were completely destroyed during the fighting
OTHER:
- from the statistics of the production of WW2 four-engine bombers: if the British were able to produce 6000 Halifaxes, the Germans - 230 Condors, the USSR - only 79 Pe-8s, then the USA - 12726 B-17s (Note 104 *)
- the weight of a minute salvo (continuous fire for a minute from all types of weapons) Yak-1 was 105kg, La-5 - 136kg, "Aircobra" - 204kg (Note 22 *)
- Messerschmitt spent 4500 man-hours on the production of one Bf-109, while the assembly of one Italian C.200 already took 21 thousand man-hours, or 4,6 times more (Note 65 *)
- in the "battle for England" the Germans lost 1733 aircraft (Note 30 *). According to other sources, the losses amounted to 1792 aircraft, of which 610 Bf-109 (Note 37 *) and 395 He-111 (Note 94 *). British losses amounted to 1172 aircraft: 403 Spitfires, 631 Hurricanes, 115 Blenheims and 23 Defiants (Note 37*). 10% (61 aircraft) of German Bf-109E losses fell into the English Channel due to lack of fuel (Note 79*)
- by the end of September 1940, 448 Hurricanes were shot down, and in October 1940 - another 240, in the same two months 238 Spitfires were shot down and another 135 damaged (Note 79 *)
- more than 200 P-36 fighters (Note 41 *) and 40 V-156F bombers (Note 111 *) the United States manufactured for France before WW2
- in September 1944, there is a peak in the number of allied bombers in Europe - more than 6 thousand (Note 36 *)
- 250 million aviation cartridges received under Lend-Lease were remelted (Note 9 *)
During the years of the Second World War, the Finns (VVS-Air Defense) claim 2787 (according to other sources, Finnish pilots during 1939-44 won 1809 victories, while losing 215 of their aircraft - Note 61 *), Romanians - about 1500 (about 1500, while losing 972 people killed, 838 were missing and 1167 were injured - Note 27 *), Hungarians - about 1000, Italians - by 150-200 (88 Soviet aircraft were destroyed on the ground and in the air in 18 months of fighting in the USSR according to the official statements of the Italian pilots themselves, 15 of their own were lost. A total of 2557 sorties or 72 sorties were made for each of the destroyed Soviet aircraft (Note 113 *), the Slovaks - for 10 downed Soviet aircraft. Another 638 downed Soviet aircraft are listed on combat accounts of the Slovak, Croatian and Spanish (164 victories and about 3 thousand sorties - Note 27 *) fighter squadrons. According to other sources, the German allies collectively shot down no more than 2400 Soviet aircraft (Note 23 *)
- about 3240 German fighters were destroyed on the Soviet-German front, of which 40 were accounted for by the allies of the USSR (Air Force-Air Defense of the Poles, Bulgarians and Romanians since 1944, the French from Normandie-Neman) (Note 23 *)
- on 01/01/1943, 395 German day fighters operated against Soviet 12300 aircraft, on 01/01/1944 - 13400 and 473, respectively (Note 23 *)
- after 1943, from 2/3 to 3/4 of all German aviation counteracted the aviation of the anti-Hitler coalition in Western Europe (Note 23 *) Formed at the end of 1943, 14 Soviet air armies put an end to the dominance of German aviation in the skies of the USSR (Note 9 *) . According to other sources, Soviet aviation achieved air superiority in the summer of 1944, while the Allies achieved local Normandy air superiority in June 1944 (Note 26 *)
- losses of Soviet aviation in the first days of the war: 1142 (800 were destroyed on the ground), of which: Western District - 738, Kyiv - 301, Baltic - 56, Odessa - 47. Losses of the Luftwaffe in 3 days - 244 (of which 51 in first day of the war) (Note 20*). According to other sources, as a result of German attacks on 66 front-line airfields and fierce air battles, the Red Army Air Force lost 1,200 aircraft by noon on June 22, 1941 alone (Note 67 *)
- in 1940, 21447 aircraft engines were produced in the USSR, of which less than 20% was the share of domestic developments. In 1940, the average repair life of Soviet aircraft engines was 100-150 hours, in reality - 50-70 hours, while this figure in France and Germany is 200-400 hours, in the USA - up to 600 hours (Note 16 *)
- at the beginning of the war in the European part of the USSR, the Soviet Air Force had 269 reconnaissance aircraft out of a total of 8,000 aircraft against German 219 long-range and 562 short-range reconnaissance aircraft out of a total of 3,000 aircraft (Note 10 *)
- the allied air force in the Mediterranean theater after the fall of Tunisia, estimated at 5000 aircraft, was opposed by no more than 1250 "axis" aircraft, of which roughly half were German and half were Italian. Of the German aircraft, only 320 were suitable for action, and among them 130 Messerschmitt fighters of all modifications (Note 8 *)
- Aviation of the Northern Fleet of the USSR in 1944: 456 combat-ready aircraft, of which 80 were flying boats. German aviation in Norway consisted of 205 aircraft in 1944 (Note 6 *)
- the German Air Force in France lost 1401 aircraft, the French lost only fighters - 508 (257 fighter pilots died) (Note 5 *)
- 10/20/42 for the first time, the BW-190 began to operate on the Eastern Front (Note 35 *)
- if in September 1939 the French aviation industry monthly produced about 300 combat aircraft, then by May 1940 it reached the line of 500 aircraft per month (Note 95 *)
NOTES:
(Note 1 *) - M. Maslov "YAK-1: From dawn to dusk" magazine "Wings" 2 \ 2010
(Note 2 *) - V. Reshetnikov. GSS "What was - that was"
(Note 3 *) - V. Kotelnikov "illegitimate" bomber, magazine
(Note 4 *) - "Legends of Aviation" issue No. 2 "Fighter MiG-3" "History of Aviation" 5 \ 2001
(Note 5 *) - A.Stepanov "Pyrrhic victory of the Luftwaffe in the West" magazine "Aviation History" 4 \ 2000
(Note 6 *) - V. Shchedrolosev "Destroyer "Active", magazine "Midel-Shpangout" issue 2 \ 2001
(Note 7 *) - M. Zhirokhov "At the signal" Ardyalul ", Aviation and Time magazine 6 \ 2001
(Note 8 *) - D. Pimlott "Luftwaffe - Air Force of the 3rd Reich"
(Note 9 *) - V. Avgustinovich "The battle for speed. Great War aircraft engines"
(Note 10 *) - A. Medved "Soviet reconnaissance aviation in the initial period of the war" Aviation magazine No. 8 (4 \ 2000)
(Note 11 *) - A. Efimov "The role of the Air Force in the Great Patriotic War"
(Note 12 *) - I. Bunich "Thunderstorm" Bloody games of dictators "
(Note 13 *) - M. Solonin "Barrel and hoops or when the war began"
(Note 14 *) - almanac "History of Aviation" No. 64
(Note 15 *) - A. Haruk "Destroyers of the Luftwaffe"
(Note 16 *) - V. Kotelnikov "Motors of the Great War" magazine "Wings of the Motherland" 7 \ 2002
(Note 17 *) - E. Chernikov "IL-2 - the pride of domestic aviation" magazine "Wings of the Motherland" 5 \ 2002
(Note 18 *) - V. Beshanov "The Blood-Red Army. Whose fault is it?"
(Note 19 *) - M. Solonin "The False History of the Great War"
(Note 20*) - Dossier "Collection 03\2010. Combat badges. USSR Air Force-Germany"
(Note 21 *) - V. Suvorov "Shadow of Victory"
(Note 22 *) - V. Bakursky "Air Cobra" magazine "World of technology for children" 12 \ 2005
(Note 23 *) - A. Smirnov "Falcons washed with blood"
(Note 24 *) - W. Schwabedissen "World War. 1939-1945"
(Note 25 *) - M. Filchenko "Vin comrades with Kozhedub and Marєs" evim ... "(interv" with a veteran of the VVV, Air Force Colonel Marchenko K.P.)
(Note 26 *) - M. Pavelek "Luftwaffe 1933-1945. Basic facts and figures about the Goering Air Force"
(Note 27 *) - M.Zefirov "Aces of WW2. Allies of the Luftwaffe: Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania"
(Note 28 *) - V. Shavrov "History of aircraft designs in the USSR until 1938"
(Note 29 *) - article "Fracture", Encyclopedia "World Aviation" issue No. 153
(Note 30 *) - F. Mellenthin "Tank battles. Combat use of tanks in WW2"
(Note 31 *) - V. Kotelnikov "Spitfire. The best Allied fighter"
(Note 32 *) - V. Beshanov "Flying coffins of Stalin"
(Note 33 *) - V. Ivanov "Airplanes of N.N. Polikarpov"
(Note 34 *) - M. Bykov "Combat "crutch" Friedrich Nikolaus" magazine "Arsenal-collection" 6 \ 2013
(Note 35 *) - A. Medved "Focke-Wulf" FV-190 - multipurpose fighter of the Luftwaffe "
(Note 36 *) - "Operations in Europe and the Mediterranean" magazine "World Aviation" No. 65
(Note 37 *) - D. Donald "Luftwaffe combat aircraft"
(Note 38 *) - V. Shunkov "German Aircraft WW2"
(Note 39 *) - Kuznetsov "Yak-1 - our best fighter of 1941"
(Note 40 *) - A. Firsov "Wings of the Luftwaffe. Part 4. Henschel - Junkers"
(Note 41 *) - D. Sobolev "History of aircraft 1919-45"
(Note 42 *) - K. Munson "Fighters and Bombers of the Second World War"
(Note 43 *) - B. Sokolov "M. Tukhachevsky. The life and death of the Red Marshal"
(Note 44 *) - S. Moroz "Speed, range, height" magazine "Science and Technology" 8 \ 2007
(Note 45 *) - Y. Mukhin "Aces and propaganda"
(Note 46 *) - article "Victory in the sky of France", magazine "World Aviation" No. 62
(Note 47 *) - Y. Borisov "Flying "coffin" magazine" Wings of the Motherland "8\2002
(Note 48 *) - N.Cherushev "Four steps down" magazine "Military Historical Archive" 12 \ 2002
(Note 49 *) - V. Galin "The political economy of war. The conspiracy of Europe"
(Note 50 *) - A. Speer "The Third Reich from the inside. Memoirs of the Reich Minister of War Industry"
(Note 51 *) - "Aviation collection. Special issue No. 2 \ 2002. Bombers 1939-45"
(Note 52 *) - V. Kotelnikov "Heinkel" -111. Blitzkrieg Bomber"
(Note 53 *) - M.Zefirov "Target ships. Confrontation between the Luftwaffe and the Soviet Baltic Fleet"
(Note 54 *) - "Bf-109f. Militant Friedrich" magazine "World Aviation" No. 52
(Note 55 *) - A. Zablotsky "In the sight of FW-189"
(Note 56 *) - F. Cheshko "Eastern Front: "Aces" against "experts" magazine "Science and Technology" 6 \ 2012
(Note 57 *) - S. Manukyan "How the war began" magazine "Science and Technology" 6\2012
(Note 58 *) - A.Isaev "Operation" Bagration: Blitzkrieg to the West "Popular Mechanics" magazine 5 \ 2014
(Note 59 *) - "B-17.Flying Fortress. Operations in Europe-part 2" magazine "World Aviation" No. 52
(Note 60 *) - I. Drogovoz "Air Fleet of the Country of Soviets"
(Note 61 *) - M.Zefirov "Aces of World War II. Allies of the Luftwaffe: Estonia, Latvia, Finland"
(Note 62 *) - A. Zablotsky "To aim for transport in ports" magazine "Aviapark" 2 \ 2009
(Note 63 *) - A. Chechin "MiG-3: speed and height" magazine "Model designer" 5 \ 2013
(Note 64 *) - "100 battles that changed the world. air war on the Eastern Front" No. 141
(Note 65 *) - M.Zefirov "Aces of World War II. Allies of the Luftwaffe: Italy"
(Note 66 *) - A. Zablotsky "Catalina seaplanes in Soviet naval aviation during the war years" Science and Technology magazine 1 \ 2013
(Note 67 *) - "History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union"
(Note 68 *) - collection "Air collection: fighter I-153 "Seagull" 1 \ 2014
(Note 69 *) - Yu. Kuzmin "How many FV-190s were in total" Aviation and Cosmonautics magazine 3 \ 2014
(Note 70 *) - A.Stepanov "Development of Soviet aviation in the pre-war period"
(Note 71 *) - "Encyclopedia of WW2. Opening of a second front (spring-summer 1944)"
(Note 72 *) - S. Slavin "Secret weapon of the Third Reich"
(Note 73 *) - Y. Mukhin "Blitzkrieg - how it's done"
(Note 74 *) - C. Ailesby "Plan Barbarossa"
(Note 75 *) - D. Degtev "Wehrmacht air cabs. Luftwaffe transport aviation 1939-45"
(Note 76 *) - A. Zablotsky "Air bridges of the Third Reich"
(Note 77 *) - O. Greyg "Stalin could attack first"
(Note 78 *) - A. Osokin "The Great Secret of the Great Patriotic War"
(Note 79 *) - F. Funken "The Encyclopedia of weapons and military costume. WW2. 1939-45 (2 hours)"
(Note 80 *) - magazine "Sea Collection" 5 \ 2005
(Note 81 *) - Y. Sokolov "The Truth about the Great Patriotic War"
(Note 82 *) - N. Yakubovich "Soviet "mosquito" or how to become a deputy people's commissar", magazine "Wings of the Motherland" 01 \ 1995
(Note 83 *) - A. Haruk "All Luftwaffe aircraft"
(Note 84 *) - V. Dashichev "Strategic planning of aggression against the USSR", magazine "Military History Journal" 3 \ 1991
(Note 85 *) - M. Maslov "The Seagulls" went halfway", the magazine "Aviation and Cosmonautics" 9 \ 1996
(Note 86 *) - P. Pospelov "History of the Great Patriotic War in the USSR 1941-45" v.2
(Note 87 *) - S. Kolov "In the backyard of the Luftwaffe" magazine "Wings of the Motherland" 10 \ 1996
(Note 88 *) - S. Ivannikov "Hawk" - an aged chick", magazine "Wings of the Motherland" 05 \ 1996
(Note 89 *) - E. Podolny "Black Sea "Seagull", magazine "Wings of the Motherland" 05 \ 1996
(Note 90 *) - V. Ivanov "Wings over the Baltic", magazine "Wings of the Motherland" 3 \ 1996
(Note 91 *) - V. Kotelnikov "Trace" Werewolf ", magazine" Wings of the Motherland "3 \ 1999
(Note 92 *) - N. Kudrin "Aircraft with an enviable fate", magazine "Wings of the Motherland" 10 \ 1999
(Note 93 *) - S. Kolov "Humpback "hawk" Marchetti", magazine "Wings of the Motherland" 2 \ 2000
(Note 94 *) - S. Kolov "Classic "Heinkel", magazine "Wings of the Motherland" 3 \ 2000
(Note 95 *) - V. Kotelnikov "Fighters of France", magazine "Wings of the Motherland" 5 \ 2000
(Note 96 *) - V. Alekseenko "In the harsh years of the war", the magazine "Wings of the Motherland" 5 \ 2000
(Note 97 *) - S. Ivantsov "Large "diamond" of the Mediterranean", magazine "Wings of the Motherland" 9 \ 1998
(Note 98 *) - S. Kolov "Many-faced "Frenchman", magazine "Wings of the Motherland" 5 \ 2001
(Note 99 *) - M. Morozov "How the Skagerrak was missed" magazine "Arsenal-Collection" 8\2013
(Note 100 *) - V. Kotelnikov "On the eve of the Second World War", magazine "Wings of the Motherland" 4 \ 2001
(Note 101 *) - E. Manstein "Missed Victories"
(Note 102 *) - V. Kotelnikov "Fighters of Belgium", magazine "Wings of the Motherland" 1 \ 2002
(Note 103 *) - V. Kotelnikov "Model 75", magazine "Wings of the Motherland" 2 \ 2002
(Note 104 *) - Y. Smirnov "Hero of "shuttle operations", magazine "Wings of the Motherland" 6 \ 2002
(Note 105 *) - S. Kolov "Cigar" of the company "Mitsubishi", magazine "Wings of the Motherland" 1 \ 2003
(Note 106 *) - S. Sazonov "Big-eyed owl" or "flying frame", magazine "Wings of the Motherland" 8 \ 2002
(Note 107*) - N. Soiko "Flight of the Condor", magazine "Wings of the Motherland" 1\2003
(Note 108 *) - E. Podolny "Attack aircraft that rushed to the front", magazine "Wings of the Motherland" 5 \ 2004
(Note 109 *) - S. Kolov "Long life of the Mustang", magazine "Wings of the Motherland" 9 \ 2004
(Note 110 *) - S. Kolov "Fairy "Battle" - an elegant loser", magazine "Wings of the Motherland" 11 \ 1998
(Note 111 *) - S. Kolov "Quickly aged defender", magazine "Wings of the Motherland" 5 \ 2006
(Note 112 *) - V. Alekseenko "In the harsh years of the war", magazine "Wings of the Motherland" 5 \ 2000
(Note 113 *) - S. Kedrov "Makki" - avid warriors", magazine "Wings of the Motherland" 6 \ 1999
(Note 114 *) - S. Kolov "Classic "Heinkel", magazine "Wings of the Motherland" 3 \ 2000
(Note 115 *) - collection " Long-range aviation Russia"
Victory certainly has absolutely importance in war, but the face of the victorious state depends on the price that was paid for it. In this case, the price of victory in the air can be determined primarily by the number of lost crews and aircraft during the period of combat operations. The cost of victory in the air is the most important criterion for the level of combat skill and military art of command personnel and flight crews, which determines the winner as having achieved victory with much fewer losses than the enemy.
Unfortunately, we have to reckon with the fact that the price for the victory of the Soviet Union in the Great Patriotic War was paid very, very high. The victory in the air did not become in this regard some absolutely separate indicator. Judge for yourself.
If from the Red Army Air Force on the Soviet-German front 129,400 aircraft participated in the hostilities, which made 3.8 million sorties (29 on average per aircraft), then from the German Air Force - 48,450, which made 1, 8 million sorties (37 on average per aircraft).
During the war years on the Soviet-German front, the ratio of aircraft losses was 1 to 1.15. If the combat losses of the KA Air Force amounted to 46,100, and not combat losses - 60,300, then the German Air Force on the Soviet-German front lost 52,850 aircraft, and in total since 1941 - 85,650 aircraft on the Eastern and Western fronts.
According to Germany itself, losses in aircraft of the German Air Force, taking into account damage from 10% to the complete destruction of the aircraft, for the entire Second World War, from 09/01/39, amount to 71965.
Moreover, if the aircraft industry of the USSR produced only 122,100 aircraft from 1941 to 1945, then the aircraft industry of Germany - 100,749. According to other sources - 113,514. Therefore, we can talk about more aircraft produced and fewer combat losses by the Soviet Union .
However, we must not forget that Germany fought on two fronts: since 1939 - 64 months, and its non-combat losses were several times less than the losses of the Air Force of the spacecraft, which can generally indicate a high level of aircraft technology and an equally high level of training aircrew of the Luftwaffe.
If the irretrievable losses of the flight personnel of the Air Force of the Spacecraft from 1941 to 1945 amounted to 48,158, including 28,193 pilots, then Germany lost more than 66 thousand people of the flight personnel on two fronts in the same period killed and missing. According to other sources, the Luftwaffe from 1939 to 1945 lost only about 24 thousand killed and 27 thousand missing.
Even based on these figures, one can imagine at what cost the victory in the air went to the Soviet Union during the Great Patriotic War.
The results of the combat operations of the Soviet Air Force in the initial period of the war were negatively affected primarily by the predominance of obsolete aircraft in their composition, the crowded deployment of aviation units and formations, and the cumbersome and slow organizational structure of front-line aviation. In addition, the level of training of the flight crew did not meet the requirements of the war.
Forcing the growth of the number of aviation personnel occurred at the expense of the quality of their training, which, in turn, led to a decrease in the combat capability and combat readiness of air units and air formations. On the eve of the war, the commanding staff of the Air Force turned out to be unsure of itself. The flight crew was slowly retrained for new combat equipment, was poorly prepared for flights in difficult weather conditions, at night, for the combat use of complex types of maneuver. The combat experience gained in military conflicts of the interwar period did not fit well with the conditions of modern warfare, and, moreover, when generalized, led to incorrect conclusions, primarily in the tactics of aviation branches.
All this led to high losses of Soviet aviation in the first two years of the war, increasing the "price of victory" of the Red Army Air Force.
Despite the fact that the size of the aircraft fleet of the KA Air Force was constantly increasing due to the growth in the volume of aircraft received from the aircraft industry and under Lend-Lease, the composition of the German Air Force grouping on the Soviet-German front was actually consistently reduced. As a result, this led to a twofold or more numerical superiority of the air group of the Soviet Air Force starting from 1943 in all strategic operations. By the end of the war, the number of new types of aircraft increased to almost 97%.
During the war years, the Air Force of the spacecraft received a number of modern aircraft that were not inferior to similar aircraft in Germany. The Soviet aviation industry managed to seriously improve the combat qualities of aircraft without increasing their weight.
In addition, Soviet aircraft, born just before the war, had reserves for modification, while the German aircraft, created much earlier, had actually exhausted such opportunities already at the beginning of the war. At the same time, shortcomings in combat use, organization of interaction and control of aviation in individual operations contributed to an increase in unjustified losses of spacecraft aviation and undoubtedly affected the cost of victory.
One of the reasons for the high losses can also be called the lack of centralized leadership of the Soviet Air Force. The division of aviation, before the creation of air armies, into army and front-line aviation prevented the massing of front-line aviation in the main directions.
A huge role in the Air Force personnel training system was played by the formation of reserve and training air regiments, the in-line pilot training system and the reduction of training periods in aviation schools and colleges. In essence, on the one hand, these measures were justified under those conditions. On the other hand, they can also be attributed to the factor of increasing losses.
Researchers of VVS spacecraft losses indicate that many of them resulted from significant shortcomings in the theory and practice of the combat use of the VVS. The lack of initiative in the SC Air Force in the initial period of the war led to its huge losses. In addition to errors in the theory of the construction and use of the Air Force, one can also pay attention to the neglect of the experience of the war taking place in the West. This is especially true for air supremacy and the practice of distributing the main efforts of the Luftwaffe according to tasks.
The most important is the fact that the fight against enemy aircraft was carried out, as a rule, by fighter aircraft, covering the most important groupings of front troops and providing other branches of aviation.
At the same time, for a number of reasons, such active actions as hunting, blocking airfields, imposing air battles, in contrast to the enemy, were carried out extremely rarely. It can be said that almost completely in Soviet aviation there were no radar sights and electronic warfare equipment, which, in turn, imposed significant restrictions on the use of the Air Force both at night and in difficult weather conditions. And this also led to unjustified losses ...
Thus, it can be argued that the KA Air Force suffered significant combat losses and even more significant non-combat losses.
N. Bodrikhin considers the amazing results of the Luftwaffe aces untenable. He's writing: “After all, the results of the combat work of more than 40 thousand fighter pilots alone, who fought on the side of Germany during the Second World War, are described by the law of normal distribution, and if we assume that the best of them really won the declared number of victories (352 - E. Hartman, 301 - G. Barnhorn, 13 more pilots - over 200.88 - more than 100, etc.), then the total number of aircraft shot down in air battles will exceed the actual number by several times. He claims, “that the losses of Allied aircraft in World War II, according to American data, consisted of non-combat losses (40-50%), losses from anti-aircraft artillery fire (15-20%), the number of those shot down in air battles (20-30%) and lost at the airfields. (7-12%).
In this case, the losses of aircraft of the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition in air battles in the European theater should not exceed 30-35 thousand aircraft, and the estimated number of Luftwaffe shot down by pilots exceeds 60-80 thousand.
Of course, patriotism is a good and necessary thing. Today it is just not enough. But as for the historical past, in this regard, the truth is still more expensive. Studies show that Germany, by the nature of the losses of the Air Force, lost 57% in air battles, or 30125 aircraft on the Soviet-German front, 17% were the losses of aircraft at airfields (8984) and 26% - from anti-aircraft artillery fire.
Therefore, in this case, the American data are not suitable for assessing the loss criterion for both the German Air Force and the KA Air Force.
It should be noted that the method of destroying enemy aircraft in the air was most widely used during the war years. This method accounts for 96% of all sorties carried out by Soviet aviation in the struggle for air supremacy. In this case, the Luftwaffe pilots during the Second World War could well have won about 70 thousand victories, including 25 thousand on the Western Front and 45 thousand on the Eastern. However, some researchers claim that the real numbers of victories for Luftwaffe pilots are 19,000 on the Western Front, and about 32,000 on the Eastern. In total, about 5,000 German pilots had five or more victories to their credit.
The list of Soviet aces includes more than 2,000 names, of which about 800 pilots achieved 15 or more victories, another 400 - from 10 to 15, and about 200 pilots shot down 20 or more enemy aircraft.
In no case should we forget that after the First World War in the young Republic of Soviets, and then in the Soviet Union, there was no continuity of generations in the field of fighter aviation. There was no school... We started from scratch. In Germany, on the contrary, much attention was paid to the training of fighter pilots. They perfectly understood their value in a future war, which means they valued them. And the question of succession as such was not raised at all. It is not surprising that in this case the German ace was primarily an individualist and, if you like, a "hunter". He was not afraid of improvisations in tactics in the name of air victory.
In the Air Force of the spacecraft for "hunting" the smallest number of sorties was carried out. For example, in the 28th IAP, in which I happened to serve as a lieutenant after school, only 86 sorties were made for this task (in 1944 - 48, in 1945 - 38). Of the 14,045 sorties, this is only 6%.
According to the authoritative opinion of the Hero of the Soviet Union, General G.A. Baevsky, “the Luftwaffe was not only a group of outstanding pilots, they, and the leading aces of Germany A. Galland and E. Hartman agreed with this, also had “thousands of young, unknown German pilots who died without winning a single battle!"
This once again shows how difficult the profession of a fighter pilot is. The French fighter pilot Pierre Huystermann, in principle, shares this opinion: “There seemed to be no “middle” in the Luftwaffe, and German pilots could be divided into two quite clear categories.
Aces, making up 15-20% of the total number of pilots, really outnumbered the average Allied pilots. And the rest did not deserve special attention. Courageous, but unable to get the most out of their aircraft. The reason for this was primarily a hasty selection due to heavy losses in the "Battle of England" and in the Russian campaign. Their training was very short and not very well balanced; paramount importance was given to the education of morale, devotion to the great German idea and adherence to military theories, while underestimating technical instruction. From the end; In 1943, an acute shortage of fuel was added to these errors. So there was, gradually suffering huge losses in severe trials in the skies of Europe, the heroic detachment of "experienced people" of the Luftwaffe, real veterans with three or four thousand hours of flight behind them. These pilots, who had gone through the school of the Spanish Civil War and survived the successful Luftwaffe campaigns since 1940, knew their job thoroughly, in all subtleties - cautious and self-confident pilots, they were very dangerous.
On the other hand, there were young fanatics with high morale and bound by iron discipline, who could be sent into battle relatively easily in many difficult circumstances.
In general, in late 1944 and early 1945, the average standard of German fighter pilots was much higher than at any other time since 1940. This can be explained - in addition to the importance of combat morale and a sense of patriotism - by the fact that elite units of fighter pilots had unsurpassed authority and primacy in everything - until the distribution of fuel and lubricants.
The 28th IAP during the war years destroyed only 511 aircraft and at the same time lost 56 pilots.
During the war years, the 5th Guards IAP won 539 confirmed victories and at the same time lost 89 pilots (36 in air battles, 23 did not return from a combat mission, 7 died from anti-aircraft artillery fire, 7 died during bombing, attack and shelling, 16 - in disasters).
During the war, the 32nd IAP destroyed 518 enemy aircraft and lost 61 pilots.
The 9th IAP shot down 558 enemy aircraft in total.
The most productive regiment in the Red Army Air Force was the 402nd Red Banner Sevastopol IAP, which destroyed 810 enemy aircraft in battle.
So why couldn't the most effective fighter squadron of the Luftwaffe (52nd) destroy 10,000 aircraft during the war years? After all, you need to divide into three groups, in our opinion - into three regiments. And it will turn out more than three thousand per group, per regiment. At the same time, one squadron in the Luftwaffe was so productive, and not all. Why not agree ... For example, in another elite fighter squadron ("Green Heart" - 54th) from June 22, 1941 to 1945, 416 pilots did not return from combat missions. In 1942, 93 pilots were lost there, in 1943 - 112, and in 1944 - 109. And in the very first month of the war in Russia, from June 22 to July 22, 1941, 37 pilots of this squadron (out of 112 included in it according to the list) were killed or went missing. That is, in each regiment or group, on average, more than ten per unit.
For example, in 1943, Major Hans Hann (108 victories) was captured from this squadron on February 21, Lieutenant Hans Beisswenger (152 victories) was shot down and died on March 17, Major Reinhard Seyler (109 victories) was also shot down on July 5 , and Lieutenant Max Stotz (189 victories) jumped out with a parachute and was captured on August 19. We still believe that if a German pilot was shot down with so many victories, then he could not have had so many.
In the Soviet Union, only 2332 pilots were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Of these, in fighter aircraft 810 (35%). Only twice - 61. Of these, 22 (36%) in fighter aviation. Only three times - 2, and all in IA.
In Germany, 1730 pilots became holders of the Knight's Cross. Of these, 568 (33%) are in fighter aviation.
The Oak Branch was awarded to 192 pilots. Of these, 120 (63%) are in fighter aviation; "swords" - 41, including 25 (61%) in fighter aviation; "diamonds" - 12, including - 9 (75%) in fighter aviation.
And here we see a similar restraint in awarding aces pilots on both sides. And here and there they did not hang high awards to just anyone. This means that Goebbels' propaganda did not finish, since in the Third Reich Knight's crosses should have been poured several times more. At two or three! But no. In two countries, awards were usually given for a certain number of victories, and each victory, as you know, had a high price.
MILITARY AVIATION IN FIGURES
Updated - 11/22/2013
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Reformatted the topic into a group of sections for each of the main participating countries and cleaned up duplicates, similar information and information that caused frank doubts.
Air Force of Tsarist Russia:
- during the years of WW1, 120-150 captured German and Austrian aircraft were captured. Most - double reconnaissance, fighters and twin-engine aircraft were rare (Note 28 *)
- at the end of 1917, the Russian army had 91 squadrons of 1109 aircraft, of which:
available at the fronts - 579 (428 serviceable, 137 faulty, 14 obsolete), 237 loaded for the front and 293 in schools. This number did not include up to 35 aircraft of the Squadron of Air Ships, 150 aircraft of naval aviation, aircraft of rear services, 400 aircraft of air fleets and in reserve. The total number of aircraft was estimated at 2200-2500 military aircraft (Note 28 *)
USSR Air Force:
- in 1937 there were 18 aviation schools in the Red Army, in 1939 - 32, on 05/01/1941 - already 100
(Note 32*)
- order No. 080 dated 03.1941: the training period for flight personnel is 9 months in peacetime and 6 months in wartime, flying hours for cadets on training and combat aircraft is 20 hours for fighters and 24 hours for bombers (a Japanese suicide bomber in 1944 was supposed to have 30 flight hours) (Note 12*)
- in 1939, the Red Army had 8139 combat aircraft, of which 2225 were fighters (Note 41 *)
- 09/01/1939 the USSR had 12677 combat aircraft at the beginning of WW2 (Note 31 *)
- for the summer of 1940, there were 38 air divisions in the Red Army, and by 01/01/1941 they should have become and became 50
(Note 9*)
- only in the period from 01/01/1939 to 06/22/1941, the Red Army received 17745 combat aircraft, of which 3719 were new types, not inferior in basic parameters to the best Luftwaffe vehicles (Note 43 *). According to other sources, at the beginning of the war there were 2739 aircraft of the latest types Yak-1, MIG-3, LAGG-3, PE-2, of which half were in the western military districts (Note 11 *)
- on 01/01/1940, there were 12,540 combat aircraft in the western military districts, excluding long-range bomber aircraft. By the end of 1940, these figures had almost doubled to 24,000 combat aircraft. The number of only training aircraft was increased to 6800 (Note 12 *)
- on 01/01/1941, the Red Army Air Force had 26,392 aircraft, of which 14,628 combat and 11,438 training aircraft. Moreover, 10565 (8392 combat) were built in 1940 (Note 32 *)
- at the beginning of the Second World War, 79 air divisions and 5 air brigades were formed, of which 32 air divisions, 119 air regiments and 36 corps squadrons were part of the Western Military District. Long-range bomber aviation in the western direction was represented by 4 air corps and 1 separate air division in the amount of 1546 aircraft. The number of air regiments by June 1941 increased by 80% compared to the beginning of 1939 (Note 11 *)
- WWII met 5 heavy bomber corps, 3 separate air divisions and one separate regiment of Soviet long-range bomber aviation - about 1000 aircraft, of which 2\\3 were lost during the six months of the war. By the summer of 1943, long-range bomber aviation consisted of 8 air corps and numbered more than 1000 aircraft and crews. (Note 2*)
- 1528 DB-3 long-range bombers were built in 1941 (Note 44 *)
- 818 TB-3 heavy bombers were produced at the beginning of the Second World War (Note 41 *)
- by the beginning of the war, there were 2739 aircraft of the latest types Yak-1, MIG-3, LAGG-3, PE-2, of which half were in the western military districts (Note 11 *). On 06/22/41, the Air Force received 917 MiG-3s (486 pilots retrained), 142 Yak-1s (156 pilots retrained), 29 Laggs (90 pilots retrained) (Note 4*)
- in the units of the Air Force of the Red Army of the border military districts at the beginning of the war there were 7139 combat aircraft, 1339 long-range bomber aircraft, 1445 - in the aviation of the Navy, which totaled 9917 aircraft
- on the eve of the war, only in the European part of the USSR there were 20 thousand aircraft, of which 17 thousand combat aircraft (Note 12 *)
- by the spring of 1942, the USSR reached the pre-war level of aircraft production - at least 1000 combat aircraft per month. From June 1941 to December 1944, the USSR produced 97 thousand aircraft
- from the second half of 1942, the Soviet industry reached the production line of 2500 aircraft per month with a total monthly loss of 1000 aircraft (Note 9 *)
- on 06/22/1942, 85% of all Soviet long-range bomber aviation was 1789 DB-3 aircraft (from the DB-3f modification it was called IL-4), the remaining 15% - SB-3. These aircraft did not fall under the first German air strikes, as they were based relatively far from the border (Note 3 *)
- over the years of production (1936-40) 6831 Soviet SB bombers were built (Note 41 *)
- 10292 I-16 biplanes and its modifications were produced from 1934 to 1942
- on 06/22/1941, 412 Yak-1s were produced (Note 39)
- 16 thousand Yak-9s were produced during the war
- IL-2 was the most massive attack aircraft of the Second World War. From 1941 to 1945, 36 thousand of them were produced. (Note 41 * and 37 *) Losses of attack aircraft during the war years amounted to about 23 thousand.
- during the years of the Second World War, 11 thousand Soviet attack pilots died (Note 25 *)
- in 1944, in parts for each Soviet attack pilot, there were two aircraft (Note 17 *)
- the life of an attack aircraft lasted an average of 10-15 sorties, and 25% of the pilots went down on the first flight, while at least 10 sorties were required to destroy one German tank (Note 9 *)
- the USSR received 18.7 thousand aircraft from the USA under Lend-Lease (Note 34 *), of which: 2243 P-40 "Curtiss", 2771 A-20 "Douglas Boston", 842 B-25 "Mitchell" bombers " from the USA, and 1338 "Supermarine Spitfire" and 2932 "Hurricane" - (Note 26 *) from England.
- by the beginning of 1944, the USSR had 11,000 combat aircraft, the Germans - no more than 2,000. During the 4 years of the war, the USSR built 137,271 aircraft and received 18,865 aircraft of all types, of which 638 aircraft were lost during transportation. According to other sources, at the beginning of 1944 there were 6 times more Soviet combat aircraft than all German aircraft (Note 8 *)
- on the "heavenly slug" - U-2vs fought during the Second World War about 50 air regiments (Note 33 *)
- from the monograph "1941 - lessons and conclusions": "... out of 250 thousand sorties carried out
Soviet aviation in the first three months of the war, against the enemy’s tank and motorized columns ... "The record month for the Luftwaffe was June 1942, when (according to the Soviet VNOS posts) 83,949 sorties of combat aircraft of all types were carried out. In other words," defeated and destroyed on the ground "Soviet aviation flew in the summer of 1941 with an intensity that the Germans were able to achieve in only one month during the entire war (Note 13 *)
- The average survivability of Soviet pilots during World War II:
fighter pilot - 64 sorties
attack aircraft pilot - 11 sorties
bomber pilot - 48 sorties
torpedo bomber pilot - 3.8 sorties (Note 45 *)
- the accident rate in the Red Army Air Force on the eve of the Second World War was huge - on average, 2-3 aircraft crashed per day. This situation was largely preserved during the war. It is no coincidence that during the war, non-combat losses of aircraft were over 50% (Note 9 *)
- "unaccounted for loss" - 5240 Soviet aircraft remaining at the airfields after they were captured by the Germans in 1941
- the average monthly losses of the Red Army Air Force from 1942 to May 1945 amounted to 1000 aircraft, of which non-combat ones - over 50%, and in 1941 combat losses amounted to 1700 aircraft, and total - 3500 per month (Note 9 *)
- non-combat losses of Soviet military aviation in the Second World War amounted to 60,300 aircraft (56.7%) (Note 32 *)
- in 1944, the losses of Soviet military aviation amounted to 24,800 vehicles, of which 9,700 were combat losses, and 15,100 were non-combat losses (Note 18 *)
- from 19 to 22 thousand Soviet fighters were lost in the Second World War (Note 23 *)
- in accordance with the Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 632-230ss of 03/22/1946 "On the rearmament of the Air Force, air defense fighter aircraft and naval aviation with modern domestic-made aircraft": "... withdraw from service in 1946 and write off: foreign fighter aircraft types, including Airacobra - 2216 aircraft, Thunderbolt - 186 aircraft, Kingcobra - 2344 aircraft, Kittyhawk - 1986 aircraft, Spitfire - 1139 aircraft, Hurricane - 421 aircraft.Total: 7392 aircraft and 11937 obsolete domestic aircraft (Note 1 *)
German Air Force:
- during the German offensive of 1917, up to 500 Russian aircraft became German trophies (Note 28 *)
- according to the Treaty of Versailles, Germany had to scrap 14 thousand of its aircraft after the end of WW1 (Note 32 *)
- serial production of the first combat aircraft in Nazi Germany began only in 1935-1936 (Note 13 *). So in 1934, the German government adopted a plan to build 4,000 aircraft by 09/30/1935. Among them there was nothing but junk (Note 52 *)
- 03/01/1935 - official recognition of the Luftwaffe. There were 2 regiments of Ju-52 and Do-23 (Note 52 *)
- 771 German fighters were produced in 1939 (Note 50 *)
- in 1939, Germany produced 23 combat aircraft daily, in 1940 - 27, and in 1941 - 30 aircraft (Note 32 *) By the spring of 1942, Germany was producing up to 160 aircraft per month
- 09/01/1939 Germany began WW2 with 4093 aircraft (of which 1502 bombers) (Note 31 *)
- on the eve of the Second World War, Germany had 6852 aircraft, of which 3909 aircraft of all types were allocated to attack the USSR. This number included 313 transport workers and 326 communications aircraft. Of the remaining 3270 combat aircraft: 965 fighters (almost equally - Bf-109e and BF-109f), 102 fighter-bombers (Bf-110), 952 bombers, 456 attack aircraft and 786 reconnaissance aircraft (Note 32 *). According to other sources, on June 22, 1941, the Germans concentrated against the USSR; 1037 (including 400 combat-ready) Bf-109 fighters; 179 Bf-110 as reconnaissance and light bombers, 893 bombers (281 He-111, 510 Ju-88, 102 Do-17), attack aircraft - 340 Ju-87, reconnaissance aircraft - 120. Total - 2534 (of which about 2000 combat-ready ). As well as 1000 aircraft of the German allies
- after the transfer in December 1941 of 250-300 aircraft of the 2nd Air Corps from the USSR for operations in the region of Malta and North Africa, the total number of Luftwaffe on the Soviet front was reduced from 2465 aircraft on 12/01/1941 to 1700 aircraft on 12/31/1941. In January 1942, the number of German aircraft was further reduced after the transfer of aircraft of the 5th Air Corps to Belgium (Note 29 *)
- in 1942, Germany produced 8.4 thousand combat aircraft. According to other sources, the Germans produced only up to 160 aircraft per month.
- in 1943, the average monthly Germany produced 849 fighters (Note 49 *)
- 84320 aircraft of all types were produced in Germany in 1941-45. (Note 24 *) - in total, 57 thousand German aircraft of all types were destroyed during the years of WW2
- 1190 seaplanes were produced by the German aviation industry during WW2 (Note 38): 541 of them Arado 196a
- 2500 Storch liaison aircraft were built in total. According to other sources, 2871 Fi-156 "Storch" ("Aist") was produced, and in the summer of 1941 the Germans seized a factory for the production of its Soviet counterfeit copy OKA-38 "Aist" (Note 37 *)
- German bomber Ju-88 was released total number 15100 aircraft (Note 38*)
- 1433 jet Me-262s were produced in Germany during WW2 (Note 21 *)
- a total of 5709 Ju-87 "Stuka" (Note 40*) and 14676 Ju-88 (Note 40* and 37*) were produced
- for 1939-45, 20087 FW-190 fighters were produced, while production reached its peak at the beginning of 1944, when 22 aircraft of this type were produced daily (Note 37 * and 38 *)
- during the years of WW2, 35 thousand German Bf-109 fighters were produced (Note 14 * and 37 *)
- having released 3225 transport Ju-52s ("aunt Yu") since 1939, the German aircraft industry was forced to stop its production in 1944 (Note 40 *)
- during the war years, 846 "frames" - FВ-189 fire spotters were produced at Czech aviation enterprises for the Luftwaffe. In the USSR, this type of aircraft was not produced at all.
- a total of 780 scouts - spotters Hs-126 ("Crutch") were released (Note 32 *)
- German unsuccessful aircraft adopted by the Wehrmacht: 871 Hs-129 attack aircraft (released in 1940), 6500 Bf-110 (6170 - Note 37 *), 1500 Me-210 and Me-410 (Note 15 *). The Germans retrained the failed Ju-86 fighter into a strategic reconnaissance aircraft (Note 32 *). Do-217 did not become a successful night fighter (364 were produced, 200 of them - in 1943) (Note 46 *). Produced in quantities of more than 1000 units (according to other sources, only 200 aircraft were produced, another 370 were at various stages of readiness, and parts and components were produced for another 800 aircraft - Note 38 *) the German He-177 heavy bomber due to numerous accidents often simply burned up in the air (Note 41 *). The Ne-129 attack aircraft turned out to be extremely unsuccessful due to heavy control, weak engine armor, weak stern weapons (Note 47 *)
- in 1945, the share of fighters from all military aviation produced in Germany was 65.5%, in 1944 - 62.3% (Note 41 *)
- during the years of WW2, the Germans launched 198 not entirely successful, heavy six-engine military transport aircraft Me-323 from converted Gigant gliders, which at one time were intended for landing (could carry 200 paratroopers or a certain number of tanks and 88mm anti-aircraft guns) to the territory England (Notes 41* and 38*)
- in 1941, the loss of transport Ju-52s for the first time exceeded their production - more than 500 aircraft were lost, and only 471 were produced (Note 40 *)
- 273 Ju-87s acted against the USSR, while Poland was attacked by 348 Ju-87s (Note 38 *)
- for 8 months (08/01/40 - 03/31/41) due to accidents and disasters, the Luftwaffe lost 575
aircraft and 1368 people died (Note 32 *)
- the most active Allied pilots made 250-400 sorties in WW2, while similar figures for German pilots fluctuated between 1000 - 2000 sorties
- by the beginning of WW2, 25% of German pilots had mastered the skill of blind piloting (Note 32 *)
- in 1941, a German fighter pilot, leaving flight school, had more than 400 hours of total
flight hours, of which at least 80 hours - on a combat vehicle. After in the reserve air group, a graduate
added another 200 hours (Note 32*)
- during the Second World War there were 36 German pilots, each of whom shot down more than 150 Soviet aircraft and about 10 Soviet pilots, each of whom shot down 50 or more German aircraft (Note 9 *)
- the ammunition of the Bf-109F fighter is enough for 50 seconds of continuous firing from machine guns and 11 seconds from the MG-151 cannon (Note 13*)
- the V-2 rocket consisted of 45 thousand parts, Germany was able to produce up to 400 rockets of this type every month
- out of 4,300 V-2 rockets, more than 2,000 exploded on the ground or in the air during launch or left
building during the flight. Only 50% of the rockets hit a circle with a diameter of 10 km (Note 27*). In total, 2419 V-missile strikes were recorded on London, and 2448 on Antwerp. Of those fired at targets, 25% of the missiles reached their target. In total, 30 thousand V-1 rockets were manufactured. In 1945, the speed of V-1 rockets reached about 800 km\\h. (Note 9*)
- 06/14/1944 the first V-2 fell on London. Of the 10492 V-2s fired at London, 2419 flew to the target. Another 1115 rockets exploded in southern England (Note 35 *)
- from carrier aircraft Non-111 (N-22) by the end of 1944, 8696, 4141 and 151 V-2s were fired in Antwerp, London and Brussels, respectively (Note 35 *)
USAF:
- after WW1, in November 1918, 1172 "flying boats" were in service in the USA (Note 41 *)
- 09/01/1939, the United States had 1576 combat aircraft at the beginning of WW2 (Note 31 *)
- over the years of WW2, the US aviation industry produced over 13 thousand Warhawks, 20 thousand Wildcats and Hellcats, 15 thousand Thunderbolts and 12 thousand Mustangs (Note 42 *)
- 13 thousand American B-17 bombers were produced in WW2 (Note 41 *)
British Air Force:
- the most massive English bomber 2 MV "Wellington" was produced in the amount of 11,461 aircraft (Note 51 *)
- 09/01/1939 England began WW2 with 1992 combat aircraft (Note 31 *)
- already in August 1940, England produced 2 times more fighters daily than
Germany. Their total number subsequently so much exceeded the number of pilots that
soon allowed to transfer part of the aircraft for conservation or transfer to other countries under lend-lease (Note 31 *)
- from 1937 until the end of WW2, more than 20 thousand British Spitfire fighters were produced (Note 41 *)
Air forces of other countries:
- 09/01/1939 France began WW2 with 3335 aircraft (Note 31 *): 1200 fighters, 1300 bombers, 800 reconnaissance, 110,000 personnel
- in 1942, Japan 3.2 thousand combat aircraft
- in total, the Polish Air Force had 1900 aircraft at the beginning of the war (Note 8 *)
- Romanian Air Force on 06/22/1941: 276 combat aircraft, including 121 fighters, 34 medium and 21 light bombers, 18 seaplanes and 82 reconnaissance aircraft. Another 400 aircraft were in flight schools. It makes no sense to specify the types of aircraft due to moral and physical obsolescence. Romanian 250 (205 combat-ready) aircraft allocated against the USSR were opposed by about 1900 Soviet aircraft. On the eve of the war, the Germans retrained 1500 Romanian aviation specialists and agreed to supply modern Bf-109u and He-110e to Romania. On the eve of the war, 3 squadrons were re-equipped with the new Romanian IAR-80 fighter (Note 7 *)
OTHER:
- in the "battle for England" the Germans lost 1733 aircraft (Note 30 *). According to other sources, the losses amounted to 1,792 aircraft, of which 610 were Bf-109s. The losses of the British amounted to 1172 aircraft: 403 Spitfires, 631 Hurricanes, 115 Blenheims and 23 Defiants (Note 37 *)
- more than 200 US P-36 fighters were manufactured for France before WW2 (Note 41*)
- in September 1944, there is a peak in the number of allied bombers in Europe - more than 6 thousand (Note 36 *)
- 250 million aviation cartridges received under Lend-Lease were remelted (Note 9 *)
- during the years of the Second World War, the Finns (VVS-Air Defense) claim 2787, the Romanians - about 1500, the Hungarians - about 1000, the Italians - 150-200, the Slovaks - 10 downed Soviet aircraft. Another 638 downed Soviet aircraft are on the combat accounts of the Slovak, Croatian and Spanish fighter squadrons. According to other sources, together the German allies shot down no more than 2400 Soviet aircraft (Note 23 *)
- about 3240 German fighters were destroyed on the Soviet-German front, of which 40 were accounted for by the allies of the USSR (Air Force-Air Defense of the Poles, Bulgarians and Romanians since 1944, the French from Normandie-Neman) (Note 23 *)
- on 01/01/1943, 395 German day fighters operated against Soviet 12300 aircraft, on 01/01/1944 - 13400 and 473, respectively (Note 23 *)
- after 1943, from 2\\3 to 3\\4 of all German aviation counteracted the aviation of the anti-Hitler coalition in Western Europe (Note 23 *) Formed at the end of 1943, 14 Soviet air armies put an end to the dominance of German aviation in the skies of the USSR (Note 9 * )
- losses of Soviet aviation in the first days of the war: 1142 (800 were destroyed on the ground), of which: Western District - 738, Kyiv - 301, Baltic - 56, Odessa - 47. Losses of the Luftwaffe in 3 days - 244 (of which 51 in first day of the war) (Note 20*)
- on 06/22/1941, the Germans assigned 3 bombers to attack each Soviet military airfield. The blow was delivered by 2-kilogram fragmentation bombs SD-2. The radius of destruction of the bomb is 12 meters with 50-200 fragments. A direct hit from such a bomb was equivalent to a medium-power anti-aircraft projectile (Note 22*) The Stuka attack aircraft carried 360 SD-2 bombs (Note 19*)
- in 1940, 21447 aircraft engines were produced in the USSR, of which less than 20% was the share of domestic developments. In 1940, the average repair life of Soviet aircraft engines was 100-150 hours, in reality - 50-70 hours, while this figure in France and Germany is 200-400 hours, in the USA - up to 600 hours (Note 16 *)
- at the beginning of the war in the European part of the USSR, the Soviet Air Force had 269 reconnaissance aircraft out of a total of 8,000 aircraft against German 219 long-range and 562 short-range reconnaissance aircraft out of a total of 3,000 aircraft (Note 10 *)
- the allied air force in the Mediterranean theater after the fall of Tunisia, estimated at 5000 aircraft, was opposed by no more than 1250 "axis" aircraft, of which roughly half were German and half were Italian. Of the German aircraft, only 320 were suitable for action, and among them 130 Messerschmitt fighters of all modifications (Note 8 *)
- Aviation of the Northern Fleet of the USSR in 1944: 456 combat-ready aircraft, of which 80 were flying boats. German aviation in Norway consisted of 205 aircraft in 1944 (Note 6 *)
- the German Air Force in France lost 1401 aircraft, the French lost only fighters - 508 (257 fighter pilots died) (Note 5 *)